Senator FERGUSON. That might cover many bureaus of statistics, the so-called heads.

Mr. AMES. Well, the point I make, Senator, is this: That if you have a situation where one bureau keeps statistics and some other bureau or agency keeps exactly the same statistics, then in the name of common sense, I think that sort of a situation should be done away with.

But I think no department or no agency keeps a set of statistics that corresponds with those kept by the Commission.

Senator FERGUSON. Do they keep any parts of those kept by the Commission?

Mr. AMES. Well, your income-tax people probably do, because the railroads report the revenues of course.

Senator MCCARRAN. They keep everything, do they not?

Mr. AMES. Yes; they keep the money, too.

But that is the point I make, that I do not see where you would gain anything from the standpoint of economy by ripping the Commission apart and taking out its working tools.

Senator FERGUSON. How would that rip it apart, if it was furnished-if the same thing was furnished by another department? Where you would have the matter of overhead involved?

Mr. AMES. Well, if you can find that situation, I will be frank with you that it should be corrected. If some other Government agency is keeping the same kind of statistics that the Commission is, they should be combined. That is just common sense. But that is not the case.

You take the Commission's Bureau of Tariffs. Thousands and thousands of tariffs are filed by the carriers every year. There is no agency in Washington that has a comparable set-up.

Now, what good would be accomplished by taking that away from the Commission and putting it over in the Čensus Department? Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know of any other bureau that does keep the same or similar, or part of them?

Mr. AMES. No; I do not.

Senator FERGUSON. Does Commerce?

Mr. AMES. No. To take the Commission's Bureaus away and its Divisions, and things of that kind, would be like asking a carpenter to work without his tools.

They have an extensive library there. The lawyers in the Commission, the Commissioners themselves, need the library. It is one of the best in town. You could take that over and put it in the Congressional Library, but I do not see what good you would accomplish. I do not see what economy you would accomplish.

Senator MCCARRAN. There has been another rumor, that there might be set up a Department of Transportation, into which the ICC and the CAB and others having to do with the various methods of transportation would be all combined under one head, and that heed be a Cabinet officer.

There has been some talk on that.

Mr. AMES. Well, I hope nothing comes of it. I would be as much opposed to that as I would be to this matter of having the Commission lose its independence. I do not see why these agencies performing legislative and judicial functions should be put under an executive department or a Cabinet officer, who is subexecutive.

It just does not go with our form of government.

Senator MCCARRAN. There is only one reason that meets your objection, and that is this: That the so-called housekeeping, to use a homely phrase, the so-called housekeeping phase of any Department, perhaps, should be under the Executive, looking toward econ

omy.

When I say "housekeeping," I mean the extent, the money, that goes to maintain, should be under the thumb of the Executive in order that he may see what is going on in the way of spending.

Now, that is the theory that is advanced, and I just wanted you to get these theories so that you can explode them if you wish. Senator FERGUSON. And who determines how many lawyers the Commission should have and how many economists?

Mr. AMES. Well, the Commission's personnel is appointed through civil service.

Senator FERGUSON. But who determines the number?

Mr. AMES. I would say the Commission..

Senator FERGUSON. The Executive has no power over that?

Mr. AMES. I do not think so.

Senator MCCARRAN. No; the Congress has the power.

Senator FERGUSON. What about your Budget Director? Does not he recommend that they need so many?

Mr. AMES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And he is under the Executive?

Mr. AMES. Well, in the sense of the Budget-well, you would have to ask somebody inside the Commission that. I am just a lawyer, practicing. I think—and I am just thinking that the Commission makes its estimate and submits it to the Budget Director, Mr. Smith. Senator FERGUSON. But does the Budget Director or the President have any authority over the Budget?

Mr. AMES. I think the Budget Director can cut the Budget. I read in the paper that he is doing it all the time, and, of course, Congress can do it.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that Congress can, but I want to know the authority of the Executive over this body.

Mr. AMES. Well, if you are speaking now of what the chairman refers to as "housekeeping" funds, or how much money the Commission needs, I think there should be over-all power over that, and there is.

Senator REVERCOMB. Well, Mr. Ames, that already exists under the present system, does it not?

Mr. AMES. Yes; and I am sorry that I am not more familiar with the mechanics of it, but I have never made a Commission budget in my life.

Senator FERGUSON. But you say Congress. Congress does not have anyone to make a survey as to whether or not they need 5 lawyers there, or 50; whether they need 1 economist or 10; whether they need 1 Secretary or 1 stenographer or 50.

How can Congress tell that? They have not the help. They cannot make that survey.

Mr. AMES. I think the Budget Office does that.

Now, you have got me in a pool where I cannot swim. I do not know anything about this Budget function.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, you come in and say this should be exempted, and I am trying to find out why.

Mr. AMES. Well, I think you could exempt the Commission, and I do not think you would affect one iota of the way this Budget is handled.

In other words, I do not think there is anything exempting the Commission from this S. 1120. In my judgment, it would not affect one iota Mr. Smith's activities on the Budget.

Senator REVERCOMB. Mr. Ames, is not the heart of your presentation here that you do not want the Interstate Commerce Commission put under an Executive authority such as a Cabinet member, to direct the policies and actions of that Commission? Is not that what you are getting at?

Mr. AMES. Yes, sir. And the reason I say that-I go back to the Humphries case, where the Supreme Court said the Commission has no policy except the policy of the law. I do not want any Executive directing the policy of the Commission; I want Congress to do it.

Senator REVERCOMB. You do not want policies changed from year to year at the will of the executive branch of the Government, or a Cabinet member.

Mr. AMES. No, sir.

Senator REVERCOMB. That is the basis of your argument.

