is so limited that if that particular estate were to expire or end in any way at the present time, some certain person who was in esse and answered the description of the remainderman during the continuance of the particular estate would thereupon become entitled to the immediate possession, irrespective of the concurrence of any collateral contingency."

This definition is not erroneous when all of the language embraced within it is properly considered. The definition, however, is very erroneous and misleading, unless the modifying clause introduced by the last eight words employed is constantly kept in mind. The subsequent treatment of the question involved in that case shows that the court applied the definition given, without considering that the death of the life tenant leaving children surviving him was the "concurrence of a collateral contingency," which, under the definition given, prevented the interest of the brothers and sisters of Emory Boatman from being a vested remainder. There was in that case, as there is in the case at bar, a collateral contingency to be taken into account-that is, the death of the life tenant without leaving surviving children before the remainder could become vested. This contingency is a dubious and uncertain event. It could not 421 be known until the death of the life tenant whether this contingency would happen; hence the remainder was contingent in the Boatman case (198 Ill. 414, 65 N. E. 81) as it is in this. In this. respect the Boatman case is out of harmony with our previous decisions as well as the great weight of authority outside of this state: See 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 418. In so far as the Boatman case seems to lay down the rule that a devise to one with remainder in fee to his children who may survive him, with a devise over to another in case the life tenant died leaving no children, creates a vested interest in remainder in the last devisee, that case is overruled. The case of Chapin v. Nott, 203 Ill. 341, 67 N. E. 833, in so far as it is based on the Boatman case on this point, must be regarded as unsound. The remainder created by the devise over in such case is contingent upon the death of the life tenant without leaving children. That this is the proper construction of a clause in a will or deed is recognized by many decisions of this court, among which the following may be cited: City of Peoria v. Darst, 101 Ill. 609; Smith v. West, 103 Ill. 332; McCampbell v. Mason, 151 Ill. 500, 38 N. E. 672; Furnish v. Rogers, 154 Ill. 569, 39 N. E. 989.

In the case last above cited the clause in the will involved was as follows: "I give and bequeath to my grand-niece, Jessie

Starkweather, . . . . my house and two lots in Sycamore, . . . . also thirty-two acres in Mayfield, De Kalb county, Ill., and $500, all of which is to go to her children should she marry. If she should die childless, then it is to be divided between her mother and the rest of my grand-nieces and nephews who will appear and give evidence of such." It was held that under the foregoing clause Jessie Starkweather took a life estate, and that the remainder created by the devise over was contingent on her marriage and the birth of children who survive the life tenant. In disposing of that case this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Phillips, on page 571, said: "The language employed designates the children as those who take the remainder, 422 and the estate does not vest in them, as an absolute fee simple title to them and their heirs forever, until the death of Jessie, as it is further provided that if she die childless the estate is to be divided among her mother and the rest of the testator's grandnieces and nephews, etc., whose estate is contingent upon the death of Jessie without a surviving child or children or the descendants of such child or children, in which case the takers of the remainder are substituted for surviving children. By the first clause of the will Jessie Starkweather takes an estate for life in the house, lots and land and in the five hundred dollars therein bequeathed. The remainder is a concurrent, contingent remainder with a double aspect, to be determined immediately upon the death of Jessie, as at that moment it will west in her child or children, or the descendants of such child or children, that survive her, and in default of such .survival the remainder would vest in the mother of Jessie and the other grandnieces and nephews of the testator"; citing Dunwoodie v. Reed, 3 Serg. & R. 435, and City of Peoria v. Darst, 101 Ill. 609.

The law as laid down in the Rogers case (154 Ill. 569, 39 N. E. 989) and the others above cited in line with it furnishes the correct rule of decision in the case at bar. The second clause of the will of George Golladay gave his wife a life estate with a contingent remainder with a double aspect, to be determined upon the death of the life tenant. At the time of her death she left no children surviving her. The devise over to the heirs of Moses Golladay therefore took effect as a fee simple interest upon the falling in of the life estate. The daughter of Nancy Golladay who died before her mother, and such of the heirs of Moses Golladay as predeceased the life tenant, had no interest in the premises.

William Golladay was a son of Moses Golladay. As already shown, he made a warranty deed purporting to convey his interest in the premises to Henry H. Fuller and Ross R. Fuller several years before the death of the life tenant. Appellants contend that this deed operated as a 423 conveyance of the interest of William Golladay, and that if said deed was otherwise inoperative it should be given effect, by way of estoppel, against the assertion of title by the complainants, who are the children of William Golladay. This contention. cannot be sustained. William Golladay died before the life tenant. No title ever vested in him. His children are not estopped by the covenants in this deed, for the reason that they are not asserting a title by descent from their father, but are claiming under the will of George Golladay, as heirs of Moses Golladay. A contingent remainder may be transferred by warranty deed, under our statute, so as to vest the title in the grantee: Hurd's Stats. 1905, c. 30, sec. 7; Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415; Walton v. Follansbee, 131 Ill. 147, 23 N. E. 332. But where the grantor of such an interest dies before the contingency happens upon which the estate is to vest, nothing passes by such deed: Thomas v. Miller, 161 Ill. 60, 43 N. E. 848. Had William Golladay survived the life tenant appellants would have succeeded to his share in this estate. In that event his deed would have been binding upon him and his heirs after his death. The conveyance by John Knock, Jr., to Henry H. Fuller is valid under the authorities which nullify the deed of William Golladay. John Knock, Jr., survived the life tenant. The court below correctly held that H. H. Fuller was entitled to the share of John Knock, Jr. This is the only interest he has in this estate. The other appellant, Ross R. Fuller, who claims under the deed of William Golladay, has no interest whatever. There is no error in the decree of the circuit court. The decree will be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Dunn took no part in the decision of this case.

