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327 (1) (Tenn.) In the case of crossing a railroad track, the look and listen rule is the proper measure of duty under ordinary circumstances, but circumstances may exist making the rule inapplicable.-Hurt v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 205 S. W. 437.

327 (12) (Tenn.) One riding with another driving an automobile over a railroad crossing must exercise due care for his own safety by looking and listening, whether he is a guest or otherwise.-Hurt v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 205 S. W. 437.

(C) Trial and Review.

59(17) (Ark.) In a prosecution for rape an instruction on extent of resistance as modified to require prosecutrix to use all the means within her power consistent with her safety, up to the time when the act was accomplished, was as favorable as defendants could ask.-Zinn v. State, 205 S. W. 704.

REAL ACTIONS.

See Ejectment; Forcible Entry and Detainer;
Partition; Quieting Title; Trespass to Try
Title.
RECEIPTS.

350 (16) (Tenn.) In a case of injuries at a
crossing due to collision of a train with an
automobile, the driver of which did not stop.
look, and listen for the train, which gave no
warning of its approach, contributory negli- See Accord and Satisfaction, 11.
gence held for the jury.-Hurt v. Yazoo & M.
V. R. Co., 205 S. W. 437.

RECEIVERS.

See Estoppel, 119.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

(G) Injuries to Persons on or near Trocks. 359(1) (Ky.) As to a trespasser on its tracks a railroad owes no duty, except to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him after his peril is discovered.-Johnson v. Sandy Valley10 (Ky.) One receiving property, knowing & E. Ry. Co., 205 S. W. 576.

369(1) (Mo.App.) Where it was the general custom for all persons to walk on private interurban right of way, it was the motorman's duty to be on the lookout for pedestrians. Marshall v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 205 S. W.

971.

376(4) Mo.App.) An interurban railway motorman is under no duty to stop when he sees a pedestrian more than 250 feet away from car, but he need stop only as soon as he should have seen that a pedestrian, unaware of the danger, was not going to step off the tracks.Marshall v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 205 S. W.

971.

390 (Ky.) In action against railroad for killing of trespasser on its track, it is not sufficient, to show negligence, in not avoiding injury after discovered peril, that the trainmen might have seen him, but it must appear that they actually saw him.-Johnson v. Sandy Valley & E. Ry. Co., 205 S. W. 576.

398 (1) (Mo.App.) Evidence held insufficient to sustain verdict for pedestrian injured when struck by interurban car on private right of way. Marshall v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 205 S. W. 971.

398(4) (Ky.) That trainmen saw a trespasser on the track, and might have avoided injuring him, may be established either by direct evidence or proof of facts showing that the circumstances were such that they could not have failed to see him.-Johnson v. Sandy Valley & E. Ry. Co., 205 S. W. 576.

400(14) (Ky.) In action for killing trespasser on bridge track, evidence as to whether engineer discovered his peril in time to avoid injuring him by exercise of ordinary care held insufficient to take case to jury.-Johnson v. Sandy Valley & E. Ry. Co., 205 S. W. 576.

RAPE.

See Criminal Law, 438, 761, 789, 811, 813, 822, 823, 834, 1169; Witnesses, 274.

II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. (A) Indictment and Information. 29 (Ark.) In a prosecution for rape it is es sential that the woman shall not at any time consent.-Zinn v. State, 205 S. W. 704.

32 (Ark.) A woman attempting to protect her chastity need not resist as long as either strength endures or consciousness continues, but she must not at any time consent.-Zinn v. State, 205 S. W. 704.

(B) Evidence.

51(1) (Ark.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of rape.-Zinn v. State, 205 S. W. 704.

See Larceny, 64, 68.

for transportation, is under Ky. St. § 1199, as it was stolen when in possession of a carrier the thief is, under section 1201b, punishable as for a felony, without regard to value of property.-Commonwealth v. Johnson, 205 S. W. 689. RECORDS.

See Appeal and Error, 500-712, 834, 837; Chattel Mortgages, 90; Courts, 33, 76, 113; Criminal Law, 1090-1111; Deeds, 194; Evidence, 175; Exceptions, Bill of. 39; Forgery, 44; Highways, 58; Infants, 85, 115; Insurance, 522; Pleading. 14; Schools and School Districts, 103; Taxation, 692.

REFERENCE.

See Appeal and Error, 274, 282, 719, 878, 1017, 1022; Partition, 73.

REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Appeal and Error, 1151; Insurance, 143; Judgment, 585.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DE-
FENSES.

(Ky.) A court of equity may reform a written contract so as to conform to the contract as made by the parties, but it is powerless to make a contract for the parties or put into it a stipulation which the parties did not mutually assent to.-Central Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 205 S. W. 589.

16 (Ark.) Equity will reform a written instrument where there is mutual mistake, or where there has been a mistake of one party, accompanied by fraud or other inequitable conduct of the other.-Cain v. Collier, 205 S. W. 651. 16 (Ky.) Equity will reform a written contract, when by reason of mutual mistake of the parties it does not express their true agreement. -Stark v. Suttle, 205 S. W. 673.

17(2) (Ky.) A deed conveying land to a married woman and her husband jointly may be reformed, after husband's death and against his heirs, where the insertion of the husband's name as grantee was shown to be a mistake of the scrivener.-Nichols v. Nichols, 205 S. W. 953.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. 36(1) (Ky.) In pleading a cause in reformation, it is necessary to allege in clear and concise language the grounds of reformation, the agreement actually made, and the agreement which the parties intended to make.Stark v. Suttle, 205 S. W. 673.

——36(3) (Ky.) In suit for reformation on the by the master was procured by fraud.-Coral ground of mutual mistake, a pleading is gener- Ridge Clay Products Co. v. Collins, 205 S. ally regarded as sufficient which alleges facts W. 958. from which a mutual mistake may be readily inferred.-Stark v. Suttle, 205 S: W. 673.

In suit to recover past-due payments under

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.

contract by which defendant, grantee, accepted See Charities, 22.
deed subject to monthly charge in favor of
plaintiff during her life, held, that defendant's

REMAINDERS.

answer and counterclaim, setting up mutual See Trusts, 140; Wills, 601.

mistake as to amount of monthly charge, was not demurrable, since mutual mistake could readily be inferred from the facts alleged.-Id.

44 (Ark.) Parol evidence is admissible in See Evidence, suit to reform written instrument as a deed.Cain v. Collier, 205 S. W. 651.

reformation

of

45 (1) (Ark.) To warrant written instrument as a deed, evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing.-Cain v. Collier, 205 S. W. 651.

45(4) (Ark.) In suit to reform deed, evidence as to any mutual mistake, or mistake on the part of plaintiff, together with fraud or inequitable conduct by defendant, held insufficient to require reformation.-Cain v. Collier, 205 S.

W. 651.

45(4) (Ky.) To entitle one to have a deed reformed for mistake, the evidence must be clear and convincing.-Atha v. Webster, 205 S. W. 598.

REPLEVIN.

420; Sales, 146.

I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DE-
FENSES.

8 (2) (Mo.App.) Plaintiff could maintain replevin on the bill of sale as a symbolic delivery, provided the intent was to have the bill vest title at once unconditionally, and provided plaintiff had complied with the conditions necessary to vest title in him before suit was instituted.-Poplin v. Brown, 205 S. W. 411.

101⁄2 (Mo.App.) A bill of sale of personalty is not such a muniment of title as requires a suit in equity to have it declared void before the seller can recover the property.-Poplin v. Brown, 205 S. W. 411.

REPORTS.

See Appeal and Error, 282, 878; Counties,
~~101; Estoppel, ~98; Evidence,
355, 377.

45(4) (Ky.) A deed conveying land to a married woman and her husband jointly may be reformed after husband's death and against his heirs, where the insertion of the husband's name as grantee was shown by full, clear, and decisive evidence to be a mistake of the scrivener.-Nichols v. Nichols, 205 S. W. 953. In a suit by a married woman after her hus- See Domicile. band's death to reform a deed, wherein his name appeared as grantee through the alleged mistake of the scrivener, evidence held not sufficient to meet the required standard necessary for reformation.-Id.

RESIDENCE.

RESTAURANTS.

See Injunction, 101; Torts,

45(14) (Ky.) To warrant reformation of life policy because of fraud or mutual mistake, the evidence must be very clear and convincing See Taxation. -Central Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 205 S. W. 589.

RELEASE.

See Attorney and Client, 147; Trial, 127.

REVENUE.
REVIEW.

See Appeal and Error.

REWARDS.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. See Criminal Law, 338.

