198 GENERAL SHAFTER'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. GENERAL SHAFTER'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. W HEN the perils were past, the victory won, and the graves were closed above the heroes who fell on bloody fields about Santiago, Major-General Shafter issued, under date of July 19, 1898, the following address to his victorious army: "The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago, resulting in its downfall and the surrender of the Spanish forces and the capture of large amounts of military stores, together with the destruction of the entire Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment of the city, was forced to leave, is one of which this army can well be proud. This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the army, and to its officers and men the major-general commanding offers his sincere thanks, for their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in the American army. "The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of your countrymen, and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world's history. Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking and overcame obstacles that, even in looking back, seem insurmountable. "Seizing, with the assistance of the navy, the towns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly forth, gallantly driving back the enemy's outpost in the engagement of Las Quasima, and completed the concentration of the enemy near Sevilla, within sight of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevilla was one that might well have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road, made well nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you looked out upon high foothills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only be traversed by bridle paths, terminating within range of the enemy's guns. "Nothing deterred, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon the foe, and, attacking at Caney and San Juan, drove him from work to work until he took refuge within his last and strongest entrenchments, immediately surrounding the city. "Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstocd his attempts to drive you from the position your valor had won. Holding in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you, after seventeen days of battle and siege, you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000 prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate 1 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 199 front, the others scattered in the various towns of Eastern Cuba, freeing completely the eastern part of the island from Spanish troops. "This was not done without great sacrifices. The death of 230 gallant soldiers and the wounding of 1,284 others shows but too plainly the fierce contest in which you were engaged. The few reported missing are undoubtedly among the dead, as no prisoners were lost. "For those who have fallen in battle with you, the commanding general sorrows, and, with you, will ever cherish their memory. Their devotion to duty sets a high example of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. All who have participated in the campaign, battle and siege of Santiago de Cuba will recall with pride the grand deeds accomplished, and will hold one another dear for having shared in the suffering, hardships and triumphs together. All may well feel proud to inscribe on their banners. the name of Santiago de Cuba. "By command of Major-General Shafter. "E. J. MCCLERNAND, “Assistant Adjutant-General.” THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. How our army was mobilized, and the military operations in Cuba and Porto Rico conducted. A BY Naesont. Miles S the general commanding, on November 10, 1898, General Miles made his report to the War Departinent, of the campaigns in Cuba and Porto Rico. Prefatory to his descriptions of the active engagements of our forces on foreign soil, he represented the condition of our army at the outbreak of the war with Spain, and recapitulated the measures taken by Congress to prepare the country for offensive operations. Continuing his report, General Miles wrote: At the beginning of the war the problem was largely a naval one, and military operations had to be delayed, pending the success or failure of the naval forces. There were two. obstacles to be avoided-one was placing an. 200 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. army on the Island of Cuba before our navy controlled the Cuban waters, and the other was putting an army on the island at a time when a large number of the men must die from the diseases that have prevailed in that country, according to all statistics, for the last one hundred years. As soon as hostilities were commenced, expeditions were organized to aid the Cubans, and the attempts of Lieutenant Rowan and Lieutenant Whitney to ascertain existing conditions in Cuba and Porto Rico proved very successful. Organizing the Definite information having been received that Cervera's fleet had been enclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba by the navy, orders were given to General Shafter, May 30, 1898, to place his troops on transports and go to the assistance of the navy in capturing that fleet and harbor. I desired to go with this expedition, and on June 5 sent a telegram to the Secretary of War, requesting that I be allowed to do so. The next day I received a message, asking the earliest moment I could have an expedition ready to go to Porto Rico large enough to take and hold the island without the force under General Shafter, to which I answered by a promise to have everything in readiness within ten days. It was found that many of the steamers were not suitable for transport service, they having been built entirely for freight steamers and not equipped for properly conveying troops and munitions of war. Notwithstanding which difficulties, the expedition sailed on June 14. On June 24 I submitted a plan of campaign, and two days later received an order to organize an expedition for operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. This order directed that "the