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Congress or the rule of the court any otherwise | bers of that bar to take the oath, under penalty than one who had been loyal to the Government of forfeiture of their "previously acquired right. throughout the war. Ours has no such operation.

The facts in Garland's case required the Court It is true that one branch of the rule of the to go no farther than this, but the opinion does Supreme Court applied, like ours, also to pergo farther, and pronounces, in effect, that Gar-sons asking for admission to that bar, and wo land would have been entitled to continue to are told that the rule has been wholly rescinded practice in that Court, even without having been -no part of it preserved-in consequence of the pardoned by the President for his treason, on decision in Garland's case. This may be true, the ground that to deprive him of the right to but we have received no judicial evidence to pursue his profession in that Court would have convince our minds of the fact, and if it has been a penalty inflicted for his offence, to which been done, it must have been for other reasons he was not liable at the time of its commis- than those furnished by the opinion of the court in that case.

sion.

In respect to the application of Magruder, the case is this: He is a native of Virginia, but for several years previous to the rebellion was a citizen of the United States, having his domicile in this District, and was a member of the bar of the late circuit court of this District. In April or May, 1861, he left us, and entered into the rebellion on the call of Virginia, and continued until the close of the war in armed hostility to the United States.

tice in the Supreme Court of the United States since the decision in Garland's case was made.

But the fatal objection to his admission to our bar is that he is now only applying for admission for the first time, and cannot furnish the requisite evidence of a previously acquired right whose continued enjoyment he might demand at the hands of the court, and is unable to take the oath required by our rule.

Although there is one passage in this opinion which seems to go even beyond this, and to advance the doctrine that the Court had no right to debar a man from admission to the profession on account of crimes previously committed, yet I am not disposed to believe that the Court in tended to advance or to advocate, even obiter, a doctrine so extreme as that. If such, however, be the fair construction of the opinion, (and nothing short of such construction will answer the object of either of the motions now under our He has since received the pardon of the Presiconsideration,) I am constrained to avow my un-dent for his offence, and been admitted to pracwillingness to obey the doctrine thus promulged. In the first place, the facts in the case of Garland called for no such decision; and, in the second place, having the absolute right ourselves to prescribe our own rules for admission to the bar, as has been already shown, we are not required to do violence to our convictions, in following such an interpretation of the Constitution, when given even by the eminent justices who concurred in that opinion. The opinion, In his case, too, there is an additional reason, in that respect, not coming to us with mandatory of great force in our judgment, which forbids his authority, I must for myself be permitted to admission, and it is this: On being admitted look upon it only as the opinion of five gentle- to the bar of the late circuit court, he was sworn, men, learned in the law, weighed against the among other things, "to support the Constitucontrary opinion of the four other gentlemen, tion of the United States," and should he be adequally learned and able, and against the judg-mitted to practice in the bar of this court, would ment of the whole legislative branch of the Gov-be required to take the same oath again. This ernment, by which the law was enacted; and whilst I acknowledge the importance of the principle that res adjudicata pro veritate accipitur, yet in this matter I am at perfect liberty to test the opinion of these five gentlemen by the application of that other maxim of the law, testimonia ponderanda sunt, non numeranda. Tried by this test, it appears to me that the preponderance of authority is not on the side of the doctrine of the Court's opinion on this point. In Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, Chief Justice Marshall says: The question whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the Constitution is at all times a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case."

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I am of the opinion, therefore, that the decision of the Supreme Court in Garland's case, even if received as authority and interpreted in its widest latitude, falls far short of requiring us to declare our rule void for unconstitutionality. Our rule applies only to persons not yet admitted to the bar, and who, therefore, possess no "previously acquired right" of which its enforcement can deprive them.

The rule of the Supreme Court was different from ours. It required persons already mem

oath has a meaning, and was prescribed for an object. We understand that it requires him who takes it to support the Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the land, in all cases in which its provisions come into conflict with the constitution or laws of any of the States, and in this sense to require a primary and paramount allegiance to the Government of the United States.

