THE

AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL.

MARCH, 1849.

United States District Court--In Admiralty.

STILES . THE STEAM-BOAT JOHN STEVENS.-COLLISION.

Where a vessel is lying near to, but not moored at the wharf, and not in absolute contact with the wharf, or with vessels at the wharf, without a signal light hoisted on dark nights, and with her boom rigged out-board, she must take the consequences of a collision with another vessel moving prudently to her accustomed birth.

The libel alleged that on the first of November, 1847, the sloop was moored safely to the pier or wharf, and that about 9 o'clock in the evening, the steam-boat was observed coming down the river, the tide being at flood, that there was sufficient time and tide for the steam-boat to be kept clear of said sloop, that the sloop was lying at her moorings and could not possibly get out of the way, that there was room for the steam-boat to pass, yet the said steam-boat kept her course and ran with great force against the sloop and did the damage complained of.

The answer denied that the sloop was safely moored, and that there was room sufficient to pass in the regular and accustomed channel, and in the usual and proper VOL. VIII.-23.

manner of navigation, by reason of the obstruction af forded by the improper mooring or anchoring of the said sloop; and it further alleged that the said sloop had not a visible signal light as is required by law; and that her boom was rigged out-board instead of in-board, and that these were the causes of the collision, and that the improper mooring of the sloop was the sole cause of the collision.

Jno. Fallon, for Libellant. Fisher & Hazlehurst for the Respondents.

The opinion was delivered by KANE, J.

"The Steamer John Stevens, approaching her landing place on the Delaware obliquely from the channel, at night, and against the tide, with her steam shut off, and her headway nearly arrested, when within a distance considerably less than her length from the head of the wharf at which she was to come to, encountered a small vessel, which had temporarily taken a position near the wharf immediately above, while waiting for a change of tide to drop down to her berth. The boom of the schooner struck the wheel-house of the steamer, passed through the side of the cabin, and damaged it considerably. In return the boom was broken by the collision, and the schooner received other injuries. The owner of the schooner files this libel, and asks damages against the steamer."

"The schooner was not at the wharf, and she had no signal lamp hoisted-this is admitted on all hands, though the witnesses in speaking of her distance from the wharf, vary from five to sixty feet. She was heading against the tide, at anchor, whether otherwise fully moored or notbut either she was not moored to the wharf by a hauser from the stern, or her boom was not rigged in-one or the other-for had her stern been steadied and secured as the libellant's witnesses say it was, and had her boom been

rigged in, the steamer, moving obliquely towards the city, could not by any possibility have come in contact with the end of the boom.

"Now, without deciding whether a vessel is to be regarded as at anchor in the stream so as to be bound to show a light, when although in the tide way and at anchor, she is within mooring distance of a wharf, and attached to it by appropriate fasts; I have no hesitation in saying, that a vessel so placing herself, not in absolute contact with the wharf, or with the vessels at the wharf, but at some distance from it or them, must take the consequences of a collision, if she allows her boom at night so to project over her side, as to infringe against a vessel, which is moving prudently to her accustomed berth.

"The libel must therefore be dismissed; each party will bear his own costs. Libel dismissed."

Crawford Common Pleas, Case Stated, &c. Nov. 25, 1848.

ELIZA HOUSEL'S ADM'RS vs. JOSEPH HOUSEL'S ADM'RS.

In the case of a marriage prior to the act of 11th April, 1848, and the death of the husband in October following, and the wife subsequently, the personal property of the wife, remaining in specie on the premises of the husband at the time of his death, goes to his representatives, notwithstanding the act of 1848.

The plff's and deft's. intestates were husband and wife, married prior to the act to secure the rights of married women, passed 11th April, 1848, (Pamph. L. 536.) The wife, at the time and prior to the marriage, owned and possessed certain articles of personal property, goods and chattels, such as sheep, cows and household furniture. This property remained in specie on the premises of the husband at the time of his death, in October 1848.

The wife died subsequently. The question was, are the plff's or deft's. entitled to this property.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by CHURCH, President.

To determine this case aright, we must first determine what title to or interest in the personal property in possession of the wife at the time of marriage, does the husband acquire immediately upon and by virtue of the marriage.

The uniform language of all authority upon the subject from Littleton and the Year Books, down to the passage of the act of 11th of April last, is that all chattels personal, the property of the wife, which she has in possession at the time of marriage, in her own right, are vested immediately thereupon absolutely and entirely in the husband, and on his death go to his personal representatives, although he have no actual possession during coverture.The marriage itself is a contract by which the woman makes an absolute and unqualified gift to the man of both her person and her personal chattels in possession, together with the right of reducing her choses in action to his possession, which when done during coverture, vests in him the entire property therein alone. Hence it is clear that when the property is so vested, the Legislature have no power to divest it, even if they attempt to do so. However, this may have been intended by the act in question, I think a careful reading of it indicates clearly that the language and terms used makes it prospective in its operation entirely, if not as to the marriage it clearly is with regard to the time the woman acquires the property. Any other construction would seem to be a direct violation of the Bill of Rights.

Judgment must be entered for defendants upon this case stated.

Derrickson for plffts., Finney for defts.

Ja First Judicial District of Pennsylvania.---Phil'a.

PIERCE BUTLER, LIBELLANT, vs. FRANCES ANN BUTLER,
RESPONDENT.

1. A respondent who denies the material allegations in a libel for Divorce, and claims in writing a trial by jury, has a right to such trial.

2. The "reasonable cause" which will justify wife or husband in quitting and abandoning each other is that, and only that which would entitle the party so separating him or herself to a divorce.

3. The cruelty, within the Pennsylvania Statute, which entitles a wife to a divorce from her husband, is actual personal violence, or the reasonable apprehension of it; or such a course of treatment as endangers her LIFE OF HEALTH, and renders co-habitation unsafe.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by KING, President.*

The libellant in his libel, which is in the brief and sententious form peculiar to our practice, sets forth that his wife, the respondent, did, in violation of her matrimonial obligations, on the 11th of September, 1845, wilfully, maliciously, and without reasonable cause, desert and absent herself from him, and his habitation, and since that time has continuously persisted in such desertion and absence. It concludes with a prayer for the divorce from the bond of matrimony, given by the act of Assembly to the injured party, under such circumstances. To this libel, the respondent, Frances Ann Butler, has answered -in which answer she first denies that on the 11th day of September, 1845, or at any other time before or since, she had wilfully and maliciously deserted and absented herself from the libellant and his habitation. She then

*The opinion of the Court contains all the facts necessary for a correct understanding of the principles decided; but to those who desiro more, we would say that the Libel, the Answer, Narrative of domestic troubles, and the Correspondence between the parties will be found in detail in the Home Journal for Dec. 16th, 1848.