without indorsement, to the plaintiff, the bank was authorized to maintain an action thereon in its own name; but it took and held the paper subject to all equities existing in favor of the makers, and this being so, no error was committed in giving the instruction under consideration. 7. It is contended that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial, on the ground that no contract had been consummated between Furnish and the defendant, whereby the notes in question were to be canceled. The rule is settled in this state that the action of a court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial is not a final order from which an appeal lies. This principle has so often been announced that it is unnecessary to cite the cases which uphold the doctrine. 8. It is argued that as all the testimony given at the trial has been sent up, a perusal thereof will conclusively show that no contract was ever entered into between the makers and the payee of the notes whereby they were to have been canceled, and hence the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered. An appellate court is created to review errors alleged to have been committed by lower courts in the trial of law actions, to which rulings exceptions have been duly reserved. No determination of a trial court can be reviewed on appeal, unless the question has been distinctly presented to that tribunal for its action. In the case at bar the court was not requested to give any instruction that involved a consideration of all the testimony, and 516 this being so, that exhibit attached to the bill of exceptions will not be examined. Other alleged errors are assigned, but, believing them unimportant, the judgment is affirmed. The Transferee of a Note Without Indorsement acquires no better title than had the payee; he holds it subject to all equities existing between the original parties: Sackett v. Montgomery, 57 Neb. 424, 73 Am. St. Rep. 522. A note payable to a certain person or order can take its place in the hands of a subsequent holder with the peculiar qualities and incidents of negotiable paper only where it has been regularly indorsed in such a way that the indorsement becomes a part of the paper: Hays v. Plummer, 126 Cal. 107, 77 Am. St. Rep. 153. If a Note Purports to be Payable to W. C., Cashier, at a designated place, a bank, on proving that he was then its cashier and acted for it, may maintain an action on the note without any indorsement thereof by him: First Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 133 Mich. 700, 103 Am. St. Rep. 468. CASES IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ог TEXAS. REED v. STATE. [53 Tex. Cr. 4, 108 S. W. 368.] LIQUORS-Want of Knowledge of Intoxicating Character When Sold.-On a prosecution for the violation of a local option law, testimony is admissible that the defendant believed the beverage sold was not intoxicating. (p. 766.) LIQUORS-Evidence.-On a Prosecution for the Violation of a Local Option Law, the statute makes admissible an examined copy of the internal revenue collector's books, but there is no statutory authority for the introduction of his certificate. (p. 767.) LIQUORS-Sale in Violation of Local Option Law.-All parties participating in the sale of liquors in violation of a local option law are principals. (p. 767.) W. H. Murchison, for the appellant. F. J. McCord, assistant attorney general, for the state. BROOKS, J. Appellant was convicted of violating the local option law, and his punishment assessed at a fine of fifty dollars and twenty days' confinement in the county jail. Bill of exceptions No. 1 shows the following: "While defendant was on the stand as a witness in his own behalf, the following question was propounded to him by his counsel: 'State whether or not at the time you begun work for B. S. Foreman, and at the time you are accused of the sale alleged in the indictment, you had been led to believe, and did 5 honestly believe, that the liquors sold in the said Foreman's place of business were nonintoxicating beverages.' The court sustained the state's objection to same on the ground that the testimony was irrelevant and immaterial. If permitted, the defendant would have stated that 'Mr. Fore man told me at the time I went to work for him, which was about two weeks prior to the date alleged in the indictment, that the liquors sold by him were nonintoxicating, and I believed at the time of the alleged sale to Mr. Miller that the cold drinks sold to said Miller in said Foreman's place of business were in fact nonintoxicating beverages.'" This testimony was admissible, and the court erred in refusing to admit same. We have heretofore held that, if a party honestly believes the liquor sold is not an intoxicant, said fact can be proven. Here the defense proposed to prove by the party who employed appellant that he was informed that the liquor was not intoxicating, and, so believing, he sold same. This testimony was admissible: See Walker v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 345, 94 S. W. 230; Covington v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 48, 100 S. W. 368. Bill of exceptions No. 2 shows the following: The state, over appellant's objection, was permitted to introduce in evidence the following instrument, in writing, to wit: "Internal Revenue Service, 4th District of Texas. "Dallas, Texas, February 27, 