Mr. Magruder has told us that in taking up arms against the United States he acted conscientiously, and indignantly repels the imputation that he had violated his oath to support the Constitution. He says that he regarded himself as under "duality of allegiance;" that his first and. paramount allegiance was due to his native State, and his secondary and subordinate allegiance was due to the United States; and that it was in this belief, honestly entertained, he went into the rebellion, in obedience to the call of his State, although he was himself of the opinion that the rebellion was without any just cause.

He acknowledges to have had no change of opinion on these points to the present hour.

Were we now, with a full knowledge of these facts, to admit him to take this oath, the ceremony would be a meaningless farce; we should

swear him in one sense, whilst he would take | that the performance of this duty might be enforced by mandamus issued from a court having jurisdiction.

the oath in another.

It would be well, perhaps, that our rule on this subject should be so amended as to enable gentlemen whose native States may hereafter rush into rebellion without just cause to see at once the path of their duty, and so relieve their consciences from any embarrassments originating in fanciful theories about a duality of allegiance."

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Opinion of the Supreme Court on the Mississippi Application for an Injunction against the President and other officers, April 15, 1867. Chief Justice CHASE delivered the opinion of the Court, as follows:

A motion was made some days since on behalf of the State of Mississippi, for leave to file a bill in the name of the State, praying this Court perpetually to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, general commanding in the district of Mississipi and Arkansas, from executing or in any manner carrying out certain acts of Congress therein named.

The acts referred to are those of March 2 and March 25, 1867, commonly called the reconstruction acts.

The Attorney General objected to the leave asked for upon the ground that no bill which makes the President a defendant and seeks an injunction against him to restrain the performance of his duties as President, should be allowed to be filed in this Court.

This point has been fully argued, and we will now dispose of it.

So in the case of Kendall, Postmaster General, vs. Stockton and Stokes, (12 Peters, 527.) An act of Congress had directed the Postmaster General to credit Stockton and Stokes with such sums as the Solicitor of the Treasury should find,due to them, and that officer refused to credit them with certain sums so found due. It was held that the crediting of this money was a mere ministerial duty, the performance of which might be judicially enforced.

In each of these cases nothing was left to discretion. There was no room for the exercise of judgment. The law required the performance of a single specific act; and that performance, it was held, might be required by mandamus.

Very different is the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed, and among those laws the acts named in the bill. By the first of these acts he is required to assign generals to command in the several military districts, and to detail sufficient military force to enable such officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the supplementary act other duties are imposed on the several commanding generals, and their duties must necessarily be performed under tho supervision of the President, as Commander-inChief. The duty thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and political.

An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the Government to enjoin the performance of such duties by the President might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, as an absurd and excessive extravagance."

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We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, without expressing any opinion on the broader issues discussed in argument, whether in any case the President of the It is true that in the instance before us the United States may be required by the process of interposition of the Court is not sought to enforce this Court to perform a purely ministerial act re-action by the Executive under constitutional quired by law, or may be held answerable, in legislation, but to restrain such action under any case, otherwise than by impeachment, for legislation alleged to be unconstitutional.

crime.

The single point which requires consideration is this: Can the President be restrained from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional?

It is assumed by the counsel for the State of Mississippi that the President, in the execution of the reconstruction acts, is required to perform a mere ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we think, a confounding of the terms "ministerial" and "executive," which are by no means equivalent in import.

A ministerial duty, the performance of which may in proper cases be required of the head of a department by judicial process, is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist or imposed by law. The case of Marbury vs. Madison, Secretary of State, furnishes an illustration. A citizen had been nominated, confirmed, and appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, and his commission had been made out, signed, and sealed. Nothing remained to be done except delivery, and the duty of delivery was imposed by law on the Secretary of State. It was held

But we are unable to perceive that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principle which forbids judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion.

It was admitted in the argument that the application now made to us is without a precedent, and this is of much weight against it. Had it been supposed at the bar that this Court would in any case interpose to arrest the execution of an unconstitutional act of Congress, it can hardly be doubted that applications with that object would have been heretofore addressed to it. Occasions have not been infrequent.

The constitutionality of the act for the annexation of Texas was vehemently denied. It made important and permanent changes in the relative importance of States and sections, and was by many supposed to be pregnant with disastrous results to large interests in particular States. But no one seems to have thought of an application for an injunction against the execution of the act by the President.

