Opinion of the Court. lished by the act of Congress, regarding that act as declarative of the general maritime law to be administered by our courts. The rule requiring the application of the general maritime law to such cases has some qualifications, which, though not affecting the present case, should always be borne in mind. One of these qualifications is, that the persons in charge of either ship will not be open to blame for following the sailing regulations and rules of navigation prescribed by their own government for their direction on the high seas; because they are bound to obey such regulations. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 184. Another qualification is, that if the maritime law, as administered by both nations to which the respective ships belong, be the same in both in respect to any matter of liability or obligation, such law, if shown to the court, should be followed in that matter in respect to which they so agree, though it differ from the maritime law as understood in the country of the forum; for, as respects the parties concerned, it is the maritime law which they mutually acknowledge. The Scotland, 105 U S. 24, 31. The first of these qualifications can rarely be called into requisition at the present day, since, for more than twenty years past, all the principal maritime nations of the world (at least those whose vessels navigate the Atlantic Ocean) have concurred in adopting a uniform set of rules and regulations for the government of vessels on the high seas. These rules and regulations have become international, and virtually a part of the maritime law. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 187. They will be presumed to be binding upon foreign as well as domestic ships unless the contrary is made to appear." We are then brought to the question of the merits of the case between the parties as shown by the pleadings and finding *Note by the Court.-The International Rules of 1863, Abbott on Shipping, 11th Ed., App. CCCLXIX; 13 Rev. Stat. 58, were revised by an Order of Council in England, in August, 1879, to take effect from the 1st of September, 1880, and as thus revised have been adopted by most commercial nations. See 4 Prob. Div. 241–249. They were adopted for both public and private vessels of the United States by act of Congress approved March 3, 1885. Public Act, No. 100. They had been adopted for public vessels before. See Luce's Seamanship, 360, Ed. 1884. Opinion of the Court. of facts. And this does not require any extended discussion. It is shown that the barque had her proper lights burning brightly, visible on a dark night, and with a clear atmosphere, at least two miles; and that, in character and location, they conformed to the regulations of the barque's nationality, which are the same as those of the British Board of Trade (or the International Rules before referred to); that the mast-head light of the steamer was sighted right ahead, distant about a mile; that the barque was kept steady on her course until the steamer was almost upon her and apparently about to run her down; that then the order was given to put the helm hard a-port; that in a few seconds the steamer's starboard light came in view, and in another instant she struck the barque in her port side, cutting her in two obliquely. In all this we see nothing that the people in charge of the barque did which it was not their duty to do by the International Rules. It was their duty to keep her steady on her course, and it was the duty of the steamer to see the barque and to avoid a collision. On the other side it appears that the steamer, which was a large and powerful one, 416 feet long and 38 feet beam, was coming towards the barque, end on, at about eleven knots an hour; that she had a lookout on the lee side of her bridge (which was over 150 feet from her bow), where the officer in charge of the deck also was; but had no other lookout on duty, the rest of the watch, except the man at the compass, and one at the wheel, were underneath the turtle-back, or top-gallant forecastle. No lookout was on the turtle-back, although it would have been entirely safe to station one there. The . omission to do so was for the alleged reason that the vessel was plunging into a head-sea, and taking so much water over her bows that he would have been of no use there. The barque was not seen by those in charge of the steamer until just at the instant of the collision; yet objects could be seen at a distance of from 500 yards to a mile, and the port light of the barque was seen by a steerage passenger on the steamer, looking out of his room just under the bridge, and was reported to his room mates long enough before the collision to enable the second steerage steward, who heard the report, to go up the Opinion of the Court. companion-ladder, cross the deck, and reach the steamer's rail. We think that these facts furnished a sufficient ground for the conclusions at which the court arrived, as before rehearsed; the substance of which was that the collision occurred by the negligence of those having charge of the Belgenland, in not seeing the barque, and in not taking the proper precautions due to such a night and such a sea, by reducing speed and keeping a sufficient lookout. It is argued that there is no express finding of negligence, or fault, as matter of fact, but only as an inference from the facts found. But we think that the facts found furnish such conclusive proof of negligence that it may be regarded as properly found amongst