it was still considered a natural right for the father · to restrain and control the actions of his minor child, and the husband those of his wife. This was the condition of the law of domestic relations at the beginning of the present century. Since then there has been a gradual emancipation of the wife from the control of the husband in this country, in the more advanced States the married woman having the same freedom from restraint as the single woman. We are also on the eve of witnessing the abrogation of the supposed natural right of the parent to control the actions of his minor child, and to educate it spiritually and intellectually as he should see fit. Instead of recognizing in the parent a right to exercise this control over the minor child, the latest judicial opinion treats this control of the child as a trust, reposed by the State in the parent for the benefit of the child; and that whenever the State should determine that the trust is not being properly executed, or that the public interests or the interests of the child require the execution of the trust by the State itself, there is no limit to the power of the State to interfere with the parental control. The confinement of minor children in reformatory schools, and compulsory education by the State, to the exclusion of private education, can alone be justified by a denial of any right in the parent to determine the destiny of his

child.' Thus we see, according to the earliest law of the Aryan races, the individual had no legal standing, and was the subject of no rights, unless he happened to be the head of a family. In this representative capacity, he was the autocratic possessor of all the rights of the family. At the present time, each individual stands free before the law, the independent possessor of his own rights, except when tender age or mental imbecility require him for his own good to be placed under tutelage.

There is, therefore, no such thing, even in ethics, as an absolute, inalienable, natural right. The socalled natural rights depend upon, and vary with, the legal and ethical conceptions of the people. As presently developed, the doctrine of natural rights may be tersely stated to be a freedom from all legal restraint that is not needed to prevent injury to others; a right to do any thing that does not involve a trespass or injury to others; or, to employ the language of Herbert Spencer: "Every man has freedom to do aught that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other The prohibitory operation of the law must be confined to the enforcement of the legal maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non lædas. This right of 1 See Tiedeman's "Limitations of Police Power," §§ 165, 166, 166a, 167.

2 "Social Statics," p. 121.

freedom from needless restraint has been guaranteed to the British subject by the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights. And while these several state papers, which in the main constitute the English Constitution, are in fact acts of Parliament, repealable by any Parliament, yet their contents are so highly esteemed by public opinion that they have been raised above ordinary enactments, and practically operate to restrain the power of Parliament. An act of Parliament, which would flagrantly violate the fundamental principles of the Magna Charta, could not be enforced, and the political future of the party and persons responsible for its enactment would be irretrievably damaged. But there is no binding force in the prohibitions of the Magna Charta, except so far as they are now voiced by public sentiment. The solemn enactment of this celebrated statute undoubtedly does check the growth of public sentiment away from its principles; but if an act of Parliament should be passed in accordance with some great public demand, the fact that it violated these principles would not prevent its enforcement by the courts. Mr. Austin, therefore, is justified in saying that English constitutional law belongs to the province of ethics, and cannot be called a branch of jurisprudence.

These same declarations of natural rights have

been incorporated into the American constitutions, both State and Federal. The Federal Constitution contains specific and general limitations upon the power of both State and Federal governments, while the State constitutions impose limitations upon the respective State governments. Most of the State constitutions also contain formal declarations, called Bills of Rights, enumerating somewhat in detail the rights of the citizen which the State government must respect. Thus the prevalent doctrine of natural rights was formulated and made a part of the organic law of the land, to be respected and enforced until repealed or changed by the proper authority. All the American constitutions make it the duty of the courts to prevent any violation of these rights by the other departments of the government by refusing to enforce laws which contain such violations of constitutional rights.

With the general growth and spread of popular government, there appeared a political philosophy whose central thought and fundamental maxim was, that society, collectively and individually, can attain, its highest development by being left free from governmental control, as far as this is possible, provision being made by the government only for the protection of the individual and of society by the punishment of crimes and trespasses. The so-called laissez-faire philosphy has, until lately, so controlled

public opinion in the English-speaking world, that no disposition has been manifested by the depositaries of political power to do more than to control the criminal classes, provide for the care of the unfortunate poor and insane, and make public improvements. Hence in the early days of our national life, the discussions in constitutional law were chiefly confined to a consideration of the more formal provisions, which determined the methods of governmental procedure, and defined the limits of each branch of the government, the all-important question being the relative superiority of the National and State governments. In those days little was thought of those "glittering generalities," as they were called, which made it a part of our constitutional law that man is possessed of certain inalienable rights, that cannot be denied to him by government, and which denied to government the power to do more than to prevent the infliction of injuries upon others. These general declarations of private rights were not then considered as important in controlling the power of government, because the government manifested no disposition to violate them. But a change has since then come over the political thought of the country. Under the stress of economical relations, the clashing of private interests, the conflicts of labor and capital, the old superstition that government has the power to banish evil from the earth, if it could only be