And yet it is difficult to perceive upon what principle the application now before us can be allowed, and similar applications in that and other cases could have been denied.

The fact that no such application was ever the execution of an act of Congr before made in any case indicates the general judgment of the profession that no such application should be entertained.

It will hardly be contended that Congress can interpose, in any case, to restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law, and yet how can the right to judicial interposition to prevent such an enactment, when the purpose is evident and the execution of that purpose certain, be distinguished in principle from the right to such interposition against the execution of such a law by the President?

The Congress is the legislative department of the Government; the President is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department, though the acts of both, when performed, are in proper cases subject to its cognizance.

The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its probable consequences.

Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for be allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the Court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the Court, and refuses to execute the act of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the executive and legislative departments of the Government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this Court interpose in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this Court to arrest proceedings in that court?

These questions answer themselves. It is true that a State may file an original bill in this Court; and it may be true, in some cases, such a bill may be filed against the United States. But we are fully satisfied that this Court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties, and that no such bill ought to be received by us.

It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson as President, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief against

by Andrew Johnson is relief against its execution by the President. A bill praying an injunction against the execution of an act of Congress by the incumbent of the presidential office cannot be received, whether it describes hi as President or simply as a citizen of a State. The motion for leave to file the bill is therefore denied.

In the case of The State of Georgia against certain officers, the Attorney General makes no objection to the policy of the bill, and we will, therefore, grant leave to file that bill.

Mr. Sharkey. If the Court please, the objection to the bill which I attempted to file seetos to be that it is an effort to enjoin the President. The bill is not filed, and 1 can reform it to suit the views of the Court, and present it again.

The Chief Justice. Leave to file the bill is refused. When another bill is presented it will be considered.

Mr. Sharkey. Do I understand the Court to say that the application can be made on Thursday? The Chief Justice. On Thursday.

This subpoena was issued in the case, April 16. 1867:

The State of Georgia, complainant vs. Edwin
M. Stanton, Ulysses S. Grant, and John Pope,
defendants.
In equity.

The President of the United States to Edwin M.
Stanton, Ulysses S. Grant, and John Pope,
greeting:

For certain causes offered before the Supreme Court of the United States, holding jurisdiction in equity, you are hereby commanded that, laying all other matters aside, and notwithstanding any excuse, you be and appear before the said Supreme Court, holding jurisdiction in equity, on the first Monday in December next, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, being the present seat of the National Government of the United States, to answer unto the bill of complaint of the State of Georgia in the said Court exhibited against you. Hereof you are not to fail at your peril.

Witness: The Honorable SALMON P. CHASE, Chief Justice of the said Supreme Court, at the city of Washington, the first Monday of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninety-first. D. W. MIDDLETON,

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the U. S.

XXI.

RESOLUTIONS OF NATIONAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS.

Of the Philadelphia Fourteenth of August Con- | delegates from every State and Territory in the

vention.

They were reported August 17th, by Hon. Edgar Cowan, chairman of the committee on resolutions, and were unanimously adopted:

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

The National Union Convention, now assembled in the city of Philadelphia, composed of

Union, admonished by the solemn lessons which, for the last five years, it has pleased the Supreme Ruler of the Universe to give to the American people; profoundly grateful for the return of peace; desirous, as are a large majority of their countrymen, in all sincerity, to forget and forgive the past; revering the Constitution as it

comes to us from our ancestors; regarding the Union in its restoration as more sacred than ever; ooking with deep anxiety into the future, as of instant and continuing trials, hereby issues and proclaims the following declaration of principles and purposes, on which they have, with perfect unanimity, agreed:

1. We hail with gratitude to Almighty God the end of the war and the return of peace to our afflicted and beloved land.

2. The war just closed has maintained the authority of the Constitution, with all the powers which it confers, and all the restrictions which it imposes upon the General Government, unabridged and unaltered, and it has preserved the Union, with the equal rights, dignity, and authority of the States perfect and unimpaired.

3. Representation in the Congress of the United States and in the electoral college is a right recognized by the Constitution as abiding in every State, and as a duty imposed upon the people, fundamental in its nature, and essential to the existence of our republican institutions, and neither Congress nor the General Government has any authority or power to deny this right to any State or to withhold its enjoyment under the Constitution from the people thereef.

