Railway L. & P. Co. v. Kiner. repute before the courts of this country, and it is not strange that juries are often disposed to give little credit to it. After reading the entire record, the court has reached the conclusion that the jury reached, to wit, that Philip Kiner's death was caused by the injuries received at the time of the accident. It is not necessary that the injuries received should be the sole and only cause of death, but if they were the primary cause, or if they contributed to produce the condition which caused the death, it would be sufficient. The expert physicians themselves admit that the heart trouble of which Kiner died might have been the secondary cause. Not only so, but Dr. Harding testified that "if the rib was fractured directly over the heart, and that rib in any way pressed the covering of the heart, that such an injury might produce endocarditis," the disease of the heart of which Kiner died. Considering the whole record as it comes to this court, having carefully read it with a view to determining whether error intervened as claimed, the court is not impressed with the contention of the plaintiff in error that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, or that the judgment was contrary to law. We have reached the conclusion that the verdict of the jury was supported and warranted by the evidence, and that the court committed no error in rendering judgment thereon, or in overruling the motion for a new trial. The court finds no prejudicial error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed, with costs, but without penalty, and the cause will be remanded for execution. Judgment affirmed. Voorhees and Shields, JJ., concur. Williams County Appeals. BONDS—MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—TAXATION. [Williams (6th) Court of Appeals, January 23, 1915.] Kinkade, Richards and Chittenden, JJ. J. H. Schieber (taxpayer) V. Eden (Val.) Et Al. 1. Municipal Power to Issue Bonds Without Vote of People Not Repealed by Tax Limitations. * 串 Section 3939 G. C. authorizing legislation by municipal councils, 2. Municipal Debt Creating Power Distinguished From Tax Limitations. Municipal debt creating power as conferred by Sec. 3939 G. C. et seq. and limitations upon taxation as provided by Sec. 5649-2 G. C. et seq., are clearly distinguished; hence, an issue of bonds under the former sections will not be enjoined if payment thereof can be made without violation of the restrictions of the latter sections. Appeal from common pleas court. R. L. Starr, for plaintiff. C. A. Bowersox and Newcomer & Gebhard, for defendants. KINKADE, J. The plaintiff brought an action in the court of common pleas to restrain the village of Edon from issuing bonds in the sum of $5,200.00, the proceeds of which were to be used to pay a portion of the cost of paving streets in the village of Eden. The contention of the plaintiff is that the village council had no power or authority to issue these bonds without a vote of the people. There is no question of irregularity in the proceedings to which we need give any attention if it be found that the council had authority under the law to issue the bonds. The claim of the village is that under Sec. 3939 G. C., and the following sections covering the same subject, the council had full power and authority to issue the bonds mentioned. On the other hand, the plaintiff contends that Sec. 3939 O. C. Schieber v. Edon. was repealed by implication by sections 5649-2 to 5649-6 G. C. Counsel for plaintiff to sustain his position that section 3939 has been repealed by implication, cites and relies upon the case of Robe v. Board of Ed. 88 Ohio St. 403. It is insisted that in all material respects Sec. 7629 G. C., relating to the power of school boards to issue bonds, is analogous to the like power conferred upon the village council in this case by Sec. 3939 G. C., and it is said that the authority thus conferred to issue obligations by the school board having been withdrawn by the repeal by implication of Sec. 7629 through the enactment of Sec. 5649-2 and following, that a like result must be held here with respect to Sec. 3939. As has been well said by counsel for the village, we think this is a very marked difference between the scope of the power conferred upon school boards by Sec. 7629 and that conferred upon municipal councils by Sec. 3939, and, as has also been stated by counsel, a careful examination of the Rabe case cited, will disclose that the court did not say that Sec. 7629 G. C. was repealed by implication. The court did say that Sees. 7591 and 7592 G. C., were repealed by implication and added that Sec. 7630 necessarily fell with the other two, but the case will be searched in vain for a statement that Sec. 7629 was repealed by implication, and we think the omission of the court to so state is a significant fact. Section 7629 G. C. is a section conferring power on school boards to issue bonds and corresponds with Sec. 3939 G. C., which is the section conferring upon municipal councils the power to issue bonds. We think the point made by counsel for the village that there should be a clear distinction observed between the debt creating power conferred by statute and the limitations upon taxation provided by statute is well taken. This principle is ably discussed by the supreme court of Illinois in the case of Coles Co. v. Goehring, 209 Ill. 142 [70 N. E. Rep. 610], to which our attention has been called in the brief of counsel. This case has been very fully and ably briefed by counsel on both sides with the whole history of the legislation touching every section involved set out in detail. We have examined 13 O. C. C. Vol. 35 Williams County Appeals. these various enactments and given the subject the fullest attention possible. It does not seem that any useful purpose would be served by an extensive review of the various points to which our attention has been called. We will state only the conclusion at which we have arrived after a thorough consideration of the questions submitted and it is this: That Sec. 3939 G. C., in so far as it confers power upon the village council to issue these bonds, was not repealed by implication by Sec. 5649-2 G. C. and the following sections upon the same subject, as shown by the latest amendments of these acts. We think the evidence in the case shows that the legislation enacted by the village council with respect to this issue of bonds is in accord with the requirement of the constitution with respect to the payment of the bonds by taxes to be levied and we see nothing to indicate that the village council may not cover the situation of payment without any violation of the statutory restrictions as to amounts that may be levied. Repeals by implication not being favored, the claim of the plaintiff in this action that the provisions of Sec. 3939 are thus repealed can only be sustained if that section is found to be clearly repugnant to the later enactments of the legislature. The provisions of Sec. 3939 are not necessarily in conflict with the later enactments of the legislature with respect to the limitation of tax levies. There may be many cases in which that power can be exercised by municipal councils without any violation of other statutes as to limitation. We hold, therefore, that the village council of Edon is clothed with power to issue the bonds in question without a vote of the people and that the plaintiff is not entitled to the restraining order prayed for, and such will be the decree of the court. Richards and Chittenden, JJ., concur. Harbeson v. Mellinger. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. [Wayne (5th) Court of Appeals, January 28, 1913.] Voorhees, Shields and Marriott, JJ. Mary Harbeson, Admrx. V. William M. Mellinger Et Al. 1. Administration Costs, "Debts" of Estate. Costs connected with the administration of the estate of a decedent and other obligations incurred in that connection are "debts" of the estate. 2. Liability for Illegal Distribution of Personal Estate not Released by Discharge on Account Filed. The fact that, upon the filing of his account, the probate court discharged an administrator from all further liability on his bond as such administrator, does not release him or his surety from liability for wrongfully or illegally distributing any part of the personal estate. 3. Widow's Election not to Take under Will Entitles Her to Intestate Distribution Only. A widow who elects not to take under the will of her deceased husband is entitled to only so much of the personalty belonging to the said estate as would have passed to her had her husband died intestate. [Syllabus by the court.] Appeal. Frank Taggart, for plaintiff. Kean & Adair, and Mahlon Rouch, for defendants. SHIELDS, J. This case is in this court on appeal from the judgment of the court of common pleas of this county and is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. It is a suit brought by the plaintiff, Mary Harbeson, as administratrix of the estate of Sarah C. Fair, deceased, against William M. Mellinger and the American Surety Company of New York, defendants, to recover from the said defendants the widow's share of the personal estate of her husband, Christian Fair, deceased, who died June 14, 1903, leaving a last will and testament, containing, among other provisions, the following: "Item 2. I hereby direct that after my death my children or their legal representatives shall pay my funeral expenses and all my other debts, and the residue of my estate not hereby be |