Remainders are Contingent when they are limited to take effect either to a dubious or uncertain person, or upon a dubious and uncertain event; vested remainders exist when the estate is invariably fixed, to remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent. The law favors vested rather than contingent remainders: Haward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 15 Am. St. Rep. 120; Chapin v. Crow, 147 Ill. 219, 37 Am. St. Rep. 213; Patton v. Ludington, 103 Wis. 629, 74 Am. St. Rep. 910.

A Devise to the Wife of the Testator for and during her natural life, and at her death to the daughter of the testator and her two children, creates in the latter a vested remainder, subject only to a

life estate in the widow: Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 120 Am. St. Rep. 291. Under a devise and bequest of property to M., to be invested by the testatrix's executors for M.'s benefit during his natural life and for the benefit of his wife and issue after his death, a trust is not created as to the wife and children, but the title vests in them absolutely on M.'s death: Mee v. Gordon, 187 N. Y. 400, 116 Am. St. Rep. 613. And under a will by which a testatrix devises to her husband all of her interest in a certain lot of land, “also all my right” in two certain other lots, "to have the said interests in the said described parcels of land" for life, with a gift over to others, the husband takes only a life interest in all of the land: Platt v. Brannan, 34 Colo. 125, 114 Am. St. Rep. 147.

COLLINS v. CAPPS.

[235 Ill. 560, 85 N. E. 934.]

WILLS.-Parol Evidence, Though not Admissible to change the language of a will, may be received when necessary to identify the subjects and objects of the testator's bounty. (p. 233.)

WILLS.-However Many Errors There may be in a Description, either of the devisees or of the subject of a devise, the gift will not be avoided, if enough remains after rejecting the errors to show with certainty what was intended, when considered from the position of the testator. (p. 233.)

WILLS-Rejection of False Description.-Where a testator devised the "west half" of a certain quarter section "containing about seventy-six acres," when the only land owned by him in that county was seventy-six acres in the north half of that quarter section, the word "west" may be stricken out and the will be given effect as a gift of the seventy-six acres in the section which he owned, though there is a residuary clause. (p. 234.)

WILLS.—It is Presumed that a Testator Intended to dispose of his own land. (p. 235.)

Wight & Alexander, for the appellants.

Jack, Irwin, Jack & Miles and Bracken, Young & Peirce, for the appellees.

561 DUNN, J. William Collins died on April 30, 1901, having on the day before made his will, whereby he gave to his wife all his personal property absolutely, and the use, income and rentals of all his real estate during her life. The third paragraph of the will contains the following language: "Third-At the decease of my said wife, I give, devise and bequeath unto my son William J. Collins, of McLean county, Illinois, that certain tract of land in said county described as follows: The west half of the north-east quarter of section ten (10), in township twenty-one (21), range one (1), west, containing about seventy-six (76) acres. Provided, however,

my daughter Mary E. Collins shall have an interest in said. premises and a lien thereon to the extent of $1000, which shall be paid to her upon the sale of said property, and until it shall be sold and conveyed my said son William shall pay to her on March 1 each year the sum of seventy-five dollars ($75). It is my desire that said farm should not be sold for five years after the decease of my said wife, and if my said son William or my said daughter Mary Elizabeth shall die without issue before said land shall be conveyed, the fee simple title thereto shall vest absolutely and in fee in the surviving brother or sister."

The fifth paragraph is as follows:

"Fifth-All the balance and residue of my property, real and personal, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Eliza Collins."

The testator owned the north half of the northeast quarter of section 10 mentioned in the will, except four 562 acres which were occupied by a railroad right of way, but not the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section, nor any other land in said section or in McLean county. He also owned one hundred and twenty acres of land in Logan county, which was specifically devised by another clause of his said will, and he owned no other real estate. Mrs. Collins died a few days after her husband, and after the expiration of five years William J. Collins, who has since his mother's death been in possession of the north half of the northeast quarter of said section 10, and his sister, Mary E. Collins, filed their bill for the construction of their father's will, praying that they may be decreed to be entitled under the said will to the north half of the northeast quarter of said section 10. All the other heirs of William Collins, who were also all the heirs of his wife, were made defendants, and a cross-bill was filed for the partition of the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 10 among the heirs of the wife, under the claim that she took the title thereto under the fifth clause of the will. On a hearing the court dismissed the cross-bill and decreed the relief prayed in the original bill. The question presented by this appeal is whether the devise is of the west half of the quarter section or the north half.

The purpose of the construction of a will is to determine the intention of the testator. That intention must be found in the words of the will itself, as applied to the subjects and objects of the testator's bounty. Parol evidence, though not admissible to change the language of the will, may be received when necessary to identify such subjects and objects. A