4. We call upon the people of the United States to elect to Congress as members thereof none but men who admit this fundamental right of representation, and who will receive to seats therein loyal representatives from every State in allegiance to the United States, subject to the constitutional right of each House to judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.

8. While we regard as utterly invalid, and never to be assumed or made of binding force, any obligations incurred or undertaken in making war against the United States, we hold the debt of the nation to be sacred and inviolable; and we proclaim our purpose in discharging this, as in performing all other national obligations, to maintain unimpaired and unimpeached the honor and the faith of the Republic.

9. It is the duty of the national Government to recognize the services of the Federal soldiers and sailors in the contest just closed, by meeting promptly and fully all their just and rightful claims for the services they have rendered the nation, and by extending to those of them who have survived, and to the widows and orphans of those who have fallen, the most generous and considerate care.

10. In Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, who, in his great office, has proved steadfast in his devotion to the Constitution, the laws, and interests of his country, unmoved by persecution and undeserved reproach, having faith unassailable in the people and in the principles of free government, we recognize a Chief Magistrate worthy of the nation, and equal to the great crisis upon which his lot is cast; and we tender to him in the discharge of his high and responsible duties, our profound respect and assurance of our cordial and sincere support. Of the Philadelphia Convention of Southern Loy

alists.

They were reported by Hon. Andrew J. Hamilton, of Texas, chairman of the committee on resolutions, and unanimously adopted:

its cruelty, and its criminality has been overruled to the vindication of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution over every State and Territory of the Republic.

5. The Constitution of the United States, and 1. That the loyal people of the South cordithe laws made in pursuance thereof, are the su- ally unite with the people of the North in preme law of the land, anything in the consti- thanksgiving to Almighty God, through whose tution or laws of any State to the contrary not-will a rebellion unparalleled for its causelessness, withstanding. All the powers not conferred by the Constitution upon the General Government, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to the people thereof; and among the rights thus reserved to the States is 2. That we demand now, as we have dethe right to prescribe qualifications for the elec-manded at all times since the cessation of hostilitive franchise therein, with which right Congress cannot interfere. No State or combination of States has the right to withdraw from the Union, or to exclude, through their action in Congress or otherwise, any other State or States from the Union. The Union of these States is perpetual. 6. Such amendments to the Constitution of the United States may be made by the people thereof as they may deem expedient, but only in the mode pointed out by its provisions; and in proposing such amendments, whether by Congress or by a convention, and in ratifying the same, all the States of the Union have an equal and an indefeasible right to a voice and a vote thereon.

7. Slavery is abolished and forever prohibited, and there is neither desire nor purpose on the part of the southern States that it should ever be re-established upon the soil, or within the jurisdiction of the United States; and the enfranchised slaves in all the States of the Union should receive, in common with all their inhabitants, equal protection in every right of person and property.

ties, the restoration of the States in which we live to their old relations with the Union, on the simplest and fewest conditions consistent with the protection of our lives, property, and political rights, now in jeopardy from the unquenched enmity of rebels lately in arms.

3. That the unhappy policy pursued by Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, is, in its effects upon the loyal people of the South, unjust, oppressive, and intolerable; and accordingly, however ardently we desire to see our respective States once more represented in the Congress of the nation, we would deplore their restoration on the inadequate conditions prescribed by the President, as tending not to abate, but only to magnify the perils and sor-. rows of our condition.

4. That with pride in the patriotism of the Congress, with gratitude for the fearless and persistent support they have given to the cause of loyalty, and their efforts to restore all the States to their former condition as States in the American Union, we will stand by the positions taken by them, and use all means consistent with

army and navy of the Republic to be true to the principles for which they fought, we pledge them that we will stand by them in maintaining the honor due the saviors of the nation, and in securing the fruits of their victories.

peaceful and lawful course to secure the ratifica- | cible soldiers and sailors" who made ne grand tion of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as proposed by the Congress. at its recent session, and regret that the Congress, in its wisdom, did not provide by law for the greater security of the loyal people in the States not yet admitted to representation.

5. That the political power of the Government of the United States in the administration of public affairs, is, by its Constitution, confided to the popular or law-making department of the Government.

