might have been pardoned had he begun to believe in the smiles of the fickle goddess. Now, a few sincere friends alone stood by him; among whom Whig statesmen, no longer in opposition, could scarcely be numbered. For, brilliant as his talents were admitted to be as a partisan officer, and perfect master as he was of the Spanish language, no employment could be found for him even with General Evans's legion, then in the heyday of its renown. At last he was taken up by Lord Aberdeen, who appointed him to the Consulate which he still holds, and in which capacity, on the occasion of the French differences with Queen Pomare, he rendered excellent service. He deserved, in our opinion, a better fate, and would have attained it, too, under any system of government less fettered by routine than that under which the affairs of this favoured nation are administered.

176

INDIA AND ITS ARMY.*

WE have no intention of criticising the merits, literary or otherwise, of the works which, in their titles, stand at the head of this Essay. They are full of interest, every one of them; not more on account of the importance of the subjects to which they refer, than because they are suggestive to such as read them attentively of very grave reflections. Who can doubt that for the last twelve or thirteen years the existence of the British empire in the

*The following are the titles of the works on which this Essay was based on its publication in the "Edinburgh Review" in 1853:

1.A'Letter to the Marquess of Tweeddale. By MajorGeneral BRIGGS, Madras Army. 1842.

2. The War in Affghanistan. By JOHN WILLIAM KAYE. 2 vols.

1851.

3. History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde. By Lieutenant-General Sir WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B. 1851.

4. Remarks on the Affairs of India. By JOHN SULLIVAN, Esq. 1852.

5. Report from the Select Committee on our Indian Terri

tories. 1852.

East has been hanging continually in the balance? Who can flatter himself that the scales have even now subsided into their proper places, and that all danger is past? Had the native powers better understood one another, and the disaffected within our own provinces been more energetic in their councils, the disasters in Affghanistan might have lighted up a blaze from one end of India to another, which we should have found it difficult if not impossible to extinguish. Had Burmah been ready and the Punjab further advanced, the march of Lord Gough upon Gwalior would have been the signal for an inburst through Arracan, and across the Sutlej, and so onwards to Delhi and Calcutta. Had the Sikhs been aware that our cavalry were fleeing from the field, how many of the gallant men who stood to their arms amid heaps of dead outside the lines of Ferozeshur would have survived to speak of their escapes and their daring? And then, with Hardinge and Gough and their stout army annihilated, what was there to prevent a general rising of the whole Asiatic population, and the consequent expulsion of the English from their land? Nor are other and scarcely less alarming truths kept back from our notice. It is impossible to deny that we are indebted for the continuance

of our supremacy in the East, quite as much to the favours of fortune as to the skill of our leaders and the bravery of our troops. Was not the advance of the enemy upon Moodkee made known to us only by the falling of their round shot about our ears? Does it not appear that, in the judgment of Sir Charles Napier at least, the famous flank-movement from Loodianah, which is supposed to have averted defeat, was an operation contrary to all the laws of strategy, and perfectly impracticable except in the face of a very rude enemy? How came 30,000 Sikhs to lie idly in their encampment within a few hours' march of Ferozeshur all the time that the battle was raging? And earlier still, when the Sikhs were beginning to threaten, and the whole army of Scinde had been prostrated with sickness, when Napier himself lay exhausted at Suckur, and his disputes with the Bombay Government were at the bitterest,-what was it that stopped the hill hordes from pouring down into the plain and taking vengeance for the defeats of Meeanee and Hyderabad? Far be it from us to undervalue that of which Sir William Napier is justly proud -the terror of his brother's name. We believe that it was as potent as a naturally partial historian represents it to have been; and

we know as well as he does how potent is such a spell among the tribes of central Asia. But even the terror of a name cannot altogether account for a state of rest so opportune among a people proverbially prone to indulge the passion of revenge, and singularly expert in obtaining information. No; we must unquestionably refer our deliverances, for such they were, to some influence beyond the compass of human ability. For, speak of the affair as we will, we were on fifty different occasions at the mercy of our enemies. of our enemies. Where were the proofs of attachment to our cause when 40,000 men were enabled to arrive within cannon shot of our outposts without one native out of all whom we professed to take under our protection coming in to tell us of their advance? Nor is this all. When the day of trial arrives, we do not find, as in former years, that every part of our army is to be trusted. The official despatches which describe recent great battles, with the lists of killed and wounded that accompany them, tell a tale as alarming as it is novel. We miss the forwardness in strife which used to characterise the Sepoys of other days, and cannot discover that they anywhere paid the penalty of their daring. The English regiments go to their work with a will; and