in the course of his employment for the defendant. He left to survive him a widow, with whom he was not living at the time of his death and who was not dependent upon him. He also left to survive him the claimant, his mother, who was dependent upon him at the time of his death. The sole question before this court is whether the claimant is entitled to compensation under "The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915." The part of Section 307 of said act applicable to this case is as follows: * * "In case of death compensation shall be computed on the following basis and distributed to the following persons: 7. If there be neither widow, widower nor children then to the father and mother, or the survivor of them, if dependent to any extent upon the employe for support at the time of his death, twenty per cent. of wages. It is the contention of the claimant that this act should be interpreted as though it read: "If there be neither widow, widower nor children entitled to compensation, then to the father and mother," etc. The cardinal principle in the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. "The legislative intent is to be followed, although seemingly contrary to the letter." Umholz License, 191 Pa. 177. The presumption is that the legislature had a definite purpose in every enactment and have adopted and formulated the subsidiary provisions in harmony with that purpose. Consequently, in the interpretation of a statute all the purposes thereof should be construed together and every seeming incongruous part should be so construed as to form one harmonious whole. "The legislative intent should be ascertained by considering and construing the act as a whole that is, by reading the different paragraphs of the act together." Commonwealth v. Danville, Bessemer Co., 207 Pa. 302. When the language of a statute is susceptible of two meanings that meaning will be adopted which will not lead to injustice or to unreasonable, absurd consequences. "Where the meaning of the statute is doubtful, the construction most agreeable to reason and justice should be adopted as embodying the intention of the legislature." "It is an old rule of construction, that if one interpretation would lead to absurdity, the other not, we must adopt the latter; so that interpretation which leads to the more complete effect, which the legislature had in view, is preferable to another." City of Philadelphia v. Railways Co., 102 Pa. 197. Where it appears with certainty that certain words have been omitted, the court may supply such words as are necessary to express the legislative intent. "Where the intention of the legislature has been ascertained with reasonable certainty, words may be supplied in the statute in order to give it effect and avoid any repugnancy or inconsistency with such intention." Orville v. Woodcliffe, 64 N. J. L. 286. Statutes are construed as best to effectuate the intention of the legislature though such construction may seem contrary to the letter. To discover the intention of the legislature it is often important to ascertain the occasion and necessity of the enactment, the mischief felt and the circumstances and purposes thereof. "Keeping in mind the previous law, the supposed evil and the remedy desired, we must consider the language of the statute and the fair and reasonable import thereof." County of Cumberland v. Boyd, 113 Pa. 56. "A thing within the intention is within the statute though not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute unless within the intention." Wilkesbarre v. Meyers, 113 Pa. 395. In the application of these familiar elementary principles to the case at bar we are led inevitably to the following conclusions: That it was the intention of the legislature in passing "The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915" to relieve the hardships and sufferings resulting to the employe or his dependent ones from injuries received by such employe while in the course of his employment. In order to place these benefits within the reach of all the common law defences were taken away, the technicalities as to the admissibility of testimony were removed and the terms describing those to be benefitted given the broadest possible meaning. It is plain that the act was intended to have a liberal construction particularly with reference to the persons to be benefitted. Furthermore, to construe the act so that one mother would receive the benefits, and another just as deserving would not, would render the act absurd, unjust and unreasonable. Certainly such a construction was not within the intention of the legislature, it is not within the act even though it be within the letter. Many precedents might be cited to sustain this position. The Act of April 14, 1851, provides that "hereafter the widow or children of any decedent dying within this commonwealth, testate or intestate, may retain either real or personal property belonging to said estate to the value of Three Hundred ($300.00) Dollars and the same shall not be sold but suffered to remain for the use of the widow and family." Under this Act the Courts have held that the widow has the primary right to take the entire fund to the exclusion of the children, but if there be no widow capable of claiming the provision, the dependent family is not to be deprived of that privilege because there is a widow who is not capable of