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then give them to the best and strongest riders to gallop them bent'—i. e., placed as for shoulder in' for considerable distances. This procedure is also recommended to anyone who has the misfortune to come in for a hard-mouthed horse ruined on the rece-course-a bolter, in fact.”

Yet if the Germans, with three years' service, can accomplish it, surely the matter is within our power.

To continue, when the horses have learned to go with their heads steady, without tossing, and a light feeling on the mouth, and, further, understand the pressure of the leg on one side only, one can proceed to collect their quarters under them by the pressure of both legs, to bring about the even distribution of weight on all four legs above referred to, and for this purpose the practice of a short collected trot is the best means, when the eye of the instructor is the best guide as to whether the quarters really are brought under the body or not. Then follows the collected canter. Again, the object is not the shortness of the stride, but the degree to which the quarters are really brought under. This must be proceeded with very gradually; it can not be hurried without the risk of breaking down the animal or ruining its temper. Its object is, besides making the horse more obedient, to strengthen the back muscles so as to give it greater speed and endurance when really extended.

As regards training the young horse to jump, he approves of driving them unbacked down a lane with obstacles, the height of which is gradually increased. Then the lane must be widened from 10 to 15 paces and the horses ridden. Except to teach obedience, he is entirely against jumping from the trot or walk, as it is unnatural to the horse. He has no objection to their rushing their fences somewhat, provided they do not stop short and buck over. It may in peace time spoil the dressing of a line; in war-time condition, the rushing will correct itself.

A wide jump of 8 to 9 feet suffices; and once the horses jump fairly willingly they must be trained over jumps without wing walls. On climbing up and down steep banks he lays particular importance.

One or two points deserve attention. Rosenberg is most bitter against those cavalrymen in his country who believe that the school and drill ground suffice for the training of officers and men, and recalls the many sins of omission to the discredit of the arm in Bohemia and France. On the other han he is quite as merciless on those of his comrades who think because they can ride a steeplechase or follow the hounds without falling off, therefore they have nothing to learn from military equitation. Both are essential to perfection in either, and he is particularly down on the theory that correct training and balance injures a horse's speed; but to that I have referred above. conclusion, I would beg those who have followed me thus far to remember that these are the views of no theoretical horseman, but of one of the first cavalrymen in Europe, and everything he says is founded on years of experience. If, therefore, some of his demands appear excessive and not attainable from our cavalry as it is, the fault must be in our system of training, or, rather, in the way in which the system is interpreted. We have made immense progress in the past few years, which should encourage us to further efforts; but, judging by the printed reports of recent cavalry maneuvers, the tendency seems to be to assume that our individual horsemanship and squadron leading is all that can be desired, and failures are to be attributed to the tactical employment of the arm, and not to the deficiencies within the squadrons themselves. The endeavor to disinter the old corrupt theory of a charge in many echelons, instead of with the bulk of force in line, recently advanced in India, is a case in point. If we can not charge 16 squadrons in line, it is not because the thing is in itself impossible, but simply because our individual training and squadron leading is not up to the required standard.

But with every European trained army a period of transition is unavoidable.

There were quite a number of most spirited charges by squadrons and troops which showed conclusively how little cavalry have to fear from undisciplined infantry, whatever the name of the weapon they carry.

It is not that our officers do too little work and too much play, but that the work is wasted in the wrong directions. The same amount of work devoted to essentials only would suffice to give us all we require. I have repeatedly seen regiments in India transformed within six weeks by these methods.

Drill alone will not, however, suffice. Horse mastership is equally essential, but this would come as a consequence of the demands made on the drill ground, if once the squadron commanders were made really responsible for the efficiency of their squadrons.

Emulation would soon find out the way. The man whose squadron best fulfilled the demands of the inspector-general would at once become a marked man, and his comrades would be quick to find out the cause of his success.

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It is this and nothing else which accounts for the general excellence of the Prussian cavalry, and for the very high standard of technical knowledge shown by the numerous works dealing with the care of the horse in stables and his training, which lighten the difficulties in the path of the German cavalry officer.

But they were not known, in the sense of being the very flesh and blood of our existence, because it had never been worth the average officer's while to master them.

Now, every cavalry in Europe uses the blanket under the saddle, and have used it for generations, and neither the Austrians or Germans get sore backs in the field. Two per cent in the whole campaign of 1870 was about the normal average in Prussian regiments, and these horses carrying loads at least as heavy as our own-for their men throughout are somewhat heavier than ours—were covering distances of 50 to 100 miles four days out of five, and were often under the saddle for fortyeight to sixty hours at a time.

