duties and obligations will largely occupy and dominate her mind, and divert her attention from the work which formerly had her undivided attention. Prior to this state her whole energies were directed to and employed in her school work. Now her mind must be largely centered on her new duties and obligations. She, far more than he, is affected by this status, so far as concerns the pursuit of their former respective callings. He must continue his efforts along previous or other lines with renewed energy, because now he must not only support himself but his wife as well. She, on the contrary, must care for the home. Her independence, in a considerable degree at least, is surrendered, and in a large measure she ceases to be a freeagent, for her life has now become blended with that of another, and hence her views, convictions and ideals are become the composite result of this blending process. Again, when a woman marries she rightfully assumes that her husband will support her, and society at large expects that of him. The unmarried women who are compelled to work for their livelihood expect that one in their ranks who marries will step aside and make room for one who has no husband to support her. The unmarried woman worker resents, and justly resents, the competition in her labor market of a married woman whose husband is in health and strength, and she has a right to assume that such is the condition of a newly acquired husband. Why should not, and why may not, a school board recognize these conditions?

In the City of Portland there are over nine hundred unmarried women teachers. At the end of the last school year there were thirty-six vacancies to fill and there were over three thousand unmarried women applicants. Does this speak for nothing on this question of public policy? May not this vast army of

capable, earnest, intelligent young women, depending entirely on their own efforts for a living, be given a slight preference over the newly wedded husbands who are seeking positions for their wives to assist in their support, without invading some profound prin ciple of public policy in the administration of our government? When a man takes unto himself a wife, he agrees to support her. Most men insist on performing the contract to the letter. All should be compelled to do so. Speaking for our own profession, we do not hesitate to affirm that no member of it would for a moment contemplate the possibility of shirking that pleasing responsibility. Of course a case will occasionally arise, due to a husband's illness or misfortune, when a wife will be compelled to go out and labor for the support of both. Such cases, however, are exceptional, and rarely occur on the wedding day, and it is only with that day that we have to deal. We therefore beg to inquire what principle of profound public policy will be contravened by conducting public business on the assumption that every American gentleman intends to and will, for at least a reasonable period after marriage, support his wife?

For respondent there were oral arguments by Mr. Oren R. Richards and Mr. Norman S. Richards, with a brief over the names of Messrs. Richards & Richards and Mr. Coy Burnett to this effect:

I. Mandamus will lie to compel a school board to reinstate a teacher to a position from which she has been unlawfully removed: Horne v. Chester School Dist., 75 N. H. 411 (75 Atl. 431); Bogart v. Board of Education, 106 App. Div. 56; School Dist. v. Shuck, 49 Colo. 526 (113 Pac. 511); Barthel v. Board of Education, 153 Cal. 376 (95 Pac. 892); People ex rel. v. Board of Education, 82 Misc. Rep. 684 (144 N. Y.

Supp. 87); People ex rel. v. Board, 43 Hun, 537; Biggs v. McBride, 17 Or. 640 (5 L. R. A. 115, 21 Pac. 878).

II. Statutes in pari materia must be construed together: Smith v. Kelly, 24 Or. 464, 475 (33 Pac. 642, 645); School Dist. No. 2 v. Lambert, 28 Or. 209 (42 Pac. 221); Stoppenback v. Multnomah County, 71 Or. 493 (142 Pac. 832, 837); 36 Cyc. 1151. The statutes which should be thus construed are these: Laws 1911, c. 58, §§ 3, 17, 20-22; Laws 1913, c. 37, §§ 4-8, 10, c. 172, §§ 17, 22, 23.

III. The manner provided by statute for the dismissal of teachers and the revocation of their licenses is mandatory; the power of dismissal can be exercised only in the manner fixed by the statutes: Barton v. School Dist., 77 Or. 30 (150 Pac. 251); Paul v. School Dist., 28 Vt. 575; Kennedy v. Board of Education, 82 Cal. 483 (22 Pac. 1042); Brown v. Owen, 23 South. 35; Murray v. City of La Grande, 76 Or. 598 (149 Pac. 1019).