command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition (General Brooke's), and you will com Campaign Plan mand the forces thus united in person." I was also directed to confer with the senior officer of the navy in those waters, with a view to harmonious action, and arrangements were also completed with General Garcia for the co-operation of the Cuban with the American troops. The expedition against Santiago, commanded by Major-General Shafter, landed at Baiquiri and Siboney June 22, 23 and 24. The subsequent movements of the expedition against the garrison of Santiago were described in full, including the reports. from General Shafter, telling of the taking of El Caney, reporting the fact that he had been ill for four days and that he was urging Admiral Sampson to try to enter the bay. To this I sent a dispatch, Shafter's Report advising that I would be with him (General Shafter) in a week, with strong reinforcements. General Shafter, on July 4, sent word that if Admiral Sampson could force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago he (Shafter) could take the place in a few hours, and asking for 15,000 more. men, if the army was to capture the place by assault. It was then decided that I should go to Santiago at once, and I accordingly did so, reaching that point on July 1. The fleet under Admiral Sampson was then bombarding the Spanish position. At my request Admiral Sampson came over and a conference was held, the Admiral agreeing to my plans as to the co-operation of the navy in the landing of troops. Conference With Sampson. When this arrangement had been concluded, I went on shore and opened communication with General Shafter. I asked him if he had sufficient troops on the east side of the harbor of Santiago to maintain his position, and he replied that he had. I then gave directions for General Garretson to disembark all the troops whenever he should receive orders. On the following morning (July 9th) I rode from Siboney to the headquarters of General Shafter. After consulting with him, he sent a communication to General Toral, saying that the commanding general of the American army had arrived in his camp with reinforcements, and that we desired to meet him between the lines at any time agreeable to him. He replied that he would see us at 12 o'clock the following day. That evening I became apprised of the fact that negotiations regarding a surrender had been pending between the commanding general and the Spanish commander, but no definite conclusions had been reached. At the appointed time, accompanied by Major General Shafter and several others, I met the Spanish general, Toral, with two of his staff officers and an interpreter. After some conversation between General Toral and General Shafter, I informed General Toral distinctly that I had left Washington six days before; that it was then the determination of the government that this portion of the Spanish forces must either be destroyed or captured; that I was there with sufficient reinforcements to accomplish that object, and that if this was not the case any number of troops would be brought there as fast as steamers could bring them if it took 50,000 men. An Ultimatum to I told him that we offered him liberal terms, namely, to return his troops to Spain; and I also pointed out the fact that this was the only way in which his forces could return, they being on an island 3,000 miles away 202 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. from their own country with no means of succor. He said that under the Spanish law he was not permitted to surrender as long as he had ammunition and food, and that he must maintain the honor of the Spanish arins. My reply was that he had already accomplished that; that he must now surrender or take the consequences, and that I would give him until daylight the next morning to decide. He appealed for longer time, saying it was impossible for him to communicate with his superiors, and upon his request I granted him until 12 o'clock noon of the following day. Discretionary Orders to Miles. This The situation I promptly communicated to Washington, and in reply a telegram was received leaving the matter entirely to my discretion-to accept surrender, order an assault, or withhold the same. dispatch, however, ordered a consultation with Admiral Sampson, and urged a prompt settlement of the matter. Orders were at once issued to General Henry to be ready to land the men on the transports, and to Admiral Sampson to cover the debarkation with the fleet. A letter was received at this time from General Toral, asking for another meeting, which I promptly granted. Toral Agreed to On meeting General Toral, by appointment, at 12 o'clock that day, (July 11th) under a flag of truce, at the same place as before, he stated that he was prepared to surrender his command, and that such action was approved by CaptainGeneral Blanco, who had authorized him to appoint commissioners to agree upon the clauses of capitulation, which he was prepared to do, but that before final action it was proper that the government at Madrid should know and approve what was done. He said, however, that he was sure that the government would not fail to endorse his action. His manner was so sincere and the language of General Blanco so positive that I felt no hesitancy in accepting it in good faith, and stated that we would accept the surrender, under the condition that the Spanish troops should be repatriated by the United States. General Toral stated that he would surrender all the troops in the department of Santiago de Cuba, many of them from seventy to 100 miles distant, and against whom not a shot had been fired; yet the activity of the Cuban troops and their dispositions had been such as to render the Spanish positions exceedingly perilous. The surrender being regarded as an accomplished fact, I sent word to that effect to Washington and informed General Shafter that he could appoint the commissioners to complete arrangements for carrying out the terms of surrender. There was some delay in the final capitulation, owing to the non-agreement at first between the two commissions as to the disposition of the small |