indictment, if they choose to abolish the grand jury system. Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129.

This provision adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. Sovereignty for the purpose of protecting the rights of life and personal liberty when assailed by others, rests in the States alone. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; S. C. I Woods, 308.

The Federal Government has no power to punish individuals for conspiring to deprive a person of life or liberty, without due process of law. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542.

A State law regulating a pursuit or profession, or regulating the use of property, does not in any manner abridge the liberty of citizens. Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80; S. C. 94 U. S. 113; Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323.

The entry of a judgment on a forfeited recognizance does not take the property of the cognizor without due process of law. People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83.

A State law which prohibits common carriers from discriminating against passengers on account of race or color, does not deprive them of property without due process of law. Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. I.

A levy by a collector in pursuance of a State law, to collect a tax, is due process of law. McMillen v. Anderson, 27 La. Ann. 18.

A State law allowing overseers of the poor to commit an alleged vagrant to the workhouse on an ex parte hearing, is void, for it deprives him of his liberty without due process of law. An ex parte decision is not such process. Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120.

A statute authorizing a commissioner to ascertain whether lewd and debauched women are among the passengers, and to prevent them from landing, is valid. Ex parte Ah Fook, 49 Cal. 402.

A statute regulating the use, or even the price of the use of private property, does not necessarily deprive an owner of his property without due process of law. Under some circumstances it may, but not under all. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; s. c. 69 Ill. 80.

When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only. Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When one, therefore, devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; S. C. 69 Ill. 80.

A State statute regulating the charges for the storage of grain by warehouses is valid. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; S. C. 69 Ill. 80.

If no state of facts could exist that would justify a statute regulating the use of private property, then the act would be void; but if it could, the presumption is that it did. The legislature is the exclusive judge of the propriety of interference within the scope of legislative power. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; s. c. 69 Ill. 80.

What is a reasonable compensation for the use of property is a legislative and not a judicial question, when the legislature has acted on the subject. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; S. c. 69 Ill. 80.

The assessment of a tax is necessarily summary, and need not be by a judicial proceeding. It is valid, although the party had no opportunity to be present when he was assessed. McMillen v. Anderson, 6 A. L. J. 335.

An arrest made by an officer of the State militia in pursuance of authority granted to him by the governor against persons in insurrection, does not deprive any person of liberty without due process of law, for in times of insurrection the sword is due process of law. In re Bergen, 2 Hughes, 512.

Equal Protection.

This provision does not add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States, and still remains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of the National Government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

Any outrages, atrocities, or conspiracies, whether against the colored race or white race, which do not flow from the war of races, but spring from the ordinary felonious or criminal intent which prompts to such unlawful acts, are not within the jurisdiction of the United States, but within the sole jurisdiction of the States, unless the States, by their laws, deny to any particular race equality of rights. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

The war of race, whether it assumes the dimensions of civil strife or domestic violence, whether carried on in a guerilla or predatory form, or by private combinations, or even by private outrage or intimidation, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States, and when any atrocity is committed which may be assigned to this cause, it may be pun

ished by the laws and in the courts of the United States. U. S. v. Cruikshank, I Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

If the wrong is of that character which permits of its being done only by certain classes of persons, or by one sex, and not by the other, the Constitution does not require that the remedy shall be broader than the evil, or be made to act upon persons other than those whose conduct produces the mischief, or stand in the way of the legislature's directing the remedy by special designation against the class or sex to which the wrong or evil is exclusively due. Ex parte Nellie Smith, 38 Cal. 702.

A statute which authorizes a recovery of double the value of the live stock destroyed by railroad trains at points where the roads are not fenced, and where the right to fence exists, is valid, and does not deprive the corporation of the equal protection of the laws. Tredway v. S. C. & St. P. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 527.

A statute prohibiting females from being in places where liquors are sold, after a certain hour at night, is valid. Ex parte Nellie Smith, 38 Cal.

702.

A State law prohibiting Chinese from testifying in any action wherein a white person is a party, does not, in criminal cases, deprive them of the equal protection of the laws. People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198.