IV. A by-law providing for the dismissal of teachers which is inconsistent with the provisions of the statutes upon the same subject is void: People ex rel. v. Maxwell, 177 N. Y. 494 (69 N. E. 1092); People ex rel. v. Board of Education (Peixetto Case), 82 Misc. Rep. 684 (144 N. Y. Supp. 87, 94); Jameson v. Board of Education, 74 W. Va. 389 (81 S. E. 1126, 1130); Hall Moody Institute v. Copass (Tenn.), 69 S. W. 327; Barthel v. Board of Education, 153 Cal. 376 (95 Pac. 892); Fairchild v. Board of Education, 107 Cal. 92 (40 Pac. 26); Thompson v. Gibbs, 97 Tenn. 489 (34 L. R. A. 548, 37 S. W. 277); School Directors v. Wright, 43 Ill. App. 270; Goodyear v. School Dist., 17 Or. 517 (21 Pac. 664); Baxter v. Davis, 58 Or. 109 (112 Pac. 410); Crawford v. School Dist., 68 Or. 388

(137 Pac. 217, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 522, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147); 35 Cyc. 899, 901.

V. The marriage of a teacher is not "good cause" for the dismissal under the laws of Oregon. The rule of the board making marriage a ground of dismissal is void, since it is not "good cause" within the meaning of that term as used in Laws of 1913, Chapter 172, Section 22. The authorities are undivided upon the meaning of this term in such a statute, and are to the effect that "good cause" is a personal disqualification of that particular person to perform the particular duties which are a part of the position in question. "Good cause" goes to the existing personal disqualification as distinguished from an apprehension that the person may become disqualified because that person is about to join a certain class of persons-as, that such person is about to become married, or to become a member of the Lady Maccabees, or a suffragette, or a Methodist, or Baptist: State v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238 (39 Am. St. Rep. 595, 55 N. W. 118); McCully v. State, 102 Tenn. 509 (46 L. R. A. 567, 53 S. W. 134, 137); State ex rel. v. Wallbridge, 62 Mo. App. 162; State ex rel. v. Wallbridge, 69 Mo. App. 657, 669; People ex rel. v. Mayor of New York, 19 Hun, 441, 448; People v. Thompson, 94 N. Y. 451, 452; Guden v. Dike, 71 App. Div. 422 (75 N. Y. Supp. 794, 798); Board of Street Commrs. v. Williams, 96 Md. 232 (53 Atl. 923); Haggerty v. Shedd, 75 N. H. 393 (74 Atl. 1055).

VI. The public policy of Oregon, as shown by the legislation through more than thirty years, is against the position taken by appellant.

We submit that the board cannot discharge the respondent on account of whim or caprice or prejudice, or on account of some archaic rule that has been

handed down to them from past ages by a prior school board, as was testified to by the school clerk. The people of the State of Oregon have in the past twenty years progressed in favor of the rights of women; they have granted to married women the right to hold school offices generally (Section 4116, L. O. L.); the right to vote; and in the Permanent Tenure Act have granted them a permanent right to teach in the public. schools. The people of Oregon passed the Permanent Tenure Act to insure teachers of the permanency of their positions so long as they were efficient in the particular work allotted to them, and it is for two reasons, so that the teacher might feel secure in her position and so that the public school would obtain thereby a better class of teachers. The people of Portland are now employing in the schools married teachers, and admittedly they are good teachers, yet in the face of this they pick out one teacher and, because she marries, cast stigma and reproach upon the marriage relation by discharging such teacher. They thereby cast stigma upon a relation which is legalized by the state, and one in favor of which public policy is exercising every endeavor. They do this because they say that during the brief period of the honeymoon the teacher is not as proficient as she was before her marriage.

So far as suspension during a period when a teacher is not proficient, the law gives the board a right to suspend, but in no case gives a right to discharge. The reasons pro and con advanced upon the policy of the employment of married teachers would be appropriate if addressed to the law-making power, but they are of no concern to a school board, which is a creature of statute, and whose powers are defined and limited by statute. If the legislature had desired that mar