the assumption of its correctness without charging myself with any investigation as to facts.

I will take leave to add, that it is no part of my official duty, upon such references as the present, to investigate or search out facts, but to give my advice and opinion upon stated cases and questions of law.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. J. CRITTENDEN.

Hon. JOHN BELL,

Secretary of War.

PAYMENT OF LOST TREASURY NOTES.

The first section of the act of 4th February, 1819, entitled "An act to authorize the payment in certain cases, on account of treasury notes which have been lost or destroyed," does apply to notes issued from 1837 to 1841.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

June 12, 1841.

SIR: I have this moment received your letter of this day, and to the question it propounds I answer that, in my opinion, the first section of the act of the 4th February, 1819, entitled "An act to authorize the payment, in certain cases, on account of treasury notes which have been lost or destroyed," does apply to treasury notes issued under acts of Congress during the years 1837, 38, 39, '40, and 41, and which have been lost. or destroyed; and that the owner of such lost or destroyed notes is entitled to the relief provided by that act, as though said notes had been issued prior to the passage thereof.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. J. CRITTENDEN.

Hon. T. EwING,

Secretary of the Treasury.

POWER OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY IN CERTAIN CASES.

The Secretary of the Treasury may examine into all the facts and circumstances which constitute the grounds upon which a judgment for losses has been rendered, and determine, upon the whole case, whether the decision of the judge is just.

The decision of the judge in such a case is not analogous to the award of an arbitrator; and if it were, the United States have not agreed to be bound by it.

The law has conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury in such cases a jurisdiction as plenary to decide upon the whole case, as upon the judge himself.

The Secretary of the Treasury, however, has no legal power to re-commit a case to a judge for a re-adjudication.

Interest on claims for losses occasioned by troops in the service of the United States is not allowable, unless the same shall be expressly provided for in the act of Congress under which the claim is authorized to be paid.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
June 17, 1841.

SIR: I have received and examined the letter addressed to you by the Solicitor of the Treasury, under date of the 3d instant, with your endorsement thereon, referring to me for my advice and opinion certain points of

law relating to the case or claim of Wood's administrator against the United States.

Fernando Wood as administrator of John Wood, and in right of his intestate, claims from the United States, under one of the provisions of the treaty of the 22d of February, 1819, between the government of the United States and Spain, satisfaction for injuries alleged to have been suffered by his intestate, in the destruction of his property by the operations of the American army in the year 1812 or 1813. In pursuance of the act of Congress of the 26th of June, 1834, entitled "An act for the relief of certain inhabitants of East Florida,' ," that claim was examined and adjudged by the judge of the superior court of St. Augustine, who decided in favor of the claimant for a large amount-namely, for the sum of $39,250, with interest thereon at the rate of five per cent. per annum, from the 10th of May, 1813, till paid. This decision was made on the 26th of November, 1840; and subsequently, on the 22d of December, 1840, the judge, by an endorsement on the record, then made up and prepared for the Treasury Department, stated that he was satisfied (by evidence since discovered) that a sum much too large had been allowed the claimant; and that so far as he could do it, he thereby corrected the error and reduced the sum allowed to $24,250, with interest as afore said.

This brief sketch of the case is made merely for the purpose of showing the application of the two questions submitted to me, and which are as follows, to wit: 1st. How far the power vested in the Secretary of the Treasury to review the decree or award of the judge authorizes him to go in recommitting, setting aside, or modifying such award or decree? 24. Whether the award of interest on the amount of damages (which our government has hitherto refused to pay) is rightly made; or, in other words, are the United States bound to pay interest on the damages awarded in these cases when it has been awarded? The learned and able ar. gument that has been filed on behalf of the claimant, takes a much wider and more enlarged view than these questions present, and embraces a full discussion of the facts as well as the law of the case. The law has not intrusted or confided to me the investigation of evidence and the finding of facts in such cases. My official duty is limited to give advice and opinions on matters of law; and to this duty I shall confine myself in answering the questions you have referred to me.

The act of the 26th of June, 1834, under which this claim is pursued, seems to me to answer your first question in terms so unequivocal as to leave but little room for doubt or argument. By it the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed in this and like cases to pay the amount awarded by the judge, in all cases when the decisions of said judge shall be deemed by him