1907. "COLLECTOR'S CERTIFICATE. "I hereby certify that it appears from the records of my office that license was issued, as follows, viz.: "Kind of stamp-Retail Malt Liquor Dealer. "Serial number, 7847. "Date of Issue, August 28, 1906. "To whom Issued, B. S. Foreman. "Issued for period, commencing August 1, 1906. "Place of Business: Rule, Texas. Locality. "Amount paid: Eighteen and 33-100 Dollars ($18.33). "In witness whereof, my official seal and signature, this the 27th day of February, 1907. "(Seal) P. B. HUNT, Collector." Appellant objected to same because it was not shown by any testimony whatever that the defendant had any knowledge of the existence of the said license, or that it had ever been issued to said Foreman, or that he had any knowledge that the said Foreman, his employer, had said license; because the said instrument was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case on trial, and was calculated to injure and prejudice the rights of the defendant. There is no authority in this state for the introduction of the internal revenue collector's certificate. 6 The statute makes admissible an examined copy where proof of said fact is made; then the examined copy of the internal revenue collector's books can be admitted, but there is no statutory authority for the introduction of the collector's certificate. Appellant complains of the following charge of the court: "You are charged that, if you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant and any other person acting together sold intoxicating liquors to M. P. Miller at the time and place alleged in the indictment in this case, and that each and both of said persons were present at the time of such sale, and each knew the unlawful act in making said sale, then the defendant would be guilty, regardless of whether it was the defendant or such other person who actually delivered to said Miller such intoxicating liquor, or received the pay therefor." This charge is correct. All parties are principals in misdemeanor cases. Besides, the evidence shows, according to the testimony of the prosecuting witness, that appellant was present at the time of the sale, aiding and abetting. For the error of the court in excluding the testimony above discussed, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. Ignorance that Liquors are Intoxicating constitutes no defense or excuse, according to Haynes v. State, 118 Tenn. 709, 121 Am. St. Rep. 1055, for their unlawful sale. The seller must know at his peril whether or not they are intoxicating, and his belief that they are not, however honest, and resulting from a guaranty under which he bought them, is no excuse. EDWARDS v. STATE. [53 Tex. Cr. 50, 108 S. W. 673.] FORGERY-Identical Names.-It is No Defense to a charge of forgery that the name of the defendant is the same as the name of the person whose name he forges. (p. 771.) W. D. Scarbrough, for the appellant. F. J. McCord, assistant attorney general, for the state. 51 BROOKS J. Appellant was convicted of passing a forged instrument, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years. The indictment contains four counts. The jury convicted appellant on the fourth count, which reads as follows: "And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present in and to said court that J. R. Edwards, on or about the 2nd day of April, A. D., 1907, in said county and state, did willfully, knowingly and fraudulently pass as true to one L. E. Martin, a false and forged instrument in writing which had theretofore been made without lawful authority, and with intent to defraud, and was then of the tenor following: "Merkel, Texas,. . . . . . . .190.. "The First National Bank of Merkel, ....No. "Pay to Samuel Killston......or bearer $32.45 "Thirty Two and 45-100......Dollars. “J. R. EDWARDS.” "And which said instrument in writing the said J. R. Edwards, then and there well knowing to be false and forged, he the said J. R. Edwards, did pass the same as true, in this. that he, the said J. R. Edwards did pass the same as being a check or an order given by J. R. Edwards of Newman, Fisher county, Texas, and represented at the time he so passed it that it was given by the J. R. Edwards of Newman, Fisher county, Texas, and he did so pass the same with the intent to injure and defraud, against the peace and dignity of the state. "W. S. CHINN, "Foreman of the Grand Jury." The facts in this case are, in substance, as follows: L. S Martin testified: "I live in Merkel, Texas. I have seen the defendant, J. R. Edwards; saw him about the first of April, 1907, at Merkel, at Hogue-Hamilton & Company's store where I was working. [Witness is handed check in question.] I have seen that check before; saw it at Hogue-Hamilton & Company's store. I cashed that check after I received it, and received it from a party representing himself as Samuel Killston, and which was the defendant here. I got that check from him. The defendant came into the store about the first or second day of April of this year, and bought a little bill of goods, some six or eight dollars' worth, and handed me this check for the payment. And I asked him who Mr. Edwards was, and he said that he was a farmer living in Fisher county, near Newman; and then I asked the defendant his name, and he said, 'Samuel Killston.' Then I asked a Mr. Young, a young man there in the store, if he knew Mr. Edwards, and |