HOUSE of Commons, March 1st. -Mr. Abercromby rose in his place to complain of a most gross and unwarrantable attack upon freedom of debate in the house of com

mons.

A sense of what he owed to himself, to the house, and to the profession of which he was a member, imposed upon him the duty of complaining of this attack from the seat of public justice, and by the lord high chancellor of England.

"On Saturday morning, (proceeded Mr. Abercromby), I happened to be in the court of exchequer, when a person with whom I had no intimate acquaintance, but of whose accuracy, character, and honour, I had no ground to entertain the smallest doubt, addressed me to this effect:He came to me and said, ' Mr. Abercromby, I have just heard a reply from the lord chancellor to what you said upon Mr. Williams's motion.' I then asked what it was that the lord chancellor had said; to which he answered, "The lord chancellor has imputed to you, that you have sent forth an utter falsehood to the public.' I then asked him if he was sure he laboured under no mistake. He answered, Certainly not; because the chancellor referred to "Gentlemen with gowns on their backs.'"

He knew not how lord Eldon was entitled to animadvert from the seat of justice upon the conduct of the members of that house, but he felt it to be due to himself not to let it pass over without calling for the serious attention of the house to the subject. In the course of that evening, he had of himself, and without communicating with any other person, come to the opinion that he could not suffer it to pass without observation. He then took care to state to a gentleman of the profession, who held a seat in the house, and whom he knew to be in the intimacy of lord Eldon, that it was his intention to bring the whole subject before the house; that he was solely and exclusively governed by the sense of injustice which had been done to him, and the duty which he owed to the house. He further requested that the lord chancellor's mind might be invited to a calm deliberation upon the expressions which he had used; and unless he were to alter his resolution before Monday morning, he wished it to be understood that it was his intention to complain to the house, which he mentioned in order to give the gentleman to whom he was speaking, or any other person who might be requested, an opportunity to attend ; and that so that friend, whoever he

might be, of the lord chancellor, should be enabled to state to his lordship, fully and faithfully, all that he (Mr. Abercromby) would say. He had no doubt of that information having been faithfully communicated to the noble lord.

He had now stated, as clearly as he could, the means which he had taken of ascertaining, with precision, the very expressions which the lord chancellor used. It was material to observe what meaning was given in the apprehension of others by the statement of his lordship. He would now state what those expressions were-and for that purpose he would read the report of them, as they were conveyed to the public by the newspapers--which in point of fact was accurate, and was further corroborated by the short-hand writer's notes:- "As it had been represented that the person who sits here, did mischief by hearing certain motions without the signature of counsel that is to say, when motions have been made to discharge an order of the vice chancellor, or the master of the rolls, that such motions have been brought on without the signature of counsel I have only to state, that having been in this court since 1778, whenever a motion had been made before the master of the rolls, which he had refused to allow, or which he did allow and upon an application to the chancellor to vary what the master of the rolls had done, or to destroy it altogether; so again, whenever a motion had been made before the vice chancellor, and counsel had been of opinion that the motion had been improperly granted or discharged, the party had always in all those cases been at liberty to move again, with a view to set the matter Fight; and if the signature of counsel were necessary to alter the practice

of the court as it had obtained since the period I have mentioned, all I can say is, that I have not a right to tax the king's subjects in that way. With respect to appeals and rehearings, it is supposed that I have heard them on new evidence, and thereby brought discredit on some part of the court. It is an utter falsehood." He would take the opportunity of saying that there was nothing in the business before lord Eldon which could have called for the animadversions; they must have been altogether premeditated.