29(1) (Mo.App.) In view of Rev. St. 1909,

§ 5431, as amended by Acts 1915, p. 269, plain

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

10.

tiff's release of his employer for a personal in- See Waters and Water Courses, 38-51. jury would not release the defendant from liability for injury caused by the negligence of defendant's servant, even if plaintiff's employ

RISKS.

er and defendant were joint tort-feasors.-Rid- See Master and Servant, 203-226.
enour v. International Harvester Co. of Amer-
ica, 205 S. W. 881.

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transfer company was injured through the neg- See Highways.
ligence of an employé of a harvester com-
pany, for which injury the transfer company
was not liable, plaintiff's release of the trans-
fer company could not release the harvester
company as a joint tort-feasor.-Ridenour v.
International Harvester Co. of America, 205 S.
W. 881.

37 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff, injured in the course of his employment because of the negligence of defendant's servant, received a sum from his employer on a written contract not to sue his employer, but expressly reserving all rights of action against other parties, there was not a satisfaction, but merely a covenant not to sue.-Ridenour v. International Harvester Co. of America, 205 S. W. 881.

III. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL,
AND REVIEW.

57(2) (Ky.) In servant's action for injuries, evidence held to show that release pleaded

ROADS.

SALES.

See Appeal and Error, 1050, 1234; Commerce, 40; Contracts, 175, 278, 280, 316; Corporations, 642; Customs and Usages, 12, 20; Election of Remedies,

118; In79; Intox233; Judicial

3; Evidence, 213, 450, 462; Execution, 238; Executors and Administrators, 115, 138; Forgery, 16; Frauds, Statute of, 139; Fraudulent Conveyances, 181; Guardian and Ward, demnity, 13, 14; Infants, icating Liquors, 146, 147, Sales; Libel and Slander, 16; Licenses, 15; Master and Servant, 367; Mortgages, 34, 505, 526, 530; Principal and Agent, 115, 148; Public Lands, Replevin, 8, 102; Subrogation, Taxation,

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531-692; Trial, 191; Usury, 18; Vendor and Purchaser.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.

52(6) (Mo.) Evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that there was a sale of material to a railroad, and not to railroad contractor. (Per Walker, P. J.)-Southern Creosoting Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 205 S. W. 716.

II. CONSTRUCTION

OF CONTRACT. 71(1) (Ky.) A contract to manufacture and deliver staves made from timber on specified land "and from other timber purchased by" defendants, up to a specified number of staves, did not obligate defendants to manufacture staves from trees on land other than that specified, unless they in fact purchased other trees. -Crescent Stave Co. v. Brown, 205 S. W. 937. 72(5) (Ky.) A provision in a contract for the manufacture and delivery of staves that the staves shall be inspected according to the rules of a certain association does not require an arbitration provided for in such rules as a condition precedent to an action for breach of the contract. Crescent Stave Co. v. Brown, 205 S. W. 937.

79 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the contract is silent, delivery by seller to carrier is prima facie evidence of the delivery to the purchaser, but is not conclusive evidence of that fact. -Heidenheimer, Strassburger & Co. v. Alexander & Baird, 205 S. W. 458.

85(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff agreed to allow defendant credit on the note sued on of $500 for used car taken in trade, and $500 more when it should be sold, but plaintiff made such car into a service car and kept it, refusing an offer of $1.000 for it, plaintiff could not be heard to say that the last credit could not be made because the car had not been sold. Tuffly v. Houston Motor Car Co., 205 S. W. 832.

III. MODIFICATION OR RESCISSION
OF CONTRACT.

(C) Rescission by Buyer.
124 (Ky.) If property is not worthless and
seller does not waive a return thereof, a breach
of warranty will not bar recovery of purchase
price unless return or offer to return property
is made.-Williams v. Shepherd, 205 S. W. 565.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.
(B) Bills of Sale.

146 (Mo.App.) To make a bill of sale valid, delivery is essential.-Poplin v. Brown, 205

S. W. 411.

Delivery of a bill of sale involves intent as well as physical control, and there is no livery, such as makes the instrument a present conveyance, unless the grantor so intended.

-Id.

For a bill of sale to pass title, the grantor must deliver it for that purpose, and not for some other purpose.-Id.

inspection or opportunity, in absence of fraud, or defect not discoverable by inspection, contract is discharged.-Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S. W. 512.

Where goods are ordered by particular description, and accepted without opportunity for inspection, it is prevented by fraud, or it would not disclose any defect, the purchaser has practically the same rights as in case of a strict breach of warranty.-Id.

