January 17, 1914. Opinion by HASS- as follows: "There is no analogy, in this LER, J.

The judgment in this case was entered to April Term, 1910, No. 388, on a warrant of attorney signed by Richard P. McGrann, and became a lien upon his real estate in April, 1910. On July 22, 1912, he conveyed the real estate in question to John A. Nauman. On August 23, 1913, execution was issued on the judgment, without notice to John A. Nauman, the terre-tenant, and the real estate was sold by the sheriff to the plaintiff in the execution for $46,000.

respect, between a scire facias quare executio non, which is served upon the terretenant, and a fieri facias and a seizure, is purely a judicial writ, and an authorin virtue thereof, of the land. The latter ity to carry into effect the judgment of the court that is, to levy and make the amount of the money mentioned in the judgment, which is recited in the writ, without requiring any notice thereof, in any event, to be given to the terre-tenant. the defendant nor the terre-tenant has On a fieri facias, however, neither any day in court."

The remaining question raised in the exceptions, is whether there was such inadequacy of price as would justify our setting aside the sale. It is conceded that inadequacy of price itself is not suffiIt is conceded that no statute requires sale. In this case there is nothing else, cient to justify setting aside a sheriff's notice to be given to a terre-tenant, nor even though there is proof that the propis any case cited where the courts have erty was sold for an inadequate price. held it to be necessary. It is argued, The evidence of this, however, is not however, that as the Acts of 1778 and satisfactory. It appeared that a brother June 1, 1887, P. L. 289, require notice of the defendant made an offer, prior to to be given to the terre-tenant, and that the sheriff's sale, for the real estate sold he must be named, in the writ, when a under this writ, which offer, he alleged. scire facias is issued to revive a judg- amounted to $62,500. He did not attend ment given by a former owner of real the sheriff's sale, and it was sold to the estate, it is also necessary when an exe- plaintiff in the execution for $46,000. cution is issued against real estate in the He remained away from the sale bepossession of one who is not the de- cause he was told, not by any person fendant in the judgment. We cannot connected with the plaintiff, that the agree with this. These acts do not re- plaintiff would bid it up to $65,000. The quire notice to the terre-tenant in an exe-property was offered at public sale twice cution, but only in a scire facias to revive a short time before the sheriff's sale, and a judgment, and there is no similarity was not bid up to a greater amount than between writs of scire facias and fieri that for which it was sold by the sheriff. facias. In the former, it is proper to The proceeds of sale of all defendant's require notice to be given to the terre- real estate amounted to $60,000, much tenant, so that he may have opportunity less than the amount of plaintiff's lien. to show cause, if any he has, why the This evidence does not satisfy us that lien of the judgment should not be con- the price at which the real estate was tinued on property to which he has title. sold was inadequate, and even if it did. In the latter, no opportunity need be we could not set aside the sale, in the given to the terre-tenant to show why the absence of any irregularity in issuing the land should not be sold, because he took execution or conducting the sale, and it subject to the lien of a judgment, one there is no evidence of any such irreġuof the incidents of which he knew when larity. We must, therefore, dismiss the he took it was to have execution and exceptions and confirm the sale. sale of it. In Koons . Hartman, 7 Watts, 20, the distinction between writs of fieri facias and scire facias is stated

Legal Miscellany.

Income and Excise Taxes.

orders of the court; not as officers of the respective corporations, nor with the advantages that inhere in corporate organizations as such. The possession and control of the receivers constituted, on the contrary, an ouster of corporate The distinction between an income tax management and control, with the accomproper and an excise tax upon a partic-panying advantages and privileges.' ular method of conducting business, as by incorporation, measured by a designated percentage of the net income from the business, is well illustrated by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, filed on the 10th inst., in United States v. Whitridge, Receiver, and United States v. Joline, Receiver (October Term, 1913, Nos. 446 and 447), holding that receivers of an insolvent corporation were not within the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, and dismissing petitions in behalf of the United States, praying for orders upon the receivers to make returns of the net income of their respective corporations for the years 1909 and 1910 to the Collector of Internal Revenue, as required by the act. In answer to the contention of the Government, Justice Pitney, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

"Reference to the language of the act is sufficient to show that it does not in terms impose a tax upon corporate property or franchises as such, nor upon the income arising from the conduct of business, unless it be carried on by the corporation. Nor does it in terms impose any duty upon the receivers of corporations or of corporation property, with respect to paying taxes upon the income arising from their management of the corporate assets, or with respect to making any return of such income.

