In re Philip Rein. for by the General Orders, imposes upon the clerk no other or greater duty than if such provision were not in the General Order. Every taxing officer is, by virtue of his general duty, required not to allow as taxable any items but such as the law prescribes and allows. But it is the universal practice that a party to a proceeding in a court of justice may bind himself and those he represents by a consent, which the judge or officer may properly adopt as a basis of action, as against the party so consenting and in favor of the other party, where the consent goes merely to the course of proceeding and not to jurisdiction. The question as to what items should be allowed is not a question of jurisdiction. When the taxation is made, it is conclusive as respects the marshal and the assignee, for the present at least, and as respects such present taxation, unless either of them excepts to the taxation. The marshal is not bound to do anything more or to await the auditing of the accounts of the assignee, before becoming entitled to receive the amount of his bill as taxed, unless it be shown to the court that there is some fraud or bad faith on the part of the marshal or of the assignee. The bill is taxed at forty-nine dollars and eighty-five cents less than the sum at which it is made out. I must conclude that, on an examination of it, the assignee came to the conclusion that the taxable items in it amounted to as much as the sum to which he consented. I cannot see on the face of the bill any evidence of any fraud or bad faith on the part of any person. Of the four hundred and forty-one dollars and thirty-five cents charged in the bill, one hundred and fiftythree dollars and seventy-five cents is for various items of services by the marshal in serving warrants and notices and in taking an inventory and for commissions, and two hundred and seventy-two dollars and sixty cents is for disbursements in and about the custody of property, and fifteen dollars is for other disbursements. The affidavit covers the performing of the services and the making of the disbursements. By General Order No. 30, and the statutes in force, it is provided that there shall be certain fees for the services of the marshal In re Philip Rein in the custody of property, which fees may extend in certain cases, to an allowance by the hour for the taking of an inventory, and to allowances by the folio for the inventory and for a copy of it, and for commissions on the value of property and on disbursements; and that, besides this, actual disbursements in the custody of property may be allowed, "which shall in all cases be passed upon by the court." Where the disbursements are set out in the bill of fees, and are verified by affidavit, as in this case, presented to the taxing officer, and are assented to by the assignee, they are passed upon by the court, for the purposes of the taxation, if the taxing officer taxes them. The disbursement of one hundred dollars charged as paid to James Turney, the deputy marshal, for services, seems in effect to have been reduced to fifty dollars, which would be for twenty days, at two dollars and fifty cents a day. A like disbursement of fifty dollars is charged in respect of George Turney, as keeper, for twenty days, at two dollars and fifty cents per day. The affidavit of James Turney sets forth that he took possession of the property November 6th, and, besides placing George Turney in charge of it as a keeper, remained in charge of it until November 25th. The other disbursements in respects of custody of property are for labor, paper, twine, packing-cases, services of porter, storage, cartman, use of safe, another keeper for five days, and some small expenses. I see nothing in all this to raise any suspicion of the good faith of the marshal. How far this taxation may be conclusive hereafter, on the auditing of the assignee's accounts, it is not necessary now to decide. It is conclusive for the present to entitle the marshal to have the check countersigned. If the check shall not be countersigned by the Register within five days after the presentation to the Register of a copy of an order to be entered hereon, the judge will countersign it, on proof of such presentation and that the check has not been countersigned. I do not see that the Register has any lien on the moneys in the hands of the assignee, and which may be paid out to the marshal on the check in question, for the services of the In re The Weber Furniture Co. Register in making the certificates which he has made in this case. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT-E. D. MICHIGAN. When, at a meeting of creditors, the debtor is examined in reference to the The English and American cases upon the authority of the creditors review- In re THE WEBER FURNITURE COMPANY. THIS was a petition in review to reverse the judgment of the District Court refusing to record a resolution of compromise. The record is voluminous, and in order to develop all the points discussed on the argument, the facts would be extensive. There was a wide discrepancy between the compromise offered, and the apparent value of the property. As the sole point decided is that it was error in the District Court to reject the resolution without notice and hearing to the parties, the particular dates and facts presented in the record became immaterial, except as they are stated in the opinion itself. Don. M. Dickinson for the debtor. Moore, Canfield & Warner and D. C. Holbrook for objecting creditors. EMMONS, J.-Several questions have been argued at the bar which will not be noticed in this judgment. The only In re The Weber Furniture Co. one decided is whether the District Court erred in refusing to record the resolution of compromise without notice and hearing of the parties concerned, thus bringing before it all the facts upon which the creditors themselves acted before passing judgment upon the papers presented. That power existed to review the resolution upon its merits, is not questioned. The statute in plain terms authorizes either the rejection of the resolution, when it is presented for record, or its rescission subsequently, if it is prematurely recorded. What we here decide is not that power has been exercised which does not exist, but that it has been exerted without proper proof. The resolution of creditors is adopted at the meeting at which not only the statement filed by the debtor is presented, but the debtor himself is examined at length, giving the creditors all the information which any, even the least of them, desire. This collateral evidence, in a great majority of cases, must be far more important than the statement itself in enabling creditors to judge of the value of the assets. This important feature of the proceeding, and which is that upon which the resolution in many instances must mainly depend, is not in the first instance brought before the court. The statement and resolution is alone presented. The statute provides no mode by which the testimony of the debtor shall be recorded, or, if recorded, can be brought before the District Judge. It is a case coming within that very familiar and universal principle which forbids a court, in reviewing the judgment of another, to reverse for error of any kind, where, in the theory of the proceedings, the facts upon which the inferior tribunal has proceeded are not brought before it. The same principle is applicable where a court reviews the findings of its own subordinate officers. If the facts upon which such officer has passed judgment are not brought before the reviewing tribunal, we know of no exception to the rule that a judgment or finding pronounced is affirmed. The principle goes farther, and in instances where provision is made to carry up the facts for judgment, if in the course of the proceed In re The Weber Furniture Co. ings it appears that they are not all contained in the record, affirmation is the necessary result. Not because they are any more illustrative than numerous other similar judgments, but for the reason that they are accessible in previously prepared papers, we refer to a few cases, going upon the general principle which we think is disregarded when the court assumes the burdensome and impolitic duty of rejudging in all instances the judgment of the creditors, without having laid before it, as the statute provides, the facts, without which it is a presumption of law they would not have acted. Walker v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 57 Mass., 1, was a proceeding to condemn lands for a railroad. The court had power to grant a new trial or reject the verdict. It was objected that the record did not affirmatively show that certain conditions, necessary by the statute to give validity to the verdict, had been complied with. At pages 2 and 3, the court say: "If the Court of Common Pleas are called upon to set aside the verdict of a sheriff's jury, on the ground that the respondent had not due notice of the application, the objection cannot be sustained by showing that such notice does not appear by the warrant, the return or the record of the court, for it may, notwithstanding, be proved, by evidence aliunde, that the respondent was summoned, or that he consented to take notice without summons, or in fact appeared before the Commissioners." Here the record shows affirmatively that there was an examination and proof in explanation of the statement. The only presumption which is asked is that it was sufficiently full to justify the vote of the creditors. Flagg v. City of Worcester, 62 Mass., 69. Commissioners having issued their warrant, the jury assessed damages for taking lands, and on its return it was objected that it did not appear that any determination by the mayor and aldermen, as required by the statute, had been made so as to authorize the commissioners to issue a warrant for a jury. After saying that an objection could not avail because not |