And they treat the young horse with the same individual attention as Sandow bestows on a promising athlete-bringing out his muscles and developing his form with almost equal results, but then every regiment possesses a few trained experts who can judge by the feel of the horse under him whether the instruction is proceeding in the proper way.

The fact is that the Germans only excel in those things which can be accomplished by energy stimulated by emulation without extra expense. When it comes to squeezing money out of the Treasury, they suffer almost, if not quite, as much as we do ourselves.

In the present state of metallurgy I believe an ideal saddle could be made either entirely of aluminium or with aluminium fans united by compressed steel arches, and the weight should not exceed 6 pounds.

Aluminium when first tried was both soft and expensive. Now its strength has been increased threefold and its cost will soon not exceed 1 shilling a pound.

I would use aluminium bits, stirrup irons, and horseshoes, and would effect thus an economy of at least 6 pounds.

Further, it has always been assumed that for bridles, headstalls, etc., there is “nothing like leather,” and perhaps in a fairly moist climate this may be so, but in the intensely dry places we have to serve in, experience has led me to believe that almost anything is better than leather. Why not try some woven material for a change. Bridles, headstalls, and stirrup leathers made of some stuff like sail cloth, with a steel-wire web woven in, would be both stronger and lighter than existing gear, and in dry climates far more reliable.

Light cavalry and medium must, of course, be able to charge as opportunity offers, on the principle that “a kick from even a quiet horse hurts;" but if they are trained to that "unconditional” obedience of horse to man, so often referred to above, the power to charge follows as a matter of course.

Hence, as I have pointed out many times before, if the fire of 5,000 Chassepots to the mile of front failed to stop the Prussian cavalry at a time when it was admittedly far inferior to its present standard, there is no reason to suppose that 500 Mausers to the mile would have any better result. In neither case does the range signify, as cavalry well handled will find some means, either of ground or opportunity, to strike without undue warning.

But down in the hollow beyond a still greater surprise awaited me, for here ran a stream some 6 feet broad in a trench 40 feet across from cutting line to cutting line, and at least 12 feet deep-a big in and out with running water where one would have wanted to take off. It would have scattered any ordinary hunting field; but a battery and eight regiments of cavalry had swept over it all without a single man down at the fullest extended speed of their horses." I afterwards met the officer command. ing the battery, who told me that except for one wheeler badly bruised by the downward blow of the pole, not a single one of his horses had been in the least the worse for the jump and scramble. I have seen horse artillery do many wonderful things, but never anything to equal this.

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EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE ON ARMY REORGANIZATION.

By the EDITOR. Published in the United Service Magazine for April, 1901.]

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The proper rôle of reserves is that they should complete for service a comparatively small balance between peace and war strength and subsequently replace casualties. * All this has been simply because neither Parliament nor the country has taken army questions seriously, and no thought for the morrow has disturbed our complacent view of the good or evil of to-day.

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The Boers, indeed, have shown us what a nation in arms can do, but only under the particular conditions of a people existing to a great extent as did primitive man.

Indifferent drill may suffice for the first, as it has sufficed for the Boers; but only the most perfect training can produce a reasonable imitation of that proficiency, which is essential when the individual himself becomes the fighting unit.

* The British army has all along suffered under the serious disadvantage that, however keen its officers may have been and however sensible they may have been that training in the use of ground” is essential, the necessary ground for the proper training of officers and men has never been available.

He (Mr. Brodrick) apparently fails to realize that the fault does not really lie in the excess of barrack-square exercises, but in the fact that owing to the superabundance of duties, fatigues, employments, etc., there are seldom any men available for real work.

We are glued to the barrack square, because we have no men for anything else, and when by any luck we have the men there is no exercise ground upon which to train them. *

The Boer dispenses with good drill because he is already a perfect light-infantry soldier; so were the North American Indians and all other primitive fighting races. But the inhabitants of thickly populated civilized countries are not ready-made soldiers, and their military education needs, therefore, to be progressive. *

Mr. Brodrick hints at the possible need of compulsory service as a last resort, and, indeed, it seems that either the advantages of the army must be considerably increased or else we shall be compelled to face the bugbear that has for so long been threatening us.

For the defense of this Kingdom and the Empire Mr. Brodrick relies, very properly, first, on the navy, and, secondly, upon the offensive action of an army sent beyond the seas, the original strength of which is to be three army corps. Ample provision is also made for what is known as “home defense"--a term the interpretation of which varies according to the understandings of individuals.

