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ernor on the express ground that the provisions of the Constitution were exclusive, but it was passed by the requisite majority over the veto. The Legislature of New York thus insisted upon its power to regulate the suffrage, notwithstanding the guaranty of the Constitution. Similar laws have been passed in various other States.

Such action in different States indicates a sensitiveness on the part of the State Legislatures, and an unwillingness to be deprived of their legitimate power to regulate the suffrage.

Other questions might be taken to illustrate the nature and extent of legislative power. In this article its application to the suffrage has been considered, because the question is now much under discussion, and because of its great importance. The conclusions upon the general question are:

1. That a State Constitution, in its relation to the people, is a guaranty of their natural and political rights; while, in its relation to the Legislature, it is a restriction upon legislative power.

2. That the legislative power of a State is not derived from the State Constitution, but directly from the people.

3. That in its extent, this power is unlimited, except, First, by the nature of our government, which forbids any violation of the natural rights of the people.

Secondly, by the restrictions placed upon the legislative power of the States by the people of the United States in the Federal Constitution.

Thirdly, by the restrictions placed upon the State Legislature by the people of the State in their own Constitution.

That the limitation first herein mentioned, the one depending upon the nature of our government, is a legitimate and valid one, has been maintained in a previous article in the "TIMES," in which it was shown that such a limitation upon legislative power has the sanction of the greatest jurists of this country, and has been established by numerous decisions, not only in the State Courts, but also in the Supreme Court of the United States.

Charles B. Waite.

LAW REFORM IN PLEADING AND PRAC

TICE IN CIVIL CASES.-THE QUESTION OF COSTS.

To refer again to the matter of costs, as not unimportant either to the payee or payor, what are known as interlocutory costs seem to me a subject worthy of consideration. Apart from the costs of the whole cause, which should in my judgment, be, as I have said, paid by the unsuccessful litigant, and thus fall on the party who has needlessly created them, there are sundry items of costs which arise from mispleading, malpractice, neglect, oversight, or some cause altogether apart from the general merits of the case at issue. These, if none other ought assuredly to fall upon the party whose act, or want of care, or lack of diligence or knowledge, causes them to be incurred. And over these the judges, under the present constitution of the courts, apparently have a discretionary jurisdiction and no further legislation would seem to be necessary to invest them with it.

In some cases the judges, very properly I think, exercise such jurisdiction. The writer is conversant with a case in which a cause was dismissed for want of prosecution, no one being present to represent the plaintiff when the case was reached on the calendar. A motion was made to reinstate, which was granted conditionally on payment of five dollars costs,-not costs so called, meaning simply the disbursements paid to clerk of court, but a counsel fee of that amount, to be paid to the defendant's attorney. Now if this can be done in one cause, it could with great propriety be done in very many cases; and if it were made the rule of practice instead of merely

an exception, how much more prompt attorneys, would become in having their cases ready for trial when called, and how many less continuances would be made than take place, to the loss of the time of the court, the attorneys and the suitors, and not infrequently to the detriment of the course of justice.

Interlocutory costs are very often caused by bad pleading. When a demurrer is filed and properly allowed, the filer of the faulty pleading gets leave to amend, almost if not always, as a matter of course; but is never as far as I can learn, ordered to pay costs; (i. e. attorneys fees.) Thus the attorney who demurs and whose demurrer is allowed, has the pleasure of setting his adversary right, but gets nothing for his own time or trouble, unless he charges his own client, who may or may not be in the right on the merits, but who has to pay in either case. It strikes one that this is not justice. Attorneys should be made to file correct pleadings, or if a mistake will occasionally occur, let the party who makes it or on whose part it is made, pay all costs of having it corrected and set right. It is or should be the one great object and aim of all judicial tribunals to have all matters that come before them for trial, come up on clear, regular and sufficient.pleadings, and it would greatly aid in bringing about this great desideratum, if the careless or inexpert pleader were made to pay the expense of successful demurrers and orders for leave to amend. Apart from which, the courts would be saved very much time and labor in not having insufficient pleadings to deal with. If such jurisdiction exists as that exercised in the case alluded to above, then a judge might as well, I think, make an order for costs in allowing a demurrer, and no legislation is needed. The whole subject could be covered by a few rules of court strictly carried out.

Such order for costs should include, as the term costs do in other places, not merely disbursements but attorney's fees. This could surely be done under the general jurisdiction exercised by the courts, and without regard to the construction of sec. 10, c. 33 of the Illinois Statutes relating to "Costs."

Before leaving the question of the establishing of a regular tariff of costs, a very fair argument in its favor would seem

to me to be apart from its effect as between litigant parties -the confidence it would tend to establish between attorneys and clients. Where tariffs exist there are two sets of costs, one as between attorney and client, the other between party and party. Whilst it is only fair and just, as I have contended, that the unsuccessful litigant should pay the expenses to which he has put his opponent, that is, the fees and disbursements he has put him to in defending against an unjust or unfounded claim, it is equally fair that these costs should be limited to the actual necessary fees and costs that the successful litigant has had to lay out. They should not include payment for time, labor and trouble which clients incur in dealing with their counsel in the conduct or defense of causes, a very large portion of which is altogether unnecessary, and seems to have for its object, to seek a salve for their own wounded feelings by obtaining assurances of a successful issue, etc. Therefore, in giving costs-fees and disbursementsagainst a suitor bringing a false claim or setting up an unsustainable defense, the costs given are costs as between party and party, and the successful litigant has to pay for any extra trouble incurred in his intercourse with his attorney in the shape of fees and costs as between attorney and client. This is certainly a much fairer practice than making the successful litigant pay the whole of his own fees and disbursements in any case, as is done here. As to the effect of the tariff system as between attorney and client, there is nothing that tends so much to the fair and honorable management and settlement of legal disputes as a thorough and distinct understanding and perfect confidence between the client and his legal representative. There may be nothing improper between the parties in making a bargain or agreement as to the recompense to be given for services performed, or to be performed, but it is much easier to arrange such terms after the services have been performed, and this is more readily and satisfactorily done when a tariff is in force to estimate them by.

There may or may not be any dispute as to the amount claimed, but for mutual satisfaction the intervention of a taxing master or clerk may be called in. Either party may obtain

an order to tax; the client if he thinks himself overcharged, can file his petition to tax, which is granted as a matter of course, he submitting to pay what may be taxed against him, and an order is made to that effect, enforceable as any other order. Under our practice an attorney seeking to recover costs, has to recover them by suit, if the amount is disputed, and is put to the trouble of proving each item, and the value of the service performed. Our courts are constantly troubled to decide squabbles between suitors and attorneys, which in case of a tariff might be disposed of by a taxing officer in very much less time, without the services of learned and high priced counsel, but by clerks of a year's standing. The correct fees are very quickly learned when they are established by rule.

These may perhaps seem minor details in the discussion of an important subject, but if, as I contend they will, they help to keep up a proper and more confidential footing and a kinder and better feeling between attorneys and clients, they are worthy of consideration. Such a system as I suggest would, in my humble judgment be very beneficial, and conducive to the interest of both of these classes.

Chas. W. Cooper.

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