the conclusions of law as a legal inference from those facts. United States v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265. The counsel of the appellants suppose that the court below found the Belgenland in fault on the mere presumption arising from the fact of collision, and the primary duty of the steamship to avoid it. But this is not a just view of the decision. There was much more in the facts of the case than the existence of such a presumption, as the foregoing rehearsal of the facts clearly shows. The ability to see objects at a distance; the fact that the men in charge of the steamer failed to see the barque, whilst a passenger did see her from his room; the fact that there was but one lookout for such a large steamer; that other lookouts could have been stationed on the turtleback; the fact that the speed was not slackened, and no precautions taken to get a better view ahead; these facts, in addition to the presumption arising from the steamer's duty, present a very different case from that supposed by the appellants. The decision of the court must be taken as the collective result from the whole case. It cannot be judged from mere isolated expressions in the opinion. The rule contended for by the appellants, that negligence and fault must be proved, and not presumed, is undoubtedly a sound one, and hardly needs cases to support it. But the Circuit Court evidently did not rest the case on presumption, but upon proof, from which it properly deduced negligence on Opinion of the Court. the part of the steamship. At all events, this court, upon a careful consideration of the facts found, is satisfied that there was such negligence, and that it was the cause of the catastrophe. The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with interest to be added to the amount from the date of the same. WALDEN 2. KNEVALS. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA. Submitted April 1, 1885.-Decided April 13, 1885. The lands granted by Congress to the State of Kansas for the benefit of the St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad Company by the act of July 23, 1866, were not open to sale or settlement after the line or route of the road was "definitely fixed"; which it was when the map of the route adopted by the company was filed with the Secretary of the Interior, and accepted by him. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, affirmed. This was a bill in equity to compel a conveyance of land. Plaintiff below derived title through the grant of lands made by Congress to the State of Kansas, to aid the St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad Company. Defendant below derived. title through a patent from the United States granted after the company had filed its maps with the Secretary of the Interior. Decree for plaintiff, from which the defendant below appealed. Mr. Delenzo A. Walden, appellant, in person. Mr. J. M. Woolworth for appellee. MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. The questions presented in this case are similar to those considered and decided in Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360. By the act of Congress of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 210, there Opinion of the Court. was granted to the State of Kansas, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver Railroad Company, in the construction of a railroad from Ellwood in that State to its junction with the Union Pacific Railroad, or a branch thereof, not further west than the 100th meridian of west longitude, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side of the road, to the point of intersection. The grant was accompanied, however, with this qualification-that in case it should appear that the United States had, when the line or route of the road was "definitely fixed,” sold any section or part thereof thus granted, or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement had attached to the same, or that it had been reserved by the United States for any purpose whatever, then it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause an equal quantity of other lands to be selected from the odd sections nearest to those designated, in lieu of the lands thus appropriated. The main question here, as in the case mentioned, is, when was the route of the road to be considered as 66 definitely fixed," so that the grant attached to the adjoining sections. In the case mentioned we held that the route must be considered as "definitely fixed" when it had ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company; that until the map designating the route of the road was filed with the Secretary of the Interior, the company was at liberty to adopt such a route as it might deem best, after an examination of the ground had disclosed the advantages of different routes. But it was held that when the route was adopted by the company, and a map designating it was filed with the Secretary of the Interior, and accepted by that officer, the route was established. In the language of the act it was "definitely fixed," and could not be the subject of further change so as to affect the grant except by legislative consent; and that no further action was required on the part of the company to establish the route. It then became the duty of the Secretary to withdraw the lands granted from market, and the court said: "If he should neglect this duty, the neglect would not impair the rights of the company, however prejudicial it might prove to others. Its rights are not |