.

from one Coburn, who had, in the winter
and spring of 1791, entered into and fenced
a field, within the bounds of the original
patent for 1000 acres to J. C., claiming to
hold the same under B. N.'s survey of 400
acres: Held, that upon the issuing of the
patent to J. C., in November 1784, the pos.
session then being vacant, he became, by
operation of law, vested with a constructive
actual seisin of the whole tract included in
his patent; that his whole title passed by
his prior conveyance to M. G. (the ancestor
of the plaintiff's lessor); and that when it
became complete at law, by the issuing of
the patent, the actual constructive seisin of
J.J. passed to M. G., by virtue of that con-
veyance. Also held, that when, subsequently,
in virtue of the agreement made in June
1786, between M. G. and R. B. (the defend-
ant), the latter entered into possession of the
whole tract, under this equitable title, his
possession being consistent with the title of
M. G., and in common with him, was the
possession of M. G. himself, and inured to
the benefit of both, according to the nature
of their respective titles. And that, when,
subsequently, in April 1787, by the direction
of M. G., J. C. conveyed to the defendant
700 acres, in fulfilment of the agreement be-
tween M. G. and the defendant, and the same
were severed by metes and bounds, in the
deed, from the tract of 1000 acres, the de-
fendant became sole seised, in his own right,
of the 700 acres 8o conveyed; but as he
still remained in the actual possession of the
residue of the tract, within the bounds of
the patent, which possession was originally aá
quired under M. G., the character of his
tenure was not changed by his own act, and
therefore he was quasi tenant to M. G., and,
as such, ccr.tinued the actual seisin of the
latter, over his residue at least, up the
deed from Coburn to the defendant in 1798.
Also held, that if Coburn, in 1791, when he
entered and fenced a field, &c., had been the
owner of B. N.'s survey, his actual occupation
of a part would not have given him a construc-
tive actual seisin of the residue of the tract in.
cluded in that survey, that residue being at the
time of his entry and occupation in the adverse
seisin of another person. (M. G.), having an
older and better title; but there being no
evidence that Coburn was the legal owner of
B. N.'s survey, his entry must be considered
as an entry without title, and consequently,
his disseisin was limited to the bounds of his

pancy of Coburn, the deed was operative,
the grantors and those holding under them

having at all times had the legal seisin....Id.
3. The deed of 1813, from R. J., surviving

trustee, under the decree in equity, was valid,
without being approved by the court, and re-
corded in the court, according to the statute

of Kentucky of the 16th February 1808. . Id.
4. Where the defendant in ejectment, for lands

in North Carolina, has been in possession un-
der title in himself, and those under whom
he claims, for a period of seven years, or up-
wards, such possession is, by the statute of
limitations of North Carolina, a conclusive
legal bar against the action by an adverse
claimant, unless such claimant brings himself,
by positive proof, within some of the disabili.
ties provided for by that statute. Somer
ville v. Hamilton...

.*230, 233
6. An agreement, by parol, between two pra

prietors of adjoining lands, to employ a sur.
veyor to run the dividing line between them,
and that it should be thus ascertained and
settled, which was executed, and the line ac-
cordingly run and marked on a plat by the
surveyor, in their presence, as the boundary,
held to be conclusive, in an action of eject-
ment, after a corresponding possession of
20 years by the parties, and those claim.
ing under

them respectively. Boyd v.
Graves....

*818
See EVIDENCE 1-4.

ERROR.

See Practice, 1-4.

cordingly run and marked on a plat, by the
surveyor, in their presence, as the boundary,
is conclusive, in an action of ejectment,
after a correspondent possession of 20 years
by the parties and those claiming under
them. Such an agreement is not within the
statute of frauds, as being a contract for the
sale of lands, or any interest in or concerning
them. Boyd v. Graves...

*513
See CHANCERY, 26–28.

evidence only in suits between parties and
privius; but the doctrine is wholly inappli.
Cable to a case, where a decree in equity was
introduced on the trial of an ejectment, not
as per sc binding upon any rights of the
other party, but as an introductory fact to a
link in the chain of the plaintiff's title, and
cons..uting a part of the muniments of his
estate....

......Id.
6. The seal to the commission of a new govern-

ment, not acknowledged by the government
of the United States, cannot be permitted to
prove itself; but the fact, that the vessel
cruising under such commission is employed
by such new government, may be established
by other evidence, without proving the seal.
The Estrella....

*303
6. Where the privateer, cruising under such a

commission, was lost, subscquent to the
capture in question, the previous existence
of the commission on board was allowed to
be proved by parol evidence...... Id.

See COVENANT, 1, 2: EJECTMENT, 4.