He went on with the statement"On re-hearings, it is always competent to read the evidence given in the cause, though it was not read in the court below, either by the judge or the counsel: further than that the court does not go. On appeals, it only reads what has been read in the court below, and that practice I have never departed from in any one instance. Therefore, really, before things are so represented, particularly by gentlemen with gowns on their backs, they should at least take care to be accurate, for it is their business' to be so." Upon which a Mr. A. observed to his lordship-" Upon motions it would be impossible for counsel to certify." To that the lord chancellor replied-" Such motions as I have referred to have been made for half a century, and never with the signature of counsel; and yet the public are told that the signature of counsel is necessary by act of parliament, and that I have dispensed with it." He postponed the details as to the expressions which the lord chancellor imputed to him as the grounds of his animadversions, until he put the house in possession of what he had actually said. Who was it that uttered these expressions? The lord chancellor of England. From what

place did he utter them? From the seat of justice. Was it to be tolerated that individuals should be accused from the seat of justice of uttering falsehoods? But, said the honourable member, what was the factwhat had been the expressions used to which the noble lord had alluded? He stated then that opinion which he had always entertained--it was the first opinion in order, in that series of his argument, and therefore the better calculated to show the tendency of all the rest which he put forth upon the usefulness of that inquiry. He took occasion to allude to the two cases of bankruptcy and lunacy. He stated that in some instances, it had been known that application was made to the vice chancellor for an order in a bankrupt petition, and, upon being refused, immediate application was made to the lord chancellor; so that, in his view of the subject, it would be material for the commissioners to remark in how many instances, occurring between the years 1813 and 1819, the court had allowed such motion for orders to be appealed from without the signature of counsel. He further stated, that in the year 1819 a great and valuable alteration had been introduced, by which the signature of counsel was declared to be requisite. He stated the particular case which had led to the order, and in which, the signature of counsel not being appended, lord Eldon had ordered that the motion should be signed by counsel, which custom at present continued. He had taken occasion to remark, that one great objection to the vice chancellor's court was the increase of appeals, and the multiplication of business; and therefore one object, and the main one of the act which created that court, had failed, by neglecting to exclude appeals from it. He had stated, that in

appeals upon decree, or upon motions for further directions, the practice had always required that the petition should be signed by counsel, which gave some security to the suitors against perverse litigation; but that upon motions, there was no such securities, and that operated to the disadvantage of suitors generally; because the litigious parties would be likely to go immediately to lord Eldon-that they not only go to the lord chancellor, but they went with the best opportunity which could be furnished them of violating the sacred principle of appeal, with perhaps the worst evidence in their possession: for by discussion before the vice chancellor, they learnt the defect and weakness of their case, and that defect and weakness they readily supplied before the lord chancellor. The consequence had been, was, and must be, that a case was commonly carried before the lord chancellor differing essentially from that upon which the vice chancellor pronounced; and the further consequence must be, that this abuse of the right of appeal, leading to a difference of conclusion upon the same cases by the two judges, must prove derogatory to the dignity of the court. Such, to the best of his recollection, was in effect the substance of his observations; and such, he declared it to have been his intention to offer to the house at the time. (Hear.) What said the lord chancellor on this subject? The lord chancellor said that a considerable number of motions had been received before the court of chancery on appeal, which had been decided upon before by the master of the rolls without the signature of counsel. So he (Mr. Abercromby) had said: he had the sanction of the lord chancellor to confirm the accuracy of it.

If the house would not protect its members who engaged in discussion

from

from despotism and tyranny-and what tyranny, what despotism, could exceed this?-would it not destroy the whole freedom of debate? (Cheers.) If such things must be endured, if lord Eldon might say of any man as he had said of him, what security had they for the freedom of debate? What would be the situation of any gentleman who was at once a member of the law and of the house? He could not persuade himself that there was no redress to be had. It was a fit case for the inteference of the house. If they refused redress-if they did not take some decisive and rigorous step to right themselves, the freedom of debate was gone-their privileges were gone-independence and public spirit were gone. If such things could pass without remonstrance, and without redress, farewell also to independence and public spirit, or any expectation of them, in the profession of the law. For if this were the situation of any gentleman who happened to be a member of the house, what must be the situation of another who might not have the same opportunity to do himself right, that he (Mr. Abercromby) had, and was obliged, at the same time, to be more careful of his views in the profession? (Cheers.) He protested that he did not raise this question from any hostile feelings towards lord Eldon, (cheers), but because he considered it as a most gross and unwarrantable attack on the freedom of debate. Feeling that it would disgrace him for ever as a member of the house-that it would disqualify him to continue in that profession to which he belonged, and that it would sink him down from his station and character as a gentleman-he claimed of the house, in the first instance, to be allowed to prove the expressions used by lord Eldon at the bar of the house. That being done, it