What we need is that the navy shall be free to go where it pleases, in order that by concentration, where such may be needed, it may the better thrust home its superiority by decisive action. Meanwhile, during the temporary absence of the fleet, our military forces must be capable of repelling any efforts of the adversary to take advantage of our unprotected state by effecting a landing on our shores. For the prompt action that such a case would demand well-trained troops are requisite

to provide in three more regularly constituted army corps, containing selected militia and volunteer corps. These three army corps would furnish a backbone for the other troops, militia and volunteers, that would also be available.

The division of the United Kingdom into six army corps districts, having at the head of each the general officer who would lead the army corps in war, naturally paves the way for the “centralization of responsibility and decentralization of administration” that is so essential to efficiency. It is to be hoped, however, that no attempt will be made to collect the bulk of the army corps in general at their respective headquarters; but rather to assemble them annually for maneuvers from the out stations where the various units have been working themselves up to a condition of efficiency qualifying them to exhibit that efficiency before their general. It can not too strongly be insisted upon that troops should not go to maneuvers to learn their work, but to show that they have mastered it. Thus the generals and staff officers can have tools ready to work with, instead of being compelled to first manufacture the tools before commencing their own proper tasks. * Concentration of troops is useless unless the various units have plenty of ground available for company, battalion, and greater exercises. The plan should be concentration for maneuver with dispersion for training, unless the available ground in the vicinity of a great camp is practically unlimited.

To keep interest there must be novelty, and this on a road soon becomes unattainable.

And if it can further be arranged that the Admiralty shall actually take over the defense of its coaling stations the total gain will be very great.

* The real value of the militia has too long been ignored, and the force has lost its popularity in the majority of districts. Therefore the undeniable improvements now contemplated may have come too late. The abolition of the militia reserve for the army was an essential step that was urgently required. The position of the militia reservist was a wholly false one, as regarded both himself and his regiment.

Of all the inisread “Lessons of the war” none has been so utterly misunderstood as that relating to the employment and utility of cavalry.

But the abolition of genuine cavalry capable of charging is ridiculous.

Cavalry should be first rate as such, and trained also to fight on foot. Mounted infantry should be first-rate infantry who have also learned to ride well and to look

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properly after the welfare of their horses. But the real duties of the two arms are entirely distinct. Either can attempt the work of the other imperfectly, but for real efficiency a specialist is required in this case, as in most others. The jack-of-alltrades is proverbially master of none. Nor is it true that the shock action of cavalry is obsolete. The opportunities in the future will be more rare, I admit, but when they occur and are properly seized they will be decisive beyond the wildest dreams of ambition.

De Wet charged when cornered at Springhaan's Nek, and broke through in spite of magazine rifles; but how would he have fared had his mounted infantrymen during that charge been fallen upon by a few squadrons of cavalry riding horses fit to go? *

The proposals with reference to the higher training of all, and more especially of the selected volunteer corps, as well as the formation of militia and volunteer heavy batteries with 4.7 guns, can not be too highly commended. * Sandhurst especially, and Woolwich also, must be reformed so that the cadets shall learn thoroughly their early duties rather than waste time over the theory and paper elements of war.

If we can get really efficient second lieutenants time and further study will produce general officers of reasonable quality. We must first educate our young officers in a sound practical fashion and then see that they have ground at their disposal, wherever they may be, so that they may at the same time continue their own education and teach their men.

But let him furnish all officers' quarters and messes.

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EXTRACTS FROM MUSKETRY REFORM.

[By an AssistANT ADJUTANT.

Published in the United Service Magazine for April, 1901.]'

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Among the numerous impending reforms in our Army it is only to be supposed that the subject of musketry will receive the most serious attention of the authorities.

Campaigns may be influenced by superior marching powers on the part of the men or superior leadership on the part of officers or half a dozen other factors, but when it comes to the actual battle the side which brings the most destructive fire to bear on its opponent is the side which wins, and it is useless to argue that the most destructive fire is anything but that in which the most shots hit their objective, i. e., the best-aimed fire.

If men are first made good individual shots, provided they are properly trained and practiced together, they will be all the better at volleys. *

In the case of musketry there has been an additional source of confusion in the rapid alterations and improvements in the rifle and its ammunition. I will begin by briefly alluding to the school of musketry at Hythe.

All officers and senior noncommissioned officers throughout the Army are obliged to undergo a regular course of instruction at this school in order that they may in turn be qualified to instruct the rank and file of their own units in a uniform manner throughout the Army and in accordance with the latest theories. It must be admitted that with all

its faults Hythe has done very useful work, and the officers and noncommissioned officers who have experienced a course of instruction thereat have undoubtedly derived a great deal of benefit, or at any rate have been given the opportunity of doing so.