INSOLVENT LAW.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 8.

JURISDICTION.
See CHANCERY, 6-7, 18, 19: PRIZE, 2, 3, 7, 9.

LEX LOCI.

1. A discharge under a foreign bankrupt law

is no bar to an action in the courts of this
country, on a contract made here. JcMillan
v. McNeill....

.*209, 213

FRAUDS.

LIBEL.

See PRACTICE.

LICENSE.

1. E. B. C., having an interest in a cargo at

sea, agreed with J. W. for the sale of it, and
J. W. signed the following agreement in
writing: “J. W. agrees to purchase the share
of E. B. C. in the cargo of the ship Aristides,
W. P. Z., supercargo, say at $2522.83, at
fifteen per cent. advance on said amount,
payable at five months from this date, and
to give a note or notes for the same, with an
approved indorser.” In compliance with this
agreement, J. W. gave his notes for the sum
mentioned, and in an action upon the notes,
the want of a legal consideration, under the
statute of frauds, being set up as a defence,
on the ground of the defect of mutuality in
the written contract; the court below left it
to the jury to infer from the evidence, an ac-
tual performance of the agreement; the jury
found a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
court below rendered judgment thereon. The
judgment affirmed by this court. Weight-
man v. Caldwell..

*85
2. Note on the 17th section of the statute of

frauds, as to the sale of goods.. .....Id. *89
8. A deed made upon a valuable and adequate

consideration, which is actually made and the
change of property bond fide, or such as is
purported to be, cannot be considered as a
conveyance to defraud creditors. Wheaton
v. Sexton...

.*503, 607
4. An agreement by parol, between two pro-

prietors of adjoining lands, to employ a sur-
veyor to run the dividing line between them,
and that it should be thus ascertained and
settled, which was executed, and the line ac-

1. A vessel and cargo, which is liable to seizure

as enemy's property, or for sailing under the
pass or license of the enemy, may be seized
after her arrival in a port of the United
States, and condemned as prize of war. The
delictum is not purged, by the termination of
the voyage. The Caledonian

*100
2. The circumstance of a vessel having been

sent into an enemy's port for adjudication,
and afterwards permitted to resume her voy-
age, held to raise a violent presumption, that
she had a license, which the claimant not
having repelled by explanatory evidence, con-
demnation was pronounced. The Langdon
Cheves......

*103

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4: EJECTMENT, 4.

LOCAL LAW.

1. The statute of charitable uses of the 43 Eliz.,

C. 4, is not in force in Virginia. Baptist
Association v.. Hart's Ex'rs.

*1
2. If there is nothing in a patent to control the

call for course and distance, the land must
be bounded by the courscs and distances of
of the patent, according to the inagnetic
meridian; but it is a general principle, that

2. The refusal of the court to grant a motion

for a new trial, affords no ground for a writ
of error.
Barr v. Gratz.

*220
3. Where a cause is brought to this court, by

writ of error, or appeal, from the highest
court of law or equity of a state, under the
25th section of the judiciary act of 1789,
upon the ground, that the validity of a statute
of the United States was drawn in question,
and that the decision of the state court was
against its validity, &c.; or that the validity
of a statute of a state was drawn in question,
as repugnant to the constitution of the United
States, and the decision was in favor of its
validity; it must appear, from the record,
that the act of congress, or the constitu-
tionality of the state law was drawn into

question. Miller v. Nicholls.....*311, 315
4. But it is not required, that the record should,

in terms, state a misconstruction of the act of
congress, or that it was drawn into question;
it is sufficient to give this court jurisdiction
of the cause, the record should show that
an act of congress was applicable to the

...Id.
5. Depositions, taken on further proof, in one

prize cause, cannot be invoked into another.
The Experiment....

*84
6. Practice of invoking testimony in prize
causes...

...ld.
7. A sale under a fi. fa., duly issued, is legal,

as respects the purchaser, provided the writ
be levied upon the property, before the re-
turn-day, although the sale be made after the
return-day, and the writ be never actually

returned. Wheaton v. Sexton, ...*503, 506
8. Depositions taken according to the proviso

in the 30th section of the judiciary act of
1789, under a dedimus potesiatem, “ according
to common usage, when it may be necessary
10 prevent a failure or delay of justice," are,
under no circumstances, to be considered as
taken ile bene exse, whether the witnesses re-
side beyond the process of the court or
within it; the proseions of the act relative
to depositions taken de bene esse being con-
fined to those taken under the enacting part
of the section. Sergeant v. Biddle....*508

case..

See ADMIRALTY, 1, 4, 6: CHANCERY, 20.

PRIORITY.