VI. WARRANTIES.

261(6) (Tex. Civ.App.) The description of millet seed contracted to be sold as "good, merchantable seed" is not properly an "express warranty," which is collateral to the contract, while a description of the quality of the goods is regarded as a part of the contract itself.-Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S. W. 512. 288 (2) (Tex.Civ.App.) An express warranty, being collateral to the agreement of sale, is not discharged by delivery and acceptance under the contract of sale, though the acceptance is made after inspection.-Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S. W. 512.

288(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where lumber company, having entered into piling contracts, accepts piling as performance of the contract without objection or complaint and uses and converts the timber, it cannot thereafter be heard to say that the piling delivered was not the piling called for by the terms of the contract.-Bay Lumber Co. v. Snelling, 205 S. W. 763.

VII. REMEDIES OF SELLER.

(E) Actions for Price or Valne.

354(1) (Ky.) A provision in a contract for the manufacture and sale of staves that the staves shall be inspected under the arbitration rules of a named association must be pleaded in order to be available to defendant.-Crescent Stave Co. v. Brown, 205 S. W. 937.

VIII. REMEDIES OF BUYER. (D) Actions and Counterclaims for Breach of Warranty.

425 (Ky.) Where warranty accompanying sale of property, which is not worthless, is broken, buyer may within reasonable time either return or offer to return property and sne for rescission, or elect to retain the property and sue for damages for breach of warranty.Williams v. Shepherd, 205 S. W. 565.

428 (Ky.) Warrantee may plead as a counterclaim the breach of warranty when sued for purchase price.-Williams v. Shepherd, 205 S. W. 565. de-428 (Mo.App.) In action on notes given for price of warranted machinery, which proved defective, wherein defendant filed counterclaim for amount of one note, paid by him on plaintiff's promise to remedy the defects, defendant could recover the amount of such note.-International larvester Co. of America v. Capps, 205 S. W. de-440(3) (Mo.App.) Where a plow and tractor was warranted to do good work, and the evidence showed that plowing 3 to 41⁄2 inches deep was not good work, evidence was admissible that the plows would only go from 3 to 4% inches deep.-International Harvester Co. of America v. Capps, 205 S. W. 252.

In replevin for an automobile, plaintiff's title being based upon a bill of sale signed by fendant, the question of the actual or constructive delivery of the property covered by the bill of sale at the time of the manual delivery of bill of sale by defendant to plaintiff, while not vital, had a bearing on the issue whether delivery of bill was conditional.-Id.

(C) Delivery and Acceptance of Goods. 176(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) A fair opportunity to inspect the property delivered under a contract of sale by particular description, in the absence of fraud, is regarded as the equivalent of inspection. Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S. W.

512.

179(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) If goods tendered in discharge of contract of sale, merely descriptive of quality, did not meet requirements, they may be rejected and seller sued for breach of contract, but where goods are accepted after'

252.

445(1) (Mo.App.) In action for price of plow and tractor, defended on ground of defective condition of machinery, whether the machinery complied with terms of warranty held for jury.-International Harvester Co. of America v. Capps, 205 S. W. 252.

446(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit for breach of warranty of quality of carload of millet seed, where there was no evidence as to what extent particular seed delivered by defendant was responsible for trash found in entire car, charge that verdict should be for defendant unless jury should find he agreed to sell entire

carload of seed, as alleged by plaintiff, and denied. was proper. Ferguson v. Johnson, 205 S. W. 512.

SALOON BUSINESS.

See Insurance, 718.

SAVINGS BANKS. See Banks and Banking, 309. SCALES.

See Master and Servant, 367.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. See Adverse Possession, 114; Boundaries, 37; Counties, 99; Interest, 39; Limitation of Actions, 102; Mandamus, 112; Public Lands, 54, 175,

II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. (B) Creation, Alteration, Existence, and Dissolution of Districts.

24 (2) (Mo.) The corporate existence of a consolidated school district can only be questioned by the state in a direct proceeding by it for that purpose.-Bonderer v. Hall, 205 S. W.

542.

37(4) (Mo.App.) Organization of a consolidated school district under Laws 1913, p. 721, was not valid, where the plats posted were not authenticated or uniform, and did not understandingly show the townships, ranges, and see tions to be included in the district.-State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. No. 2, Shelby County. v. Curtright, 205 S. W. 248.

In organization of a consolidated school district under Laws 1913, p. 721, plats posted prior to election must bear some kind of identification by the county superintendent, or show in some manner that they are the boundaries adopted by the county superintendent.-Id.

