The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative VetoPrinceton University Press, 1998. 3. 29. - 178페이지 Jessica Korn challenges the notion that the eighteenth-century principles underlying the American separation of powers system are incompatible with the demands of twentieth-century governance. She demostrates the continuing relevance of these principles by questioning the dominant scholarship on the legislative veto. As a short-cut through constitutional procedure invented in the 1930s and invalidated by the Supreme Court's Chadha decision in 1983, the legislative veto has long been presumed to have been a powerful mechanism of congressional oversight. Korn's analysis, however, shows that commentators have exaggerated the legislative veto's significance as a result of their incorrect assumption that the separation of powers was designed solely to check governmental authority. The Framers also designed constitutional structure to empower the new national government, institutionalizing a division of labor among the three branches in order to enhance the government's capacity. |
목차
Introduction American Constitutionalism and American Political Science | 3 |
The American Separation of Powers Doctrine | 14 |
The Legislative Veto | 27 |
The Legislative Veto over the Federal Trade Commission | 48 |
Legislative Vetoes in Education Statutes | 69 |
Legislative Vetoes over Presidential Authority to Extend MostFavoredNation Status | 91 |
Conclusion | 116 |
Notes | 125 |
Acknowledgments | 167 |
171 | |
175 | |