All persons, whether native or foreign, high or low, are, while within the jurisdiction of the United States, entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Equality of protection implies not only equal accessibility to the courts for the prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of rights, but equal exemption, with others of the same class, from all charges and burdens of every kind. Ex parte Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144.

A statute regulating the charges for storage in warehouses, in certain places, does not deprive the owners of the equal protection of the laws. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

A State, while providing a system of education, can not exclude colored children from its benefits merely because of their African descent, for this would deny them the equal protection of the laws. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; contra, Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush, 681.

Unless separate schools are in fact maintained for colored children, all children, whether white or colored, have an equal right to become pupils at any common school organized under the laws of the State. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36.

A statute providing for the education of colored children in schools separate from those provided for the education of white children, is valid. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198.

A State law which inflicts a more severe punishment for adultery or fornication, where the parties are of different races, than where they are of the same race, is valid. Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150; Ellis v. State, 42 Ala. 525.

Disability.

The intention of the people was to create a disability to be made operative by the legislation of Congress, in its ordinary course. Legislation by Congress is necessary to give effect to the prohibition by providing for the removal. The exercise by an officer of his functions until removed, in pursuance of such legislation, is not unlawful. Ex parte Cæsar Griffin, 25 Tex. Supp. 623; s. C. Chase, 364; Powell v. Boon, 43 Ala. 469.

A person engaged in the rebellion, who held office under the Confederate Government, or voluntarily aided the rebellion by personal services or contribution other than charitable, of anything that was useful or necessary in the confederate service, is disqualified. Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C. 199.

A sheriff who took an oath to support the Constitution is within this prohibition. Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C. 199.

A county attorney who took the oath to support the Constitution is within the prohibition. In re William L. Tate, 63 N. C. 308.

Did not this amendment bar any other punishment? Ex parte Jefferson Davis, Chase, I.

Confederate Debt.

No contract to be paid in confederate notes can be enforced, for that would be a payment of the confederate debt. Smith v. Nelson, 34 Tex. 516.

[The following amendment was proposed at the third session of the fortieth Congress. 16 Stat.]

ARTICLE XV.

SEC. I. The right of citizens of the United States to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

This amendment does not establish the right of any citizen to vote. It merely declares that race, color, or previous condition of servitude shall not exclude him. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542

The object and effect of this amendment was to place the colored man in the matter of suffrage on the same basis with the white. It does not give him the right to vote independent of the restrictions and qualifications, such as age and residence, imposed by the State laws upon the white man. Anthony v. Halderman, 7 Kans. 50.

No person can claim the right to vote under this provision, unless he is a citizen of the United States. Hedgman v. State, 26 Mich. 51.

This amendment deprives the provisions of the State constitutions and laws restricting the exercise of suffrage to white persons of all legal force and efficacy. Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Oregon, 568; Anthony v. Halderman, 7 Kans. 50.

The amendment does not confer an authority to impose a penalty for every wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a qualified elector at State elections. It is only where the wrongful refusal at such an election is because of race, color or previous condition of servitude, that Congress can interfere and provide for its punishment. U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.

This amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents the States from giving preference to one citizen of the United States over another, on account of race, color or previous condition of of servitude. It has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protective power of Congress. U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

The limitation which is prescribed by the amendment must not be overlooked. It is not the right to vote which is guaranteed to all citizens. Congress can not interfere with the regulation of that right by the States, except to prevent by appropriate legislation, any distinction as to race, color or previous condition. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542; U. S. v. Petersburg Judges, 14 A. L. Reg. 105, 238.

This clause confers a positive right which did not exist before. The language is peculiar. It is composed of two negatives. The right shall not be denied. That is, the right shall be enjoyed; the right, namely, the right to be exempt from the disability of race, color or previous condition of servitude, as respects the right to vote. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.

one.

The right conferred and guaranteed is not an absolute, but a relative This clause does not confer the right to vote. That is the prerogative of the State laws. It only confers a right not to be excluded from voting by reason of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and this is all the right that Congress can enforce. U. S. v. Cruikshank, I Woods, 308; S. C. 92 U. S. 542.