Every rigid, stereotyped formation under fire, for even one section, is just as dangerous to permit as a stereotyped battalion attack.

As regards the question of expense, it might easily be shown by figures that the money which is yearly spent in transporting troops by rail from one station to another for the purpose of musketry, not to speak of the maintenance of musketry camps, would far more than pay the possibly high rents that would in some instances be demanded for such range accommodations as I have proposed in the vicinity of barracks.

Every range should have a suitable covered building with sitting accommodations for at least half a company, to enable men to take shelter from the weather and to keep themselves warm until their turn for shooting comes round.

It is almost incredible that the amount of ammunition allowed by regulation during the year for a trained soldier to keep himself in practice in individual firing is the ridiculously inadequate number of 42 rounds, the remainder of the 200 rounds being blazed away in collective practices.

And a man should most certainly practice to shoot at every distance in every position. * Prizes should be given for the highest aggregate at the end of the year, and the

WAR 1901—VOL 1, PT III -15

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money for the same might be drawn pretty much on the lines that now exist. Returns should be reduced to a minimum and might be less complicated than those now used.

Each company should keep what might be called “The company progress return, which should contain a year's work and show each man's score after each day's firing. It should be kept up to date and a copy posted in a conspicuous place in each company quarters.

All volley firing or field firing should be carried out as part of the annual field training, and most of it could be done with blank. * Regarding distances, all ranges should, if possiole, permit of practice up to 1,000 yards; but there may be stations at which shorter distances only are available.

No man ever fires or should ever fire at a figure. . He must, if he takes any aim at all, select some spot, such as a button or a man's face, which for the occasion becomes the bull's eye. * * *

Some arrangement of disappearing targets should also be used. gestion that exemption is a privilege should not be tolerated.

There most certainly should be at least two staff-sergeant instructors of musketry in each battalion.

I shall therefore recapitulate briefly. *

Shooting, to be made interesting and enjoyable to the men, and not allowed to be identified, as it too often is, with extra hardships, long marches, overcrowded camps, and a general hustle.?

* The sugo

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EXTRACTS FROM THE SERVICE KIT OF THE INFANTRY SOLDIER.

(By Maj. G. W. W. SAVILE, Middlesex Regiment. Published in the United Service Magazine for

April, 1901.)

Water bottle.

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I have found an aluminum one covered with felt a great suc

cess in India and South Africa. It is very light and keeps the water nice and cool.

I think, however, it could be improved by fitting a cup onto the bottom with the strap passing round it, the cup should be covered with felt as well, or it would get very hot. * The bottle should be fastened to the strap by swivels so as to take it off easily to drink out of or to refill it. The waterbottle strap should be of webbing and not leather.

This is the most useful article the soldier carries, but it could Mess tin.

be made lighter if made of aluminum.

This has been found most useful by the men in this campaign, Waterproof sheet.

not only as a ground sheet but as a waterproof case. think the sheet should be 6 feet 6 inches by 4 feet broad to serve this double purpose.

The present home helmet is a thing of misery and always gives Head dress.

me a headache. The Indian khaki helmet is much better in this respect. * * The majority of the men are in favor of the slouch hat, which certainly is very comfortable and looks smart, but I doubt if it is a sufficient protection against a tropical sun-it certainly would not do in India.

The Egyptian sun hat worn by officers of a good many regiments seems to be as good as anything. *

* The hat also covers the ears, which the helmet does not. Clothing: the coat.

Khaki drill is certainly better as a wearing material than serge,

which goes at the points, elbows, knees, etc., in no time. The coat should have a loose turn-down collar and with four pockets.

These should not be worn, but breeches, or knickerbocker Trousers.

breeches, loose at the knee, with continuations of the same material down to the socks; such an article can then be worn in camp or at night with or without putties or gaiters. As to material, the breeches having to stand more wear and tear than the coat, they should be made of some kind of corduroy, more the class of stuff worn by navvi

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1 A more important matter is that once the soldier has become a good shot he should learn to be a real marksman by shooting at unknown distances. To make such advanced practices useful and realistic it is essential that when a bullet hits a target the man who has fired the shot shall be able to observe the fact. In short, the target must fall and then swing back.- Ed. U. S. M.

2 The best system of prizes is a bag of coppers from which to deal out a penny for every bull's eye then and there. Even the bad shot knows that he may make a fluke, and is thus encouraged to try his best up to the last round. It is not the amount won, but the pleasure of immediate winning that has influence. -Ed. U. S.M.

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