1. The United States are not entitled to priority

over other creditors, under the act of 1799,
8 65, upon the ground of the debtor having
made an assignment for the benefit of cre-
ditors, unless it is proved, that the debtor
has made an assignment of all his property.

United States v. Howland.... ...*108, 116
2. Where the deed of assignment conveys only

in its ports..

the property mentioned in a schedule annexed
to the deed, and the schedule docs not pur.
port to contain all the property of the party
who made it, the onus probandi is thrown on
the United States, to show that the assignment

embraced all the debtor's property......:Id.
3. The decisions on the subject of the priority

of the United States in case of insolvency, &c.,
collected..

..ld. *118

PRIZE.

*52, 63

1. The government of the United States haring

recognised the" existence of a civil war be-
tween Spain and her colonies, but remaining
neutral, the courts of the Union are bound
to consider as lawfu those acts which war
authorizes, and which the new governments
in South America may direct against their
chemy.

The Dirina Pastora ..
2. Unless the neutral rights of the United

States (as ascertained by the law of nations,
the acts of congress, and treaties) are violated
by the cruisci's sailing under commissions
from those governments, captures by them
are to be regarded by us as other captures,
jure belli, are regarded; the legality of which
cannot be determined in the courts of a neu-
tral country..

.......Id.
3. Note on the jurisdiction of neutral courts

over belligerent captures inade in violation of
the neutral jurisdiction...

.IN. *65
4. Different public acts by which the govern-

ment of the United States has recognised
the existence of a civil war between Spain

and her colonies. · Appendix, Note II.....*23
6. Prize code of Buenos Ayres and Chili... Id.
6. Where restitution of captured property is

claimed, upon the ground, that the force of
the cruiser making the capture has been aug.
mented within the United States, by enlisting
men, the burden of proving such enlist
is thrown upon the claimant; and that fact
being proved by him, it is incumbent upon
the captors to show, by proof, that the per-
sons so enlisted were subjects or citizens of
the prince or state under whose flag the
cruiser sails, transiently within the United
States, in order to bring the case within the
proviso of the 2d section of the act of June
6th, 1794, and of the act of the 20th April
1818. T'he Estrella......

*298, 306
7. The right of adjudicating on all captures

and questions of prize belongs exclusively to
the courts of the captor's country: but, it is
an exception to this general rule, that where
the captured vessel is brought, or voluntarily
comes, infra præsidia of a neutral power,
that power has a right to inquire whether its
own neutrality has been violated by the crui-
Ber which made the capture; and if such

violation has been committed, is in duty
bound to restore to the original owner prop-
erty captured by cruiscis illegally equipped

.Id.
8. No part of the act of the 5th June 1794, is

repealed by the act of the 3d March 1817.
The act of 1794 remained in force, until the
act of the 20th April 1818, by which all the
provisions respecting onr neutral relations
were embraced, and all former laws on the

same subject were repealed. ...........Id.
9. In the absence of any act of congress on the

subject, the courts of the United States
would have authority, under the general law
of nations, to decree restitution of property
captured in violation of their neutrality, im-
der a commission, issued within the United
States, or under an armament, or augmenta-
tion of the armanient, or crew of the captur-
ing vessel, within the same.......

.Id.
10. A cruiser, equipped at the port of Cartha.

gena, in South America, and commissioned
under the authority of the Province of Car-
thagena, one of the United Provinces of New
Grenada, at war with Spain, sailed from the
said port, and captured on the high seas, as
prize, a vessel and cargo belonging to the
subjects of the king of Spain, and put a
prize-crew on board, and ordered her to pro-
ceed to the said port of Carthagenit: the
captured vessel was afterwards fallen in with
by a private armed vessel of the United
States, and the cargo taken out and brought
into the United States for adjudication, as
the property of their enemy. The original
Spanish owner, and the prize-master from the
Carthagcnian privatcer, both claimed the
goods. The possession was decreed to be re-
stored to the Carthagenian prize-master. The

Neustra Scnora de la Caridad.... *497
11. War having been recognised to exist be-

tween Spain and her colonies, hy the gorern-
ment of the United States, it is the duty
of the courts of the United States, where
a capture is made by either of the bel.
ligerent parties, without any violation of our
neutrality, and the captured prize is brought
innocently within our jurisdiction, to leave
things in the same state they find them; or
to restore them to the state from which they
have been forcibly removed by the act of our
own citizens..

...Id.
12. The Spanish treaty held not to apply to the

above case, as the court could not consider
the Carthagenian captors as pirates, and the
capture was not made within the jurisdic-
tional limits of the United States, the only
two cases in which the treaty enjoins resti-

.Id.

tution......

See DOMICIL: LICENSE: PRACTICE, 6, 6.