de during the penitenti children copile of time ited to take efetto e a dulous and (2 Blackstone's Com me; Th the reversion in in in the remini his heirs miler determination of the p together with their tate, jined in de became sl remable f class. In order to provide against this contingency the further provision is made that in the event any of his children should die during the pendency of the life estate their children shall take their parents' share. It will thus be seen that by the provisions of this clause two estates in remainder are created,-one in the children and the other in the grandchildren of the testator. The second is to take effect only in case the first does not and in substitution for it. Remainders of this character, in which the disposition of the property is made in the alternative, the one to take effect only in case the other does not and in substitution of it, are said to run concurrently, and are commonly spoken of as alternative remainders or contingent remainders with a double aspect. 40 Cyc. 1643; Furnish v. Rogers, 154 Ill. 569; Smith v. Chester, 272 id. 428. Estates in remainder are divided into two general classes: vested and contingent. They arise whenever the owner of the fee creates an estate less than the fee, such as for life or years, (called the particular estate,) to take effect in possession, and disposes of the balance of his estate to one other than the owner of the fee, to take effect immediately upon the determination of the particular estate. The chief distinction between a vested and contingent remainder is, that in the former the reversion in fee passes at once out of the owner and vests in the remainder-man, while in the latter it remains in such owner or his heirs until the happening of the contingency upon which the reversion in fee is to vest. (Williams on Real Prop. *246.) It follows from this that the former is alienable while the latter is not, for until the happening of the contingency upon which the reversion is to vest there is no estate in the remainder-man which he can convey. A contingent remainder, therefore, cannot be alienated. Another peculiarity about such remainder is, that while it is said to be an estate it is destructible, and may be destroyed at any time before vesting by the joint action of the owners of the par ticular estate and the reversion in fee. This results from the nature of an estate in fee, which is the highest estate known to the law and consists of the particular estate and the reversion in fee. From this it follows that a contingent remainder will be destroyed whenever there is a union of the two estates in the same person. When this occurs the remainder will be destroyed, as the particular estate and reversion will merge into a fee, and there can be no remainder limited to take effect after an estate in fec. (2 Blackstone's Com. 165.) With these general rules in mind there can be no doubt as to the effect of the conveyances in question. By the second clause of the will the testator created an estate for life in his wife, with an alternative or contingent remainder with a double aspect in such of his children as should survive the life tenant, or the children of such of his children as should die during the pendency of the life estate leaving children. The remainder is contingent for the reason it is limited to take effect to dubious and uncertain persons, for until the death of the life tenant it is uncertain that any of his children will survive her or that such as may die during the pendency of the life estate will die leaving children capable of taking under the will. A remainder limited to take effect to dubious and uncertain persons or upon a dubious and uncertain event is a contingent remainder. (2 Blackstone's Com. 168; Thompson v. Adams, 205 Ill. 552; Golladay v. Knock, 235 id. 412; Brownback v. Keister, 220 id. 544; Smith v. Chester, supra.) In this instance the reversion in fee did not pass out of the owner and vest in the remainder-man, but remained in him and vested in his heirs under the twelfth clause of the will, pending the determination of the particular estate. When these heirs, together with their mother, the owner of the particular estate, joined in the conveyances to Annegers, he at once became seized of an estate in fee simple and the estate in remainder was thereby destroyed, (Barr v. Gardner, 259 Ill. 256; Bond v. Moore, 236 id. 576; Messer v. Baldwin, 262 id. 48; Blakeley v. Mansfield, 274 id. 133;) and the deed from him to Friedman and Oertley invested them with the grantor's indefeasible title in fee simple, and they were entitled to have partition made of such estate in accordance with their respective rights and interests therein, free and clear of any claims which the remainder-men might have in such estate. Section I of the Partition act (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 1948,) authorizes partition to be made where land is held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common or co-parcenary, by proceedings in the circuit court of the county in which the real estate is situated. We have held that the right conferred by this section is absolute, and that the court has no discretion to refuse it where the statutory requisites are met by the pleadings and proofs. (Miller v. Lanning, 211 Ill. 620.) By section 39 of the same act it is further provided that in such proceedings the court may investigate and determine all questions of conflicting titles and remove clouds from the title of the premises sought to be partitioned. That is what is sought to be done by the bill in this case. Friedman and Oertley were each seized in fee simple, as tenants in common, in equal parts, of the real estate in controversy. When Friedman applied to Oertley to make partition he refused to do so by reason of uncertainty. as to the title they had because of the remainders created by the ninth clause of such will. Under these circumstances it was necessary for Friedman to resort to a court of chancery to secure partition of such premises. When he did so he had a right, under the provisions of section 39, to bring all questions of conflicting rights and titles to the premises before the court and have the same adjudicated and determined in such proceeding. (Henrichsen v. Hodgen, 67 Ill. 179; Gage v. Lightburn, 93 id. 248; Iberg v. Webb, 96 id. 415.) This is what was done here. Where the rights conferred by a statute are absolute, the motive of the par ties in resorting to such proceedings cannot be questioned when the statutory requisites for the institution of such proceedings are met by the pleadings and proofs. For the reasons given the decree of the circuit court was right and will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. (No. 11965.-Judgment affirmed.) THE PEOPLE C.x rel. Maclay Hoyne, Appellant, vs. W. W. GRANT et al. Appellees. Opinion filed April 17, 1918. I. CORPORATIONS-representative body of a corporation not for profit may elect trustees at meetings outside the State. A corporation not organized for profit may hold meetings at stated times outside the State, composed of delegates of constituent associations, and it is not in conflict with the constitution or statutes for the bylaws of such corporation to authorize the election of trustees of the corporation at such meetings of the delegates. cata on 2. CERTIORARI-when denial of writ of certiorari is not res judia second appeal. The denial by the Supreme Court of a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the Appellate Court ordering the awarding of a writ of mandamus to compel a State's attorney to file an information in the nature of quo warranto is judicata on a second appeal involving a determination of the merits of the case after the information has been filed and dismissed on demurrer. not res APPEAL from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. OSCAR E. HEARD, Judge, presiding. MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, (SEYMOUR STED MAN, CHARLES H. SOELKE, and SWAN M. JOHNSON, of counsel,) for appellant. LOESCH, SCOFIELD, LOESCH & RICHARDS, for appellees. |