business practices by public or private commerciel enterprises possessing rcnopoly cwer in international trade or conspiring to restrain international trade, cach country joining the ITO will commit itself

(1) to "take appropriate measures . . to prevent" such practices whenever they "have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade" (Art. 46);

(2)

(3)

to "take all possible measures, by legislation
or otherwise •
.. to ensure, within its juris-
diction, that private and public commercial
enterprises do not engage in practices" which
have such effects (Art. 50); and

to "take full account of each request, decision,
and recommendation" made by the ITO and "take
in the particular case the action it considers
appropriate having regard to its obligations"
under the Charter (Art. 50).

These commitments are consistent with the policy embodied by the Congress of the United States in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. For most other countries, however, they represent a radical departure from established policy.

III. With rospect, to intergovernmental agreements to rogulate the production, exportation, importation, or prices of primary commodities, each country joining the ITO will commit itself

(1)

(2)

(3)

not to enter into any such agreement unless the
industry in question displays a number of specific
economic characteristics that are
that are to be found in
combination only in the case of certain agricul-
tural staples and of a few minerals (Art. 62);

not to adhere to any such agreement unless its
duration is limited to five years or less and
to formulate and adopt, during the life of the
agreement, measures of domestic economic adjust-
ment designed to render its extension unnecessary
(Art. 63, 65);

not to adhere to any such agreement unless it contains specified provisions designed to safeguard the interests of consumers, including an

equal vote for producer and consumer interests,
and full publicity (Art. 60, 63); and

(4) to modify or withdrew from any agreement that the
ITO finds to be inconsistent with these require-
ments (Art. 68).

With respect to subsidies, each country joining the ITO will commit itself

(1) not to subsidize the exportation of any commodity
other than a primary commodity (Art. 26);

(2) not to subsidize the exportation of any primary
commodity to an extent that would maintain or
acquire for itself more than an equitable share
of world trade in that commodity (Art. 23); and

(3)

upon request, to discuss with the ITO or its
Members the possibility of limiting any subsidy
that operates, directly or indirectly, to main-
tain or increase exports or to reduce or limit
imports (Art. 25).

In these cases, as elsewhere, the procedure of enforcement through nullification and impairment action applies.

The limitations on the freedom to subsidize are admittedly weak. The rules governing commodity agreements are more important. In the absence of these rules, no government will be under any commitment not to enter into such agreements, in any field, for any period of time, containing no safeguards for the protection of consumer interests. Under the Charter, in effect, no such agreement can be concluded unless its terms are acceptable to the United States.

V. With respect to the inter-relationship between the international trade program and domestic programs for the stabilization of industrial activity, each country joining the TTO will commit itself

(1) to "take action designed to achieve and maintain
full and productive employment and large and
steadily growing demand within its own territory
through measures appropriate to its political,
economic and social institutions" (Art. 3).

This commitment, originally proposed by the United States, is consistent with the provisions of the Employment Act of 1946.

sists, a Member with a heavy export balance commits itself

(2) to "make its full contribution, while appropriate action shall be taken by the other Members concerned, toward correcting the situation" (Art. 4).

This wording involves a recognition of the inescapable fact that no country can continue indefinitely to sell far more than it buys. The character of the "contribution" by the overselling country is for it alone to decide. And "appropriate action" by others is also required.

VI.

With respect to economic development, each country joining the ITO will commit itself

(1) to take action designed to develop its resources
and to raise standards of productivity (Art. 9);
(2) not to impose "unreasonable or unjustifiable
impediments" that would prevent other Members
from obtaining facilities for their development
*(Art. 11); and

(3) to cooperate with other international organizations in promoting and facilitating economic development (Art. 10).

VII.

With respect to the treatment of private foreign investments, countries joining the ITO will commit themselves

(1)

(2)

not to take "unreasonable or unjustifiable
action.

injurious to the rights or interests of nationals of other Members in the enterprise, skills, capital, arts or technology which they have supplied" (Art. 11);

to provide "adequate security for existing and
future investments
(Art. 12);

sec

(3) to impose no requirements as to the ownership of investments that are not "just" (Art. 12);

(4)

to impose no other requirements with respect to investments that are not "reasonable" (Art. 12);

and

(5) to "enter into consultation or to participate in
negotiations directed toward the conclusion" of
"bilateral or multilateral agreements relating
to . opportunities and security for invest-
ment" (Art. 12);

and

and the ITC may "formulate and promote the adoption of a general agreement . . . regarding the conduct, practices and treatment of foreign investment" (Art. 11).

If another Member

fails to provide adequate security for American
investments,

imposes requirements as to the ownership of investments which are not just,

or other requirements with respect to investments
that are not reasonable,

cr takes any unreasonable or unjustifiable action
injurious to American investors,

or refuses to participate in negotiations directed toward agreements regarding the treatment of foreign investments,

the United States may complain that benefits accruing to it under the Charter are being nullified or impaired (Art. 93),

com

and the ITO may then release the United States, on a pensatory basis, from "obligations or the grant of concessions to the offending Member" (Art. 94).

2. EXCEPTIONS

The exceptions or possible exceptions to the general rules contained in the Charter fall into the following general categories:

(1)

definitions of jurisdiction which except matters covered in other parts of the Charter, by other international agreements, or by other intergovernmental organizations;

(2) routine, boiler-plate exceptions copied from
previous commercial treaties and trade agreements;

(3) temporary exceptions, limited to the post-war
transition or to the duration of some other
period of emergency;

(4)

exceptions permitting the retention of existing preferences, mixing regulations, and screen

to reduction or elimination through negotiation;

(5) other exceptions of minor importance which are designed, in most cases, to permit a single country to continue to employ a particular measure which would otherwise be inconsistent with the general principles of the Charter; and

(6) a half dozen exceptions of major importance.

Among thesc major exceptions, three were included on the initiative of the United States as prerequisites to acceptance of the Char ter:

(1)

tariff concessions may be suspended or withdrawn if increased imports cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers (Art. 40);

(2) quotas may be imposed on imports and subsidies paid on exports of agricultural products when domestic prices are maintained at levels higher than world prices through measures of the sort that are employed in the United States (Art. 20, 27); and

(3)

measures adopted and agreements entered into for the protection of essential security interests are exempt, in general, from the provisions of the Charter (Art. 99).

None of these escapes requires the prior approval of the ITO.

There remain three possible escapes of major importance that are likely to be used by other countries and not by the United States:

(1) quantitative restrictions may be imposed and
discrimination practiced by countries that are
in balance-of-payment difficulties (Art. 21, 23);

(2)

exceptions to the most-favored-nation rule;
involving new preferences, may be granted where
incidental to the formation of customs unions
or free trade areas or required for economic
development (Art. 44, 15); and

(3) exceptions to other rules respecting restrictions