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II. With respect to the elimination of restrictive business practices by public or private commercial enterprises possessing r.onopoly power in international trade or conspiring to restrain international trade, cach country joining the ITO will commit itself
to "take appropriate measures ... to prevent" such practices whenever they "have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade" (Art. 46);
(2) to "take all possible measures, by legislation
or otherwise . . . to ensure, within its jurisdiction, that private and public commercial enterprises do not engage in practices" which have such effects (Art. 50); and
to "take full account of each request, decision,
These commitments are consistent with the policy embodied by the Congress of the United States in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. For most other countries, however, they represent a radical departure from established policy.
III. Vith rospect to intergovernmental agreements to rogulate the production, exportation, importation, or prices of primary commodities, each country joining the ITO will commit itself
(1) not to enter into any such &greement unless the
industry in question displays a number of specific economic characteristics that are to be found in combination orily in the case of certain agricultural staples and of a few minerals (Art. 62);
not to adhere to any such agreement unless its
not to adhere to any such a greement unless it contains specified provisions designed to safeGuard the interests of consumers, including an
equal vote for producer and consumer interests,
(4) to modify or withdrew from any agreement that the
ITO finds to be inconsistent with these require
ments (Art. 68). IV. With respect to subsidies, each country joining the ITO will commit itself
(1) not to subsidize the exportation of any commodity
other than a primary commodity (Art. 26 );
commodity to an extent that would maintain or
of world trade in that commodity (Art. 28); and
upon request, to discuss with the ITO or its
In these cases, as elsewhere, the procedure of enforcement through nullification and impairment action applies.
The limitations on the freedom to subsidize are admittedly weak. The rules governing commodity agreements are more important. In the absence of these rules, no government will be under any commitment not to enter into such agreements, in any field, for any period of time, containing no safeguards for the protection of consumer interests. Under the Charter, in effect, no such agreement can be concluded unless its terms are acceptable to the United States.
With respect to the inter-relationship between the international trade program and domestic programs for the stabilization of industrial activity, each country joining the ITO will commit itself
to "take action designed to achieve and maintain
This commitment, originally proposed by the United States, is consistent with the provisions of the Employment Act of 1946.
If pronounced imbalance in international trade persists, a Member with a heavy export balance commits itself
to make its full contribution, while appropriate action shall be taken by the other Members concerned, toward correcting the situation" (Art. 4).
This wording involves a recognition of the inescapable fact that no country can continue indefinitely to sell far more than it buys. The character of the "contribution" by the overselling country is for it alone to decide. And "appropriate action" by others is also required.
VI. With respect to economic development, each country Joining the ITO will commit itself (1) to take action designed to develop its resources
and to raise standards of productivity (Art. 9); (2) not to impose "unreasonable or un justifiable
impediments" that would prevent other members from obtaining facilities for their development *(Art. 11); and
to cooperate with other international organizations in promoting and facilitating economic development (Art. 10).
VII. with respect to the treatment of private foreign investments, countries joining the ITO will commit themsolves
not to take "unreasonable or un justifiable
in jurious to the rights or interests of nationals or other members in the enterprise, skills, capital, arts or technology which they have supplied" (Art. 11);
to provide "adequate security for existing and
to impose no requirements as to the ownership of investments that are not "just" (Art. 12);
to impose 30 other requirements with respect to investments that are not "reasonable" (Art. 12); and
to "enter into consultation or to participate in
and te omulate and promote the adostiin of a gezerei agreezent ... regarding the conduct, ingoticos e tretcent of foreign investment" (Art. 11).
* ansther Verber
ca:Is to provide adequate security for American
i coses requirements as to the ownership of invest-
or other requirements with respect to investments
cr takes any unreasonable or un justifiable action
or refuses to participate in negotiations directed
and the ITO may then release the United States, pensatory basis, from "obligations or the grant of concessions to the offending Member" (Art. 94).
2. EXCEPTIONS The exceptions or possible exceptions to the general rules contained in the Charter fall into the following general categories:
(1) definitions of jurisdiction which except matters
covered in othor parts of the Charter, by other
previous commercial treaties and trede agreements; (3) temporary exceptions, limited to the post-war
transition or to the duration of some other
(4) exceptions permitting the retention of existing
preferences, mixing regulations, and screen
quotas, but making them subject (like tariffs)
other exceptions of minor importance which are
a half dozen exceptions of major importance.
Among these major exceptions, three were included. on the initiative of the United States as prerequisites to acceptance of the Char ter:
tariff concessions may be suspended or withdrawn
quotas may be imposed on imports and subsidies paid on exports of agricultural products when domestic prices are maintained at levels higher than world prices through measures of the sort that are employed in the United States (Art. 20, 27); and
measures adopted and agreements entered into for the protection of essential security interests are exempt, in general, from the provisions of the Charter (Art. 99).
None of these escapes' requires the prior approval of the ITO,
There rema in three possible escapes of ma jor importance that are likely to be used by other countries and not by the United States:
quantitative restrictions may be imposed and