The barges were neither ballasted nor gas freed at the terminal, and at about 0230 e.s.t. the tow departed for Baton Rouge, La. Though a portable electric blower was used to ventilate the empty cargo tanks en route, it is not known how many tanks had been ventilated prior to the casualty.

The Martin was coupled to the box type stern rakes of both barges and was centered while pushing the barges down the Ohio River. There were approximately twenty 55-gallon drums on the deck of the MOS 103 stowed on dunnage in the vicinity of the No. 3 cargo tanks. Twelve or thirteen of these drums contained stern tube

The M/V Martin is a 93.8 foot, 183 gross-ton towboat built in 1950. She was powered by a 1200 horsepower diesel engine. She was not Coast Guard inspected nor was she required to be.

At the time of the casualty, she was pushing the two similarly constructed steel tank barges, made up side by side. Each of the barges was 50.3 feet in breadth and approximately 290 feet long. Both barges had last been inspected and certificated by the Coast Guard on May 20, 1970 for flammable or combustible liquids of grade "B" and lower.

lubricating oil for use by the towing vessel; the remainder were either empty or contained slops from the barge cargo tanks.

The Martin and tow were manned by the following persons (whose titles

are given in river parlance): her captain, her pilot, her mate and tankerman, her chief engineer, her assistant engineer, her cook, and three deckhands. None of these were, nor were

they required to be licensed by the Coast Guard, and only the mate held a Merchant Mariners Document, which was endorsed for tankerman Grade "B".

Ventilating operations on the barges, which had been secured during the night, began the morning of January 7 on MOS 101 as a deckhand placed the blower on the No. 4 port tank. As the tow approached the Parkersburg Railroad Bridge, the blower was moved to the No. 3 port

tank. The suction hose for the stripping pump was being held in the adjoining starboard tank by a deckhand; the mate held the discharge hose in a 55-gallon drum on the deck of the MOS 103.

The pilot of the Martin slowed to approximately 5 m.p.h. and lined up to pass between the piers marking the sides of the navigable channel. In testimony before a Coast Guard investigating officer, the pilot stated that he was lined up perfectly to make passage and that just after the head of the tow passed under the railroad bridge an explosion occurred on the barges. The mate and the deckhand on the barges were not seen alive after the explosion.

Below decks, the captain of the Martin was thrown from his bed by the force of the blasts. As he went outside he saw a fire burning forward and smelled smoke. Unable to reach the pilothouse without his artificial leg, the captain ordered the chief engineer to tell the pilot to back the vessel away from the fiercely burning barges. The vessel was finally landed on the Ohio shore above the bridge, where the pilot and the cook were taken to the hospital for treatment of shock and minor injuries.

Because the location of the now submerged barges was not precisely known, the captain of the port, Huntington, W. Va., ordered the river closed to traffic shortly after the casualty. Broken electrical cables dangling from the bridge also posed a hazard to navigation until they were removed. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determined during the following day that the adjacent channel under the bridge was clear, and traffic was allowed to pass through the bridge on January 8. On January 9 the Coast Guard Cutter Oleander marked the alternate channel and the wreck, and traffic through the area was restored to normal with caution advised.

Salvage operations and investigation of the sunken barges revealed that the initial explosion occurred in the No. 5 port cargo tank of the MOS

When Is a Bridge An Unreasonable Obstruction?

Built in 1871, the Parkersburg Railroad Bridge has a horizontal clearance, between the piers in the main channel, of 326 feet. In 1904 the U.S. attorney for the northern district of Virginia filed a complaint against the Parkersburg Branch Railroad Co. and the B. & O. Railroad Co. charging the width of the spans was inadequate to accommodate the commerce of the Ohio River.

The motion for a permanent injunction, which would have forced the company to modify the bridge structure, was heard 1 year later in a district court. The judge refused to grant the injunction and an appeals court upheld the lower court's ruling.