40 (Mo.App.) A county clerk could attack validity of organization of consolidated_school district, organized under Laws 1913, p. 721. in an action by district to compel him to extend taxes, where there was no certificate from the superintendent of schools that the law had been complied with, and plats posted prior to election were not authenticated and were wholly insufficient.-State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. No. 2, Shelby County, v. Curtright, 205 S. W. 248.

Seduction

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97(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) In order to vote at an election to determine whether bonds shall be in and own property in the school district.issued to build a schoolhouse, one must reside Barker v. Wilson, 205 S. W. 543.

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whether bonds should be issued to build a In contest of a school election to determine schoolhouse, upon the ground that certain persons were unlawfully denied the right to vote, it devolved upon contestants to show, by clear and satisfactory testimony, that such persons possessed all the necessary qualifications of voters.-Id.

sufficient to show that one denied right to vote In contest of school election, evidence held inresided within the school district.-Id.

whether bonds should be issued, it is essential, In a contest of a school election to determine county attorney be served with a written notice to give the district court jurisdiction, that the of contest and statement of the grounds on which the contestant relies, and service of petition of contest upon such attorney, with verbal notice, was insufficient. Id.

103(1) (Ky.) Where the board of education has reported what is a sufficient tax levy for the council must, within the lawful rates of levy school purposes as required by Ky. St. § 3595, comply therewith, unless it can show that the board acted corruptly, or in bad faith, or emDayton v. Board of Education of Dayton, 205 braced unlawful items in the demand.-City of

S. W. 678.

Where the board of education of a city of the fourth class failed to request a levy as required by law, the board of council could waive irreg ularity of demand and make a valid levy. Id. 103(4) (Ky.) The

board of education held not to show that the official record of the board ever made a proximate ascertainment of the needs or resources, or fixed the amount of tax levy for the current school year in compliance with Ky. St. § 3595.-City of Dayton v. Board of Education of Dayton, 205 S. W. 678.

44 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 7548, authorizing the dissolution of a school district upon petition of a majority of the electors therein, the fact that the petitioners constitute a majority must be made to appear in the petition.-Hughes v. Special School Dist. No. H See Dedication, 24. of Haynes, 205 S. W. 824.

Kirby's Dig. § 7548, providing for the dissolution of school districts by county court upon petition of majority of residents, does not require granting the petition, but merely authorizes the exercise of a discretion in the best interests of the citizens affected.-Id.

Whether the petitioners for the dissolution of a school district, under Kirby's Dig. § 7548, constitute a majority, is a question of fact, not reviewable on appeal in the absence of palpable error.-Id.

The judgment of the county court relative to the dissolution of a school district, under Kirby's Dig. § 7548, rests upon discretion, and will not be disturbed in absence of a clear showing of abuse thereof.-Id.

Upon petition for the dissolution of a school district under Kirby's Dig. § 7548, the court's exclusion of evidence that residents of a portion of the district petitioned for inclusion in another district was not prejudicial error, where denial of the petition was supportable as a proper exercise of discretion.-Id.

SEALS.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

See Corporations, 648.

SEDUCTION.

See Appeal and Error, 197, 273, 1047;
Criminal Law, 811, 814, 824; Evidence,
155; Indictment and Information, 87;
Trial, 296.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY.

of plaintiff's daughter, the laws relating to the
I (Mo.App.) In a civil action for seduction
crime of seduction and their interpretation are
W. 69.
not controlling.-Owens v. Fanning, 205 S.

16 (Mo.App.) Under a
fully, wickedly, wantonly and maliciously se-
that defendant did "unlawfully, willfully, wrong-
petition alleging
duce, debauch and carnally know one," plain-
tiff's daughter, it was competent to show that
plaintiff's daughter was forcibly debauched by

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

defendant, in the first instance, and that thereafter she was induced to yield to defendant through the wiles and blandishments of the seducer.-Owens v. Fanning, 205 S. W. 69.

17 (Mo.App.) In an action by a father for the seduction of his daughter. evidence of her prior good reputation for chastity was admissible as tending to show that she was of previous chaste character and to corroborate her own testimony.-Owens v. Fanning, 205 S. W. 69. In an action for seduction of plaintiff's daughter, defendant was not entitled to show she had a bad reputation after he had accomplished her ruin.-Id.