would be for the house to determine what step should be next taken. He moved that Mr. Farquharson, of 323, Strand, be ordered to attend this house to-morrow. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. Canning.-There is no man who heard the hon. and learned gentleman's speech, no member of the profession to which he belongs, no one of the friends by whom he is surrounded, who makes more allowance than I do for the feelings which he has evinced, or renders more sincere tribute of praise for the moderation and propriety with which he has expressed them. He has displayed an anxiety that is creditable to him, to free himself from an imputation which, as far as my testimony goes, he is not subject to; for, without being enough a professional man to be aware thoroughly of the importance of the distinction between what he stated the other night, and what he elsewhere was understood to have stated, I can most unequivocally state, that in his argument that night, the impression on my mind was, that he did not go out of his way to throw imputations on the lord chancellor, or to make what has happened in the court of chancery matter of individual blame, not the result of a faulty system. (Hear, hear, hear.) That was the impression on my mind; and if my testimony had been required, I should have been as ready to state elsewhere, as I have been to state here, that there was nothing uttered by the hon. and learned member on that occasion which went beyond the fair line of discussion, or which could justifiably furnish a ground of personal offence. Admitting this, sir, I can feel also that the hon. and learned gentleman, strong in the recollection of his purpose at the time, and of his mode of executing that purpose, could not

Have avoided feeling surprise and indignation at finding his speech stamped with terms of so gross a character as those which have been applied to it. But, sir, in his statement to the house, the hon. and learned gentleman has dropped one link of the transaction; he has dropped the consideration whether what he said justifiably was reported correctly to the lord chancellor, as if there could be nothing in the channel in which what was said here was conveyed to the noble lord, which might have perverted its meaning. (Hear.) Here again, as an unlearned person, I must remark, that I am not capable of discriminating the difference between what has been actually reported, and what the hon. and learned gentleman actually said; but those on whose knowledge of the subject I fully rely, assure me, that while in the speech actually made by the hon. and learned gentleman there was nothing of which the lord chancellor would justly complain; yet in the report conveyed to the noble lord, there was that colour given to the hon. and learned gentleman's observations, which, though not materially different to an unprofessional eye, was false and incorrect, and calculated to excite in the breast of the judge to whom they referred, the same feeling of indignation for which he had made a not less generous allowance, when manifested by the hon. and learned gentleman. (Hear.) What then, sir, is the conclusion to which the hon. and learned gentleman comes at last? That whatever is said here, and misrepresented elsewhere, affecting any person high or low, the person against whom it is directed must put up with it quiet and unresistingly? Sir, if there be any fault in what has happened, the fault is in our own practice, or rather

in our own connivance; a fault which I do not indicate with any wish to see it corrected; a fault which has produced incalculable benefits to the country, but which, amidst all its advantages, has this inconvenience, that when the characters of individuals are under discussion here, the smallest variation, the most unintentional misrepresentation of what is here uttered may harrow up the feelings of the justest man in the country, by the imputation of principles or practices which he has abhorred. (Hear.) The hon. and learned gentleman has said, that a judge should take no cognizance of what is said of him here. What! is it of no consequence that in courts in which a judge administers justice, he should be known to sit with clean hands? or is it unnatural that he should be anxious to refute, before those who are the best judges of their truth or falsehood, the imputations which he may suppose have been levelled at him. (Hear.) The hon. and learned gentleman will acquit me of the charge of contending, that either on this or any other occasion, a judge should discharge his duty to himself without reference to his duty towards others, or that he should make observations on statements, of the authenticity of which he is not satisfied; as readily, I am sure, will he acquit me of the idea of sheltering myself under the technicality of denying, that what was said by the lord chancellor had reference to what passed in this house. But it had not reference, I am sure, in the sense which the hon. and learned gentleman attributed to it-not in the sense of a great officer of the crownattempting to intimidate a member of the house of commons-but of an individual, feeling, perhaps, too sensibly for his character, after a public