Nine months after the decision of the circuit court of appeals, the Secretary of War indicted the company for failing to obey the River and Harbor Act of 1889 in that the span widths were too narrow for safe navigation. Again the circuit court of appeals decided for the defendants, citing that the structure was not subject to the act, which was passed 18 years after the bridge was built. Since that decision no further attempts have been made by the government to alter the bridge.

In addition to the narrowness of the channel between the bridge piers, the Coast Guard investigating officer also cited the construction of the supports as a possible hazard to navigation. Each of the piers has approximately 12 steps located on the upstream side of the supports, with the vertical distance between the steps measuring 24 inches.

Because many of these steps are under water most of the time, a vessel passing under the bridge has to contend with what amounts to an unseen projection from the pier. A projection of this nature poses the danger of holing a vessel below the waterline-a possibility which was mentioned by the investigating officer as one possible explanation of the explosion aboard the MOS 101.

A study of the Parkersburg Railroad Bridge is now underway in the Second Coast Guard District as a result of the casualty. If the facts of the case warrant further investigation, the Commandant may conduct a public hearing. With the information garnered from the public hearing and from other sources, a more exhaustive study of the condition of the bridge would be made, after which the bridge could be declared an unreasonable obstruction to navigation. An order to alter the structure would then be issued under authority of the Truman-Hobbs Act of 1940.

101 (which was the port barge in the tow) at about the point of impact with the bridge. Twelve out of the total of 20 cargo tanks had suffered explosions after the initial blast. Damage to the Martin, which consisted primarily of broken glass, was repaired and the vessel was returned to service.

It was not until a month later, on February 26, that the body of the deckhand was found in the No. 4 starboard tank of MOS 101. The body of the mate was recovered 50 miles down river on March 9, 1972.

The Coast Guard investigating officer concluded in his investigation of the casualty that the accident resulted from the improper alignment of the Martin and tow to safely pass under the bridge. Stripping and ventilating operations conducted on the barges contributed to the severity of the casualty, but the hazardous condition created by the use of ungrounded portable electric equipment (the blower and stripping pump) did not cause the explosion. Remedial action against the pilot was recommended and is pending. Recommendations by the investigating officer included one proposing a study of the Parkersburg Bridge to determine if it is an un

reasonable obstruction to navigation. (See box.)

As the volume of hazardous materials carried on inland waterways increases every year, the potential for disasters which involve whole cities also increases. The cost to the cities of Parkersburg and Belpre was meas

ured in dollars, not in lives, last January; but the need for strict compliance with safety standards is still obvious. Only continued adherence to safe cargo transporting practices can prevent another, or perhaps worse, disaster of the type which occurred on board the Martin. +

For the second year in a row, the Marine Section of the National Safety Council received the Cameron Award at the National Safety Congress and Exposition in Chicago. Capt. Richard N. LePage of Farrell Lines, Inc., general chairman of the Marine Section for the past year, accepted the award.

Organized in 1917, the Marine Section won over 27 other industrial sections including the aerospace, airline, trucking, railroad, utilities, construction, glass and ceramics, and metal industries. The Cameron Award is given to the National Safety Council industry section which makes

the largest contribution to promoting and advancing safety during a 12month period within its own industry.

At the presentation ceremony, Captain LePage remarked:

In the past 2 years, the U.S. maritime industry has conducted what amounts to a national campaign to promote safety at sea, on the docks and in the shipyard. Safety indeed, has become the watchword of the American Merchant Marine and the cargo fleets of all nations engaged in domestic and international trade.

We in the maritime industry must daily face the new safety challenges as we put into effect new safety procedures, so essential to the operation and handling of cargo on technically advanced U.S. flag ships now in service or being built under the 1970 Merchant Marine Act.

The National Transportation Safety Board, concerned with the unnecessary loss of life which occurs in sudden sinking of vessels when no distress messages can be transmitted, has released a study entitled "Survivor-Locator Systems for Distressed Vessels." The purpose of the study was "to analyze casualties involving vessels which have been unable to transmit a distress call or message; to discuss the inadequacies of the current distress communications system; to determine whether certain vessels should be required to carry automatic emergency position-indicator radio beacons (EPIRB's); to consider other possible distress communications systems; and to make recommendations which will help prevent unnecessary loss of life when seamen must abandon ship on short notice."

