People ex rel. v. New York Central R. R. (Dunn, J.) . . 380 334 People v. Powers. (Cartwright, J.).. 438 People ex rel. v. Russel. (Farmer, J.). 520 People ex rel. v. Thompson. (Cartwright, J.). 87 People ex rel. v. Windes. (Cartwright, J.).. 251 People, for use, etc. v. Wylie. (Cartwright, J.).. 515 438 R Rhoades v. Felter. (Dunn, J.) ........ 36 Rock Island County ads. Dunne. (Cartwright, J.).... 628 550 Russel ads. People ex rel. (Farmer, J.). 520 Ryan v. Heffernan. (Duncan, J.) ........ S 429 Scott County Drainage District ads. Freesen. (Craig, J.).... 536 Sherman v. Flack. (Dunn, J.) . . . . . Slinger v. Sterrett. (Cartwright, J.). Smith-Wallace Shoe Co. ads. Dixon. (Duncan, J.). Standard Brewery v. Creedon. (Duncan, J.). Stanton v. Chicago City Ry. (Cooke, J.).... 457 82 234 474 256 (Farmer, J.).. 581 State Bank of East Moline v. Moline Steel Co. Stoessand v. Frank. (Cartwright, J.)... Straus ads. Holmes. (Cooke, J.)............. Szulerecki v. Oppenheimer. (Duncan, J.). T Thompson ads. People ex rel. (Cartwright, J.)....... 425 271 621 525 87 University of Illinois ads. People ex rel. (Carter, C. J.)..... 494 W Waggoner ads. Clark. (Duncan, J.). Walker v. Walker. (Carter, C. J.). Watson ads. Dime Savings and Trust Co. (Duncan, J.).......... 199 II 276 Windes ads. People ex rel. (Cartwright, J.)...... 251 557 (Duncan, J.) 429 515 CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. (No. 11709.-Judgment reversed.) GEORGE S. WALKER, Trustee, Defendant in Error, vs. ELIZABETH FRANCES WALKER et al. Plaintiffs in Error. Opinion filed February 20, 1918-Rehearing denied April 4, 1918. I. WILLS-court may consider surrounding circumstances in ascertaining intention of testator. The intention of the testator is found by construing the words in the will in the light of the testator's circumstances and surroundings, and evidence of the condition of the testator's mind when he executed the will, whether he lived with his family, and the state of his family and of his property, is admissible. 2. SAME-general rule as to when a legacy to be paid through a trustee is contingent. Where a legacy is to be paid through a trustee, the general rule is that where there are no words importing a gift other than to the trustee to divide or pay at a future time the legacy is contingent, but if the payment is postponed for the convenience of the funds of the estate and not for reasons personal to the legatee or devisee it should be held vested. 3. SAME when legacies to be paid by trustees are contingent. Where the primary purpose of the testator in creating a trust in all of his personal estate is to give the legatees one-half of their shares at the end of a five-year period of management by his trustees and the other half at the end of a ten-year period of such man agement the legacies are contingent and do not vest until the time arrives for the respective five and ten-year distributions. 4. SAME―meaning of word "heir" at common law. The word "heir" or the phrase "heir-at-law" means, at common law, that person who succeeds to the real estate in case of intestacy. 5. SAME-testator's intention as to use of word "heir" is to be ascertained from entire will. The testator's intention must be the controlling factor as to the meaning to be given to the word "heir” or the phrase "heir-at-law," and this intention is to be ascertained from a consideration of the will in all of its parts, bearing in mind the scope and plan of the testator as expressed by the whole will. 6. SAME when husband of deceased daughter will take bequest over to her "heirs-at-law." In a testamentary disposition of personal property to a married daughter of the testator, with a bequest over, in case of her death, to her "heirs-at-law according to the Statute of Descent in the State of Illinois," the daughter's husband must be held to be included in the term "heirs-at-law" even though the daughter left a child surviving. (Gauch v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. 88 Ill. 251, distinguished.) 7. SAME-testator is presumed to know the law. A testator is presumed to know the law and to make his will in view of existing statutes, including the words of substitution used in the Statute of Descent. 8. SAME―a reasonable construction that will avoid intestacy should be adopted. It is presumed that one who makes a will intends to dispose of his entire estate by that means and not to die intestate as to any part of his property, and any reasonable construction that will avoid intestacy as to a part of the property should be adopted. 9. SAME when legacy does not lapse. If the testator has provided for the substitution of another legatee in place of the first one, in case of the latter's death the legacy does not lapse on the happening of that event. WRIT OF ERROR to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS G. WINDES, Judge, presiding. SCOTT, BANCROFT, MARTIN & STEPHENS, and LESTER L. FALK, (JOHN E. MACLEISH, and LELAND K. Neeves, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error Frederick Whiting. GEORGE C. OTTO, for plaintiff in error the Chicago Title and Trust Company. GERALD TURNBULL, for plaintiff in error Charles Foley. GEORGE H. KRIETE, for defendant in error. RUBY KOENIG ELLIS, for Irene Rabell; WILliam H. GRUVER, for Edwin Walker, Jr.; and FELSENTHAL & WILSON, for Clara May McDonald and Mary E. Walker. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Edwin Walker died testate April 27, 1910. His will was duly admitted to probate and thereafter a bill was filed by the testamentary trustees in the circuit court of Cook county for its construction. A decree was entered in said court construing the will, and from that decree a writ of error was sued out to the Appellate Court for the First District, and counsel in that court insisted that the decree was wrong on three points: First, in holding that certain. interests under the will were contingent and not vested; second, in holding that Frederick Whiting was an "heir" under the provisions of the will; and third, in holding that the children and husband of Hettie Foley took the share of a son of said Hettie Foley who died before the testator. The Appellate Court affirmed the decree in holding that the interests in question were contingent and not vested but reversed the decree on the other two points. A judgment was entered accordingly in the Appellate Court, and the case has been brought here on petition for certiorari. The estate disposed of by said will is all personal property, amounting to over $250,000. After making certain specific bequests to the widow as to certain household goods and furniture, etc., and $6000 in money, the will provides in the second clause of article 2: "I give, devise and be |