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States at Jackson, in that State; and inquiring whether the executive authority to pardon properly extends to such cases.

If we adopt-as the Supreme Court of the United States has decided we should do-the principles established by the common law respecting the operation of a pardon, there can be no doubt it may embrace such a case. A pardon has been held to extend to a contempt committed in Westminster Hall, under circumstances not materially different from those which occurred in the case submitted to the President.

I am therefore of opinion that, should the President consider the facts such as to justify the exercise of his constitutional "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States," there is nothing in the character of this offence which withdraws it from the general authority.

To the SECRETARY OF STATE.

H. D. GILPIN.

EXECUTION OF PATENTS FOR LAND.

It is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the act of July 4, 1836, for the engrossing clerks to write the name of the President to patents, and for the secretary thereafter to attest them by his signature.

All the duties respecting the execution of patents, except the attestation, are ministerial, and may be performed either by the clerks or by the secretary.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
February 27, 1841.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 24th instant, enclosing one from the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and inquiring whether the clause in the sixth section of the act of 4th July, 1836, which makes it the duty of the secretary appointed by the President, pursuant to the authority of that act, "to sign, under the direction of the President, in his name, and for him, all patents for land," is sufficiently and legally complied with by the signature of the secretary being subscribed in his own proper handwriting; the name of the President, for whom it is signed, being written by the clerk who engrosses the patent.

In reply, I have to say that, in my opinion, such a mode of execution is sufficient and legal, and is as much an execution of the patent, within the meaning of the act, a is the execution of a deed by a party who does nothing more than subscribe his name. The intention of the law was to impose on an officer appointed as the act requires the responsible duty of executing these instruments-of attesting their validity by his signature. This he has done. The rest is a merely ministerial duty, of which the form is prescribed by law; and whether it is performed by a clerk, or by the secretary himself, is quite immaterial.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

H. D. GILPIN.

RIGHT OF THE SENECAS TO RETAIN POSSESSION OF THEIR LANDS. The Seneca Indians are entitled to the possession of their hunting-grounds, as well as their cultivated lands, until the time limited by the treaty with them for their voluntary removal.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

March 2, 1841.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 16th of December, 1840, enclosing several documents from the Commissioner of Indian Af fairs relative to the purchase made by Messrs. Ogden and Fellows from the Seneca Indians, under the deed annexed to the treaty of January, 1838, and inquiring whether they are entitled to take immediate possession of the forest lands, although the Indians have not removed to their new homes, and the time allowed for their voluntary removal is unexpired.

After carefully considering the argument submitted by Messrs. Ogden and Fellows, and after examining the provisions of the treaty, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that the Indians are entitled to the possession of their forest lands, or hunting grounds, as fully as to that of the improved or cultivated spots, and that there is nothing, in a correct construction of the treaty and the deed, (which must be regarded as part of it,) that authorizes us to make a distinction between the two. The papers sent me are herewith returned.

Very respectfully, yours,

Hon. J. R. POINSETT,

H. D. GILPIN.

Secretary of War.

EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF POSTMASTER GENERAL IN PAYMENT.

Where the acceptance of a Postmaster General had been given in payment of an account for work done, and the amount thereof had been recharged by a subsequent Postmaster General-DECIDED, that the amount of the acceptance ought not to be deducted from an account current for other work.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
March 2, 1841.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of this day, relative to the case of Blair & Rives, therein referred to, and inquiring whether the fact of their having been recharged by Mr. Kendall, when Postmaster General, with the amount of certain acceptances of the previous Postmaster General, Mr. Barry, which were given in payment of work done for the department by order of Mr. Barry, and regularly allowed and settled by him, authorizes a deduction of that sum in the account now existing between them and the department.

It appears from the documents before me, that the case turns upon the same principle as that submitted to the Supreme Court in the suit between the United States and the Bank of the Metropolis: there an account between Mr. Reeside and the department had been settled on its journals, and similar acceptances given in payment were held by the bank. The court has this day decided that the amount could not be thus

charged; and I have, therefore, no hesitation in saying, that the deduc tions in regard to which you inquire ought not to be made in the case of Blair & Rives.

The papers sent me are herewith returned.

Very respectfully, yours,

H. D. GILPIN.

The Hon. JOHN M. NILES,

Postmaster General.

PRIORITY OF RIGHT OF UNITED STATES TO PAYMENT.

Where a receiver of public moneys at Kalamazoo received in payment for public lands the notes of a specie-paying bank that afterwards suspended specie-payments, and then took from the bank a draft on another bank which was returned dishonored; and a receiver of assets having been appointed under the laws of Michigan, with whom the receiver of public moneys filed a claim for this debt-HELD, that, notwithstanding the acts of the latter, the legal priority of the United States to payment still exists.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
March 3, 1841.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, relative to the case of Thomas C. Sheldon, receiver of public moneys at Kalamazoo. It appears that he received $1,500 in bank notes of a specie paying bank of the State of Michigan in payment for public lands, under general instructions from the Treasury Department, and that afterwards the bank suspended specie payments. He then took from the bank, in lieu of the notes, a draft on another and solvent bank, which draft was returned dishonored. A receiver having been appointed under the laws of Michigan to receive demands against, and divide the assets of, the bank, Mr. Sheldon, without any special authority, however, from the Treasury Department, filed this claim with that receiver.

In reply to your inquiry, whether these acts of the receiver of publie moneys have deprived the United States of their priority of payment out of the assets of the insolvent bank, I have to say that, in my opinion, they have not. If that priority of payment exists, as I think it does, no injury accrues to the United States from the receiver having taken the drafts in lieu of the notes.

Very respectfully, yours,

The Hon. LEVI WOODBURY,

Secretary of the Treasury.

H. D. GILPIN.

DATE OF OFFICIAL LIABILITY.

The liabilities consequent upon a reappointment to an office already held, do not commence until the term commences for which such reappointment is made.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

March 3, 1841.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th of January, 1841, enclosing a communication from the office of the First Comptroller

of the Treasury, in which it is stated that William Frick, the collector of the customs at Baltimore, was, on the 15th January, 1841, appointed for the term of four years from the 9th of January, 1841, he being at the time in office under a previous appointment, and inquiring when his liabilities under the last appointment commenced. I am of opinion that they commenced from the 9th of January, 1841, and not at the date of the commission. This opinion renders it unnecessary to answer the other inquiries in the Comptroller's letter.

The papers are herewith returned.

Very respectfully, yours,

The Hon. LEVI WOODBURY,

Secretary of the Treasury.

H. D. GILPIN.

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