whose existence was justified by every humanitarian principle. But it was nevertheless one to be fought in earnest and to the nation's glory. So it was fought. The country and Congress reposed the utmost confidence in the President. He had acted wisely in every preliminary step. He had disarmed fear of intervention by foreign powers. Congress voted him fifty millions of dollars to meet preliminary and extraordinary expenses, and on April 23 he called for 125,000 volunteers. The complement was quickly filled, and on May 25 he called for 75,000 additional men. The response was immediate. Transports were provided for the invasion of Cuba, the navy was strengthened by additional ships and Commodore Dewey, in command of the naval squadron at Hongkong was ordered to strike the Spaniards at Manila, and on May I occurred the great battle there which resulted in the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and the events that followed to give to the United States the group of islands, known as the Philippines that are so opulent in resource as to be of great commercial value, as well as strategic. These events are matters of history familiar to all readers, or readily available in the records of the war.

Thus from April 19, when a state of war was recognized, to August 12, when the protocol was signed, within a period of 115 days, the United States had swept from Spain her island possessions in both the West and East Indies, destroyed her effective fleets and humbled her in the eyes of nations. Victory was as complete as the war had been brief and brilliant. Congress and the country had stood by the administration as it had stood by them.

As executive of the nation and Commander-in-Chief of its forces, President McKinley had achieved for his country a new place among the powers, and his directing hand was more than ever needed to guide her through the intricate paths of responsibility entailed by signal victory. And, let it be remembered in this connection, that the multitudinous problems of conquest were of a kind wholly within his keeping until Congress could act upon them. As head of the military he alone was responsible for that provisional rule of ceded territory which its holding, its peace, or its disposition under treaty terms required.

In all that affair of the Spanish war President McKinley stood a watchtower and bulwark, a light and a safeguard. His sense of right and justice prevented heedless and harmful complications. His wisdom and patriotism placed the Republic in equity before the nations. His sagacious statesmanship attained the proper war footing when war was inevitable; his soldier experience and general knowledge of war made of him a successful com

mander-in-chief. His humanity and fairness, the honor and manhood that were his, gave him breadth and the country credit in the clearing up of the situation.

Never until that hour when President McKinley, commissioned by his country and blest by his God, issued the Republic's mandate to a king, had the United States of America for one hour ventured to take part in the affairs of nations. Singularly strong, admittedly brave and progressive, confessedly full of the vigor drawn from the best blood in all nations, it had never asked for place beside them, nor joined in their age-old contendings for spoil. And never in the century and a quarter of our national life had the kings and emperors of Europe given more than a good-humored credence to the theory that the American Republic was a nation. It was no small matter to so wisely choose the time, so judiciously select the occasion as that America's entrance into the affairs of the world should meet no united opposition in the conservative courts of the continent. A day too soon or a day too late, a warrant less adequate or a reason more impelling, would have arrayed the world against the Republic, and launched a nation of peace upon a limitless era of war.

But the master hand of this Chief Executive saw the instant under the shadow of the Spanish war-cloud when advance might be sounded; and that moment, well employed, lifted the Republic to the crest of the world, widened her borders and enriched her people, and made substantial peace a certainty.

He proved himself a prophet and statesman in peace, a soldier and leader in war, equally strong in all situations.

Able, fair, fearless, successful was his record in this—as in all things.

CHAPTER XXI.

MCKINLEY'S OWN STORY OF THE SPANISH WAR.

In all that has been written of the Spanish war and the way in which it was conducted by President McKinley's administration, no history can give such a clear and complete account of it as was written by the President himself. President McKinley's own history of the Spanish war is contained in an official message to Congress sent by him after the war had been brought to such a successful close. It is as follows:

For a righteous cause and under a common flag military service has strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more closely than ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the country.

In my annual message very full consideration was given to the question of the duty of the Government of the United States toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection as being by far the most important problem with which we were then called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced, and the exposition of the views then expressed, disclosed my sense of the extreme gravity of the situation.

Setting aside, as logically unfounded or practically inadmissible, the recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, the recognition of the independence of Cuba, neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, intervention in favor of one or the other party, and forcible annexation of the islands, I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations of reform, to which she had become irrevocably committed. Within a few weeks previously she had announced comprehensive plans, which it was confidently asserted would be efficacious to remedy the evils so deeply affecting our own country, so injurious to the true interests of the mother country as well as to those of Cuba, and so repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity.

The ensuing month brought little sign of real progress toward the pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administration set up in the capital and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor of the inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large extent of territory held by the insurgents, while the military arm, obviously unable to cope with

the still active rebellion, continued many of the most objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded it.

No tangible relief was afforded the vast numbers of unhappy reconcentrados, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard and the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of zones of cultivation proved illusory. Indeed, no less practical nor more delusive promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear and herded in a strange region among unsympathetic strangers hardly less necessitous than themselves.

By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these distressed people at over 40 per cent. from the time General Weyler's decree of reconcentration was enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable. contributions raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the Consul General and the several Consuls, by noble and earnest individual effort through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such forms of aid.

The war continued on the old footing, without comprehensive plan, developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result, that had marked the course of the earlier Ten Years' rebellion as well as the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to conjecture.

DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.

At this juncture, on the 15th of February last, occurred the destruction of the battleship Maine, while rightfully lying in the Harbor of Havana on a mission of international courtesy and good will-a catastrophe the suspicious nature and horror of which stirred the nation's heart profoundly.

It is a striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense distinguishing our national character that this shocking blow, falling upon a generous people, already deeply touched by preceding events in Cuba, did not move them to an instant, desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the existence of a condition of danger and disorder at our doors that made possible such