6. That the political status of the States lately in rebellion to the United States Government, and the rights of the people of such States, are political questions, and are therefore clearly within the control of Congress to the exclusion of the independent action of any and every other department of the Government.

7. That there is no right, political, legal, or constitutional, in any State to secede or with draw from the Union; that they may, by wicked and unauthorized revolution and force, sever the relations which they have sustained to the Union; and when they do so, and assume the attitude of public enemies at war with the United States, they subject themselves to all the rules and principles of international law, and the laws which are applicable to belligerents, according to modern usage.

8. That we are unalterably in favor of the Union of the States, and earnestly desire the legal and speedy restoration of all the States to their proper places in the Union and the establishment in each of them of influences of patriotism and justice by which the whole nation shall be combined to carry forward triumphantly the principles of freedom and progress, until all men of all races shall everywhere beneath the flag of our country have accorded to them freely all that their virtues, intelligence, industry, patriotism and energy may entitle them to attain.

9. That the organizations of the unrepresented States, assuming to be State governments, not having been legally established, are not legitimate governments until reorganized by Congress.

10. That the welcome we have received from the loyal citizens of Philadelphia, under the roof of the time-honored Hall in which the Declaration of Independence was adopted, inspires us with an animating hope that the principles of just and equal government, which were made the foundation of the Republic at its origin, shall become the corner stone of reconstruction.

11. That we cherish with tender hearts the memory of the virtues, patriotism, sublime faith, upright Christian life, and generous nature of the martyr President, Abraham Lincoln.

12. That we are in favor of universal liberty the world over, and feel the deepest sympathy with the oppressed peoples of all countries in their struggles for freedom and the inherent right of all men to decide and control for themselves the character of the government under which they live.

13. That the lasting gratitude of the nation is due the men who bore the hardships of the battle, and, in covering themselves with imperish able glory, have saved to the world its hope of free government; and relying upon the "invin

14. That, remembering with profound gratitude and love the precepts of Washington, we should accustom ourselves to consider the Union as the primary object of our patriotic desire, .which has heretofore sustained us with great power in our love of the Union, when so many of our neighbors in the South were waging war for its destruction; our deep and abiding love for the memory of the Father of his Country and for the Union is more deeply engraven upon our hearts than ever.

After the adjournment of this convention, the loyalists of the non-reconstructed States met and adopted an address, closing with this declaration:

"We affirm that the loyalists of the South look to Congress with affectionate gratitude and confidence, as the only means to save us from persecution, exile, and death itself; and we also declare that there can be no security for us or our children; there can be no safety for the country against the fell spirit of slavery, now organized in the form of serfdom, unless the Government, by national and appropriate legislation, enforced by national authority, shall confer on every citi zen in the States we represent the American birthright of impartial suffrage and equality before the law. This is the one all-sufficient remedy. This is our great need and pressing necessity."

The vote was as follows: TEXAS, 10 yeas; LOUISIANA, 14 yeas; VIRGINIA, 28 yeas, 3 nays; 2 yeas, GEORGIA, 8 yeas, 1 nay; ALABAMA, 3 nays; MISSISSIPPI, 1 yea; ARKANSAS, 2 yeas; NORTH CAROLINA, 1 yea, 2 nays; FLORIDA, 2 yeas, 1 nay.

Pittsburgh Convention of Soldiers and Sailors,
September 26, 1866.

General Benjamin F. Butler reported these resolutions, which were adopted unanimously : By the soldiers and sailors of the army and navy of the United States, in convention assembled, be it

Resolved, That the action of the present Congress in passing the pending constitutional amendment is wise, prudent, just. It clearly defines American citizenship, and guaranties all his rights to every citizen. It places on a just and equal basis the right of representation, making the vote of a man in one State equally potent with the vote of another man in any State. It righteously excludes from places of honor and trust the chief conspirators, guiltiest rebels, whose perjured crimes have drenched the land in fraternal blood. It puts into the very frame of our Government the inviolability of the national debt and the nullity forever of all obligations contracted in support of the rebellion.

2. That it is unfortunate for the country that these propositions have not been received in the spirit of conciliation, clemency, and fraternal feeling in which they were offered, as they are the mildest terms ever granted to subdued rebels.

3. That the President, as an executive officer,

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