"And we are unable to perceive that

As the Income Tax Act of 1913 imposes a direct tax on the income of the corporation, as distinguished from the excise tax on corporate business imposed by the Corporation Tax Act of 1909, receivers, assignees for the benefit of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy would seem to be within the later act; such at least is the case with receivers and assignees for creditors and trustees in bankruptcy of individuals, and there would seem to be no sound distinction in principle between the liability of such fiduciaries to make return when they represent individuals and their liability when they represent corporations. Thus receivers are mentioned in paragraph D of the Act of 1913 as among those fiduciaries who are required to make returns. So, under the English act, it has been held that where an assignee for the benefit of creditors carries on the business of the assignor and makes a profit, it is subject to the income tax. For it is not necessary that the business should be carried on for the purpose of making a profit for the owner; it is none the less carried on, because the object is to earn a larger dividend for creditors: Black on Income Tax, 65, citing Armitage v. Moore, 2 Q. B., 363.

-Legal Intelligencer.

such receivers are within the sphere and Property in Photograph as Against Photog

purpose of the act, any more than they are within its law. True, they may hold, for the time, all the franchises and property of the corporation, excepting its primary franchise of corporate existence. In the present cases, the receivers were authorized and required to manage and operate the railroads and to discharge the public obligations of the corporations in this behalf. But they did this as officers of the court, and subject to the

rapher-the Right of the Relatives of

the Dead as to Privacy

In a recent Kentucky case the plaintiff's wife gave birth to twin boy children, joined together from the shoulders down to the end of their bodies, and

having certain organs in common. They died, and after death plaintiff employed defendant, a photographer, to take a photograph of the corpse in its nude condition, it being agreed that defendant

was to make for plaintiff twelve photo- | right of the parents to object to a pub graphs and no more. Contrary to the lication without authority regarding a deagreement, defendant made several photo- ceased child, and says: graphs from the negative, one of which he filed in the copyright office of the United States, and a copyright was issued to him thereon. It was held that defendant had no authority to photograph the bodies or make copies of the negative, except by plaintiff's authority, and his misuse of the negative by copyrighting it constituted a violation of the right of privacy of the bodies, for which defendant was liable for damages in a suit brought by both parents. A judgment for $2,500 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The court first discusses the right of a photographer who takes the picture of another for pay, saying:

"It is insisted that the photographer has the right to copyright a photograph, as it represents his skill in his art, and

we are referred to the case of Burrow v.

"The corpse of the children was in the custody of the parents. The photog rapher had no authority to make the photographs except by their authority, and when he exceeded his authority he invaded their right. We do not see that this case can be distinguished from those involving the like use of the photograph of a living person, and this has been held actionable. The most tender affections of the human heart cluster about the body of one's dead child. A man may recover for any injury or indignity done the body, and it would be a reproach to the law if physical injuries might be recovered for and not those incorporeal injuries which cause much greater suffering and humiliation. If the defendant had wrongfully taken possession of the nude body of the plaintiff's Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 4 Sup. Ct. 279, 28 dead children and exposed it to public L. Ed. 349, as sustaining this conclusion. view in an effort to make money out of In that case a photographer who had it, it would not be doubted that an incopyrighted a photograph sued a litho-jury had been done them, to recover for grapher for using his copyrighted photograph without his consent. The subject of the photograph used was not a party to the litigation. No question was made in that case as to the rights of the person whose photograph was taken, and it may be inferred from the facts stated by the court in that case that the person whose photograph had been taken had no objection to his photograph being copyrighted and exposed to the public. The case of Bolles 7. Outing Company, 77 Fed. 966, 23 C. C. A. 594, 46 L. R. A. 712, Snow v. Laird, 98 Fed. 813, 39 C. C. A. 311, and Werckmeister z. Lithographing Company (C. C.), 63 Fed. 809, are similar; but in this case the question arises between customer and the photographer. The question was before the English Supreme Court in Pollard v. Photographing Co., 40 Chancery Divi-, sion, 345, and it was held upon very full

consideration of the authorities that the

photographer has no right to make other copies of his customer's photograph without his consent."

The court then proceeds to discuss the

When he wrongfully used the photowhich an action might be maintained. graph of it, a like wrong was done, the injury differing from that supposed in degree, but not in kind."

-Chicago Legal News.

An Irishman in Nevada, wishing to take a homestead and not knowing just how to go about it, sought information from a legal friend.

"Sir," he said, "I know your brother has taken a homestead, and I thought maybe you could tell me the law concerning how to go about it."

"Well, Dennis, I don't remember the exact wording of the law, but I can give you the meaning," which he proceeded Dennis listened attentively to to do. what the lawyer had to say, then

"I see. The meaning of it is this: The Government is willing to bet you 160 acres of land against $14 that you can't live on it five years without starving to death."

January 17, 1914. Opinion by LAN- (20), twenty-two (22), twenty-three DIS, P. J.