against whom the tax is assessed, and the amount actually paid in accordance with the terms of the compromise." Here is general authority given to compromise "any civil or criminal case arising under the internal-revenue laws," and I see no reason for inserting limitations which Congress has not seen fit to make. In the memorandum of the Solicitor of Internal Revenue inclosed with your letter it is suggested that the words in section 3229 "instead of commencing suit thereon" limit the application of the statute to those cases involving court proceedings and therefore exclude cases of distraint. In my judgment, however, these words merely mark the boundary line between those cases where compromise may be made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury, and those cases where the concurrence of the Attorney General is necessary. While the remedy by way of distraint for the collection of taxes. is a lawful and indeed essential one, it is nevertheless harsh in its operation, and it can not be supposed Congress intended to permit compromises of actions inter partes but not of those ex parte. Suppose that after the tax is assessed and sent to the collector, but before distraint, the commissioner learns of a decision of the Supreme Court to the effect that the tax so levied is illegal. Must he still proceed to distrain, although the amount realized would at once have to be refunded under section 3220? Such a conclusion does not commend itself. But The solicitor of internal revenue also suggests that Congress can not delegate the power to remit a tax. while the power to levy a tax is legislative, the power to assess it is quasi judicial and administrative. (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 693, 694; Coopersville Cooperative Creamery Co. v. Lemon, 163 Fed. 145, 147.) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue under authority of law assesses internal-revenue taxes, determining the persons upon whom the levy falls and the extent thereof. No reason is perceived why Congress has not the power to confer upon him authority to revise an assessment, which be himself makes, and to withdraw it, if he believe it without warrant of law. Equally Congress must have power to delegate to him authority to withdraw the assessment on terms that is, to compromise it-if he think the tax illegal, or the particular individual not liable for it, or not to the whole extent, or that the full amount of the tax can not be collected. The power conferred on the commissioner by section 3220, Revised Statutes, to pay back taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected has been exercised for years without question, and has been sustained by the Supreme Court. (U. S. v. Savings Bank, 104 U. S. 728.) If Congress can give the commisisoner authority to pay back taxes which have gone into the Treasury, it can of course give him authority to remit the taxes at an earlier stage. The remarks of Justice Harlan in United States v. Roelle (Fed. Cas. 16186) are dicta, as is shown by the opinion on error (Whiskey cases, 99 U. S. 594, 596, 597), where it appears that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had never acted on the case. The Dorsheimer case (7 Wall. 166) dealt with a statute authorizing the remission of fines, forfeitures, and penalties only, and the remarks of the court must be construed in view of that fact. I entertain no doubt that Congress can delegate to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the power to compromise a tax after it is assessed, but before payment, and before distraint is levied or suit brought upon it. It is equally clear that section 3229, Revised Statutes, does this. Its language is amply large to cover this grant, and the express requirement in the statute of a statement showing the assessed tax with additions and penalties would be meaningless, if the power to compromise did not include the tax itself. Your letter refers to certain opinions of my predecessors which are said to indicate a divergence of view on the subject here dealt with. The question discussed in those opinions was whether either section 3229, Revised Statutes, er section 3469, Revised Statutes, gave the power to remit an admittedly lawful tax on a perfectly solvent person on account of the hardship of the case. No such question is submitted to me in your letter which confines itself, as I confine myself, to the mere question of power to com promise a tax case involving a distraint. Nor does the case of the Denver Dairy Co. referred to in your letter raise such a question. In that case there was a fair doubt as to the validity of the assessment (United States v. 11,150 Pounds of Butter, 195 Fed. 657), and the revenue officer reported that probably no more than the offer could be realized by distraint. The question of the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to remit an admittedly valid tax on a solvent taxpayer for reasons of mere hardship is one, therefore, which I have not considered, and on which I express no opinion. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. PURCHASE OF LINE OF RAILROADS IN ALASKA. The President is authorized, under the act of March 12, 1914 (38 Stat. 305), to obligate the United States to expend, for the purchase of a line of railroads in Alaska necessary to complete the line designated by him, a sum in excess of the existing appropriation by Congress, but within the maximum of the cost as prescribed by the act. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, March 24, 1915. SIR: In your letter of the 5th instant you refer to the act of March 12, 1914, entitled "An act to authorize the President of the United States to locate, construct, and operate railways in the Territory of Alaska" (38 Stat. 305, ch. 37), the execution of which has in certain respects been confided to your department by Executive order, and ask whether the President "is authorized to obligate the United States to expend, for the purchase of a line of railroads in Alaska necessary to complete the line designated by him, a sum in excess of the existing appropriation by Congress, but within the maximum of the cost as prescribed by the act." The act expressly empowers and directs the President to lay out, construct, and operate the railroad or railroads in contemplation. There is a provision that he may "purchase, condemn, or otherwise acquire, upon such terms as he may deem proper, any other line or lines of railroad in Alaska which may be necessary to complete the construction of the line or lines of railroad designated or located by him"; and another that he may make such other contracts as may be necessary to carry out any of the purposes of this act"; and there is also this sweeping grant of power, viz: "That it is the intent and purpose of Congress through this act to authorize and empower the President of the United States, and he is hereby fully authorized and empowered, through such officers, agents, or agencies as he may appoint or employ, to do all necessary acts and things in addition to those specially authorized in this act to enable him to accomplish the purposes and objects of this act." Thus it appears that the making of such a contract as that which you describe is authorized, not by implication merely but in express terms. Section 2 provides: "That the cost of the work authorized by this act shall not exceed $35,000,000, and in executing the authority granted by this act the President shall not expend nor obligate the United States to expend more than the said sum; and there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $1,000,000 to be used for carrying out the provisions of this act, to continue available until expended." While the limitation upon the total expense must, of course, be carefully respected in the making of all contracts, as well as in all actual disbursements of the moneys within that amount which Congress may from time to time appropriate, it is clear that the power to contract presently for the payment of money in the future is not confined to the amount of the existing appropriation. The contract would stand good until satisfied- even though the appropriation became exhausted. In that event, however, the obligation of the Government could not be discharged until more money had been appropriated oy Congress. See: Revised Statutes, section 3679, as amended February 27, 1906 (34 Stat. 48); Revised Statutes, sections 3732, 3733, 5503; act of June 30, 1906, section 9 (34 Stat. 764); 30 Op. 147; 28 Op. 466; 15 Op. 124, 209, 236; 19 Op. 650; 21 Op. 1, 244, 288, 490; 27 Op. 432; 12 Comp. Dec. 324; Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 146. Your question is answered in the affirmative. Respectfully, To the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. T. W. GREGORY. WHEN SECTION 14 OF THE SEAMEN'S ACT TAKES EFFECT, Section 14 of the seamen's act of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat. 1170), relating to life-saving regulations, becomes effective on November 4, 1915, as to United States vessels and on March 4, 1916, as to all other vessels. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, March 31, 1915. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 19, 1915, wherein you request my opinion as to whether section 14 of the so-called seamen's bill (Senate 136) approved March 4, 1915, will take effect on July 1, 1915, or on November 4, 1915, and March 4, 1916, respectively, as to domestic and foreign vessels. The material portions of the two sections of this act that must be considered in answering your inquiry read: "SEC. 14. That section forty-four hundred and eightyeight of the Revised Statutes is hereby amended by adding thereto the following: "The powers bestowed by this section ** in re navigating the ocean, or any lake, bay, or sound of the United States, on and after July first, nineteen hundred and fifteen, shall be subject to the provisions, limitations, and minimum requirements of the regulations herein set forth, and all such vessels shall thereafter be required to comply in all respects therewith: Provided, That foreign vessels leaving ports of the United States shall comply |