Mr. AMES. That is the argument.

Senator FERUGSON. But there you come to functions solely; is

not that true?

Mr. AMES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That Congress should control the functions. Mr. AMES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But there are many other things in this Commission besides those functions.

You

Mr. AMES. What else is there in there besides the functions? are speaking of the Budget? If the Commission is extravagant, it is composed of 11 men, and you helped put them on there; not this committee, but the Senate. You approved them. If you have got men on there that you cannot trust with the public's money, men who will waste it, get them out.

Senator FERGUSON. No. But why should not the Executive be able to look over the expense of running that Commission?

Mr. AMES. I wish, sir, I knew that Budget set-up. I have in mind that he can do it now, and that he does do it, and that he has been doing it for several years, since Mr. Smith was appointed.

I am sorry that I do not know.

Senator FERGUSON. But if this bill were passed, it would not give him any authority to change the functions, but it would let him go into the question as to the cost and the expense itself.

Senator REVERCOMB. Now, Senator Ferguson, if you mean by "functions" the powers and jurisdiction of the Commission, certainly the President should not, and no executive officer, from my viewpoint, ought to have any hand in that.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean under the bill.

Senator REVERCOMB. Congress entirely fixes the jurisdiction under the powers. If, by "functions" you mean the acts under those powers, then that is left solely in the Commission itself. That is its independence.

Mr. AMES. That is right; and the difference between its present set-up and the Executive set-up would be that the Commission, under the latter, would be governed by a policy of the Executive.

Senator FERGUSON. How does this bill give him power to do that? Mr. AMES. I do not think the bill does it by words; but I have enough experience-more than a quarter of a century, with the Commission-to know that if an Executive is at the top of it, you are not going to try cases on their merits any more.

Now, I do not know whether your plan is to do away with these 11 Commissioners and put some Cabinet officer in charge of the Commission

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). No; I have not any plans. I am just trying to get information this morning as to whether this is a good bill or a bad bill.

Senator MCCARRAN. There is no plan in this bill, Mr. Ames.

Mr. AMES. I understand that. There is the opportunity for the plan.

Senator REVERCOMB. Mr. Ames, do you mean to say that if this is left open to the Chief Executive to make a change, that you have given him the right to make the change and take over policy-making powers?

Mr. AMES. That is right. And it may come over here and lay around for 60 days, and you may not take any action upon it.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you must assume that Congress approves it.

Mr. AMES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the bill.

Mr. AMES. I must assume that Congress is willing to delegate its powers.

Senator FERGUSON. That the majority of them are willing to do that.

Senator REVERCOMB. And you want to stop that before it happens. Mr. AMES. I would like to try to discourage it.

Senator MCCARRAN. All right, Mr. Ames.

Mr. AMES. I think everyone familiar with the workings of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission and these other establishments has recognized the desirability of the independence of thought and action that they have had through that set-up.

One very famous case on it is the Humphries case, to which I alluded; that is reported as 235, 6 U. S. 2. There the Court said:

The language of the act, the legislative reports, and the general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates, all combine to demonstrate the congressional intent to create a body of experts who shall gain experience by length of service a body which shall be independent of Executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the Government.

I think all of you are familiar with the background of the Humphries case, and I think also that anyone who has the slightest notion to destroy the independence of establishments like the Commission should take the trouble to read Professor Schauffman's work, which is probably the most comprehensive work on the Interstate Commerce Commission which was ever undertaken.

He is a professor of economics at the University of Michigan. He devoted 5 years to the preparation of that work. It is repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decisions, and it is regarded as wholly authoritative. He has a chapter in volume II under the head "The Maintenance of Commission Independence," and that runs from page 452 to page 467.

And if anyone has the slightest doubt on the desirability of this independence and the maintenance of it, I would suggest that they read that book.

Senator FERGUSON. How many would you except from this?

How many agencies or bureaus or departments would you except from this act? I notice you keep referring to "others."

Mr. AMES. I do not think that I should have to take any position for any other establishment. Icertainly would not like to. If you are asking for my personal opinion

Senator FERGUSON (interposing). That is what I am asking.

Mr. AMES. I think the transmission of intelligence, the Federal Communications Commission, is a commission similar to the Interstate Commerce. The transmission of power-the Federal Power Commission. The Civil Aeronautics

Senator MCCARRAN (interposing). How about the General Accounting Office?

Mr. AMES. Well, I have some remarks to make about that later, unless you want them now. I read Comptroller General Warren's testimony with great interest. He is exempted, but he puts it on the ground that he is a creature and an agent of Congress.

Well, I do not know of anything that is more of a creature or more of an agent of Congress than the Interstate Commerce Commission, so I do not see that he has any more reason or any better ground for exemption than the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Now, I cannot, at the moment, think of any other agency, but certainly any agency which has quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions should operate independently of the Executive or a Cabinet officer.

Otherwise our form of government just goes to smash.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you would put the War Labor Board under that?

Mr. AMES. Well, are they quasi-legislative? Are they quasijudicial?

Senator FERGUSON. The National Labor Relations Act-the National Labor Relations Board-you would put under that category? Mr. AMES. Could I generalize? I say, I will put any agency under it which performs quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.

Senator MCCARRAN. That is all right up to a point, and that applies now to many agencies. But there is a point where you cannot make them entirely independent, because they have to go to the Bureau of the Budget for the money with which to conduct their business.

Therefore there is an element that takes from their independence, and they have to come to Congress for that Budget aspect.

There is another element that takes from their independence, if you think that men become dependent, or that agencies become dependent, because they are dependent upon other agencies for their support or their housekeeping.