taking. Henkels Estate, 13 S. C. 337. There are many similar decisions on statutes relating to the intestate laws of Pennnylvania which might be cited. So too, the Act of June 13, 1836, provides that a settlement may be gained by any district "by any unmarried person not having a child who," etc. Under that act our Superior Court decided that a woman whose husband was long since dead and whose only child was married, gained a settlement under that act as an unmarried person not having a child. Turbett Township v. Port Royal Borough, 33 S. C. 520. Likewise in order to carry out the intention of the law makers the Supreme Court of the United States decided that singing birds were not included in the term "all other living animals." In this case the intention of Congress was ascertained by the Supreme Court not from the act itself, but from the intention manifested in a previous act. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U. S. 566. Likewise, the term "single woman" has been made by context and manifest intent to include certain married women. Q. B. 681. 12 It seems clear, therefore, that it was the intention of the legislature that Paragraph 7 of Section 307 should be interpreted as though it read: "If there be neither widow, widower, nor children entitled to compensation, then to the father and mother," etc. And now, October 27, 1919, the above mentioned appeal is dismissed, the order of the Workmen's Compensation Board is affirmed, and Mary H. Settlemoyer, dependent mother of the deceased, is awarded twenty per cent. of $20.00 or $4.00 per week, for a period of 300 weeks from August 24, 1917, together with $100.00, the costs of the last sickness and burial, upon which amount a credit of $40.00 is to be allowed, the said amount having been paid by the defendant. WETHERHOLD v. NADIG. Landlord and Tenant-Summons-Service-Attested CopyAct of December 14, 1863, P. L. (1864) 1125. Where the record, in landlord and tenant proceedings under the Act of 1863, fails to show a service of an attested copy of the summons, the proceedings will be reversed. In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County. No. 64 June Term, 1919. Edward H. Wetherhold, Plaintiff below and Defendant in error, v. Charles Nadig, Defendant below and Plaintiff in error. Certiorari. Robert L. Stuart, for Plaintiff in Error. Groman, P. J., October 13, 1919. Suit was brought before an alderman of the City of Allentown, under the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1863. No complaint was attached to the record returned by the alderman in response to the writ of certiorari issued out of this court; but the transcript sets forth that complaint was made and summons issued to William F. Fink, Constable, and return thereto made: "Served summons on defendant, a true and attested copy thereof to an adult member of his family, at his dwelling house, April 30, 1919." Counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant at bar agreed the summons left at the home of defendant by the constable should be attached to the proceedings and taken as the original summons served by the constable. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. An examination of the summons served by the constable fails to show an attestation thereof by the constable. Such are the facts relative to the summons issued in the matter; defendant's exceptions raise the question of the regularity of the service of the summons. Proceedings under the Landlord and Tenant Acts of Pennsylvania, being in derogation of the common law, the provisions of such acts must be strictly followed to confer jurisdiction and to support the judgment: Hickey v. Conley, Appellant, 24 Pa. Sup. Ct. Page 388; Ballou v. Nehring, Appellant, 28 Pa. Sup. Ct. Page 156. The Act of June 9, 1901, relative to the service of writs by a constable, provides: "Writs issued by any magistrate, justice of the peace, or alderman shall be served in the county wherein they are issued, by the constable or other officers therein to whom given for service, in the same manner and with like effect as similar writs are served by the sheriff when directed to him by the proper court;' the act also provides for the attestation of a writ. That the service by a constable of a summons not duly attested, is an invalid service, is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1901, and must be set aside, was held by this court in C. A. Gernerd v. Frank Faust, No. 16 October Term, 1904, certiorari, wherein Trexler, P. J., then presiding, sustained exceptions. Failure to serve a summons as provided for by the Act of 1901, gives an alderman no jurisdiction over the defendant, where the defendant fails to appear at the hearing; the judgment of the alderman in such a case, cannot be sustained, but must be set aside: Carey v. Pender and Redmond, 8 Northampton County Reporter, Page 372; South Bethlenem v. Wyandotte Gas Co., 9 Northampton County Reporter, Page 106; Bixby & Co. v. Mangan, 11 Kulp, Page 147; Clark v. Cadshaw et al. 11 Kulp, Page 227; Montgomery Table Works v. Nice, 11 Dist. Reps. Page 202. It is not necessary to cite other authorities sustaining the same proposition. The other exceptions filed need not now be considered as the proceedings will have to be reversed for reasons herein stated. Now October 13, 1919, exceptions to service of summons by the constable sustained, and proceedings reversed. |