21 (Mo.App.) The gist of plaintiff's action for seduction is the debauching of his daughter and loss of services, though he may recover for the dishonor and disgrace brought upon him and his home, and punitive damages are recoverable whether the debauchment was accomplished by artifices and blandishments of the seducer or with force and violence.-Owens v. Fanning, 205 S. W. 69.

22 (Mo.App.) In an action for seduction of plaintiff's 17 year old daughter, where plaintiff had to care for her and the child, a verdict of $2.025 actual damages held not excessive.Owens v. Fanning, 205 S. W. 69.

In an action for seduction of plaintiff's daughter, an award of punitive damages in the sum of $1,416 held moderate enough in view of the atrocious acts of defendant and of his wealth and position in life.-Id.

II. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

34 (Ark.) A prior promise of marriage, continuing to the time of intercourse, is sufficient for conviction of seduction, notwithstanding a promise at the time that, if she became pregnant, he would marry her immediately.-Oakes v. State, 205 S. W. 305.

45 (Mo.) In a prosecution for seduction, evidence held sufficient to show that prosecutrix was an unmarried female.-State v. Stemmons, 205 S. W. 8.

In a prosecution for seduction, as denounced by Rev. St. 1909, § 4478, evidence held to show a seduction, and not a barter by prosecutrix of her virtue.-Id.

of right of property to sequestered cotton, that it was stored with it, need not name the owners who stored it, it stating it could not, and this appearing on trial.-King-Collie Co. v. Wichita Falls Warehouse Co., 205 S. W. 748. Evidence on trial of right of property to cotton sequestered in action by plaintiff warehouse company against a compress company which had issued receipts therefor to claimant, held sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of its being cotton which plaintiff manager had embezzled from it, and sold after destroying the marks thereon.-Id.

SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM. See Execution, 413; Judgment. 585; Landlord and Tenant. 290; Limitation of Actions, 180; Pleading, 384; Reformation of Instruments, 36; Sales, 428.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS OF
REMEDY.

13 (Ark.) The term "counterclaim" means a cross-demand in liquidation or reduction of plaintiffs' claim, and is necessarily limited to actions for recovery of money, under Acts 1917, p. 1441, § 1, amending Kirby's Dig. § 6099.Smith v. Glover, 205 S. W. 891.

See Drains.

SEWERS.

SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES. See Seduction, 46; Taxation, 3621⁄4.

SIGNATURES.

See Acknowledgment, 38; Courts, 76, 113; Criminal Law, 1099; Forgery, 48.

4 (Ark.) A directed signature especially where duly acknowledged, is effective, and is not within Kirby's Dig. § 7799, relating to signature by mark and witness thereto.-Chipman v. Perdue, 205 S. W. 892.

SLANDER.

46 (Ark.) Letters of defendant in seduction to prosecutrix, beginning "Dear Sweetheart," "Dear Girl," etc., tending to prove that a close and affectionate relation existed between them, See Libel and Slander. held competent in corroboration of her testimony as to promise of marriage.-Oakes v. State. 205 S. W. 305.

SLEEP.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Partition, 57.

I.

NATURE AND GROUNDS OF REM

46 (Mo.) In a prosecution for seduction See Negligence, 88. under promise of marriage, the promise held sufficiently corroborated, as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 5235, by circumstances other than those disclosed in the testimony of the prosecutrix.-State v. Stemmons, 205 S. W. 8. ~50(2) (Mo.) In a prosecution for seduction, an instruction that the jury might consider the preparations of the prosecuting witness for marriage as corroborating the promise of marriage, notwithstanding that they were unknown to defendant, was not erroneous.-State v. Stemmons, 205 S. W. 8.

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EDY IN GENERAL.

8 (Mo.) Although specific performance of a contract to convey real estate is of grace rather than a right, yet when the premises show a valid legal agreement, based upon a sufficient consideration, and untainted with fraud or other vice, promisees are as much entitled to specific performance as to any other legal remedy, and the discretion resting in the court must be judicially exercised.-Campbell v. McLaughlin, 205 S. W. 18.

II. CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE.

39 (Mo.) Equity will not permit the statute of frauds to be made an instrument of deception and fraud; therefore it has enforced oral contracts made in disregard of the statute. -Signaigo v. Signaigo, 205 S. W. 23.

49 (2) (Mo.) Equity will grant specific performance of an agreement to convey land in consideration of life support, where performed by the promisees, although services were of less value than the property to be conveyed.Campbell v. McLaughlin, 205 S. W. 18.

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