The report discussed 10 casualties in which a total of 263 lives were lost, indicating that had the vessels been carrying EPIRB's, many lives might have been saved. The following are NTSB's case histories of the casualties. A. SS Marine Sulphur Queen

On February 2, 1963, the fully laden Marine Sulphur Queen, a T-2 type tankship which had been converted to carry molten sulphur, departed Beaumont, Tex., bound for Norfolk, Va. The last known radio contact, a routine personnel message from a member of the crew, was made at 0125 e.s.t. on February 4. At 1123 e.s.t. on February 4, RCA radio made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the vessel. At 2100 e.s.t. on February 7, the owners reported to the Coast Guard that the vessel was overdue.

A Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation concluded that: (1) the vessel foundered in the vicinity of the Straits of Florida some time during February 4, 1963; (2) the suddenness of the casualty precluded transmission of a distress message; (3) the cause of the foundering could not be determined; and (4) life jackets found during subsequent searches indicated that at least some personnel had managed to don life jackets.

With respect to this study, the important aspects of the case are that the vessel apparently sank very rapidly without transmitting a distress message and more than 3 days

elapsed before an alert was sounded and a search effort was initiated.

The entire crew of 39 persons was lost. The vessel was traversing well established and frequently used shipping routes between the Gulf of Mexico and the east coast of the United States. If the vessel had been equipped with an EPIRB, prompt notification of the casualty might have saved some of the crew.

B. SS Daniel J. Morrell

last, en route from Buffalo, N.Y., to Taconite, Minn.,

The Great Lakes ore carrier Daniel J. Morrell, in bal

broke in two during the height of a storm and sank in Lake Huron at approximately 0200 e.s.t., November 29, 1966.

When the vessel broke in two, all power cables to the forward section were severed. Since the vessel neither had nor was required to have an emergency radio, it was without means of communications and no distress message was sent. The first report of alarm concerning the whereabouts of the vessel was made to the Coast Guard at 1215 e.s.t. on November 30, 1966. Thus more than 11⁄2 days elapsed between the time of the casualty and the initiation of search efforts.

At the time of the casualty, there were at least two other vessels in the vicinity. Only one person survived this casualty, and the other 28 crewmembers perished.

C. M/V Johannes Kruss

Major loss of life due to sudden founderings is not limited to the larger vessels previously discussed. The German February 28, 1967, that no radio distress message was fishing vessel M/V Johannes Kruss sank so quickly on

broadcast. She foundered south of Greenland in an area where other fishing vessels were operating. Several days elapsed before it was known that the vessel was missing. All 22 of her crew were lost.

D. M/V Etnafjell

The Norwegian fish-factory ship M/V Etnafjell caught fire and was abandoned by most of her crew on Novem

ber 2, 1968, in latitude 55°20′ N., longitude 33°25′ W. This position is about 450 miles southeast of the southern tip of Greenland, and is close to heavy transatlantic air routes and some shipping lanes. On November 3, the burning vessel was sighted by a Polish vessel, which was unable to communicate either visually or by radio with the Etnafjell. The Coast Guard dispatched the Coast Guard Cutter Absecon to assist the stricken vessel. The cutter arrived on scene on November 4. The Norwegian vessel was no longer afire, but her lifeboats were missing on one side, and those on the other side were burned beyond usefulness. Three persons on board the vessel stated that 25 crewmembers had abandoned the burning vessel in two lifeboats, and another five were missing. The explosion and fire occurred so quickly that no distress message was transmitted. A massive search and rescue operation was initiated and was continued for 2 weeks. No trace of the crew or lifeboats was found. The bodies of four of the crew were discovered later in the afterquarters and engineroom. An EPIRB capable of transmitting an alerting signal on 121.5 or 243 MHz would have been heard by some of an estimated 600 airplanes which transited the distress area during the 3-day period immediately following the sinking. As a result of this accident, Norway has taken positive action to require the carriage of EPRIB's on most Norwegian vessels.

E. SS Chryssi

The tankship SS Chryssi broke in two on December 26, 1970, about 250 miles southwest of Bermuda. This vessel, built in the United States, was owned by a Greek concern and was registered under the Panamanian flag. At the time of the casualty, the Chryssi was en route from El Palito to Boston. No radio distress message was transmitted. The U.S. SS Geneva sighted the bow section of the Chryssi 2 day after the fracture. The stern section had sunk. The Norwegian M/V Ross Mount later rescued 17 survivors from one of the lifeboats. The crewmembers reported that 21 other crewmen had abandoned the stricken vessel in other lifeboats. An extensive air-sea search failed to find these 21 persons or the lifeboats.

F. SS Texaco-Oklahoma

On March 27, 1971, the tankship Texaco-Oklahoma, en route from Port Arthur, Tex., to Boston, Mass., broke in two and eventually sank approximately 120 miles northeast of Cape Hatteras, N.C. Immediately after the vessel broke in two, at about 0330 hours e.s.t., the bow section rose bow-up and the midship house was partially submerged. No distress message was sent. Although 13 crewmembers were in the midship house and the bow section did not sink immediately, there were several possibilities concerning the failure to transmit a distress message: (1) the antenna was broken; (2) there was no primary source of power; and (3) emergency batteries may have been submerged.

A portable lifeboat radio designed to transmit on 500 kHz and 8364 kHz was available and was used by the 31 members of the crew who were on the stern section of the vessel. Although this radio was operated continuously for over 12 hours and although there were many vessels in the area, no auto alarms were activated and no vessel or shore station reported hearing any distress signal. The crewmembers on the stern section made other unsuccessful attempts to alert passing ships of the vessel's distress.

At 0530 on March 28, 1972, approximately 26 hours after the vessel broke in two, all 31 crewmembers stranded on the stern section abandoned ship. Within 30 minutes, the stern section sank. Approximately 11 hours later, 11 survivors in an inflatable liferaft were sighted and picked up by the passing tankship Sasstown. The Sasstown reported the rescue to the Coast Guard at 1642 on March 28, 1972. This was the first notification that the TexacoOklahoma had sunk. Two more survivors were rescued at approximately 1410 on March 29. Thirty-one out of 44 crewmembers perished.

G. M/V Brandenburg

The German cargo motor vessel Brandenburg sank in 3 minutes in the English Channel, southwest of the Varne light-vessel, on January 12, 1971. This ship sank so rapidly that her crew was unable to send a radio distress message. Fortunately, about 2 hours later, a passing vessel sighted survivors in the water. Eleven of the crew were rescued, although 20 perished. There were in the area of the disaster numerous vessels which could have saved many of those who perished.

This case demonstrated the need for an EPIRB capable of transmitting on 2182 kHz, an international distress frequency. Ships in the vicinity and the coastal radio stations at Foreland, England, and Boulogne, France, would have heard an alerting signal on this frequency, and could have plotted the position of the sinking vessel. H. V.A. Fogg

This jumbolized T-2 tankship departed Freeport, Tex., at about 1230 c.s.t. on February 1, 1972. The vessel had discharged benzene and was scheduled to clean tanks en route to Houston, where she was to complete discharge and load other petroleum products destined for northeast U.S. ports. The normal practice was to proceed outside the 50-mile limit en route and to notify the operator's home office 5 hours prior to reaching the sea buoy off Galveston. The Fogg was expected to arrive at the buoy at about 0200 on February 2. No communications were received from the tankship.

At about 1610 on February 1, a NASA pilot reported sighting an expanding smoke cloud 40 miles off Galveston. Coast Guard aircraft investigated the area in the vicinity of the smoke, but found no vessels or oil platforms in distress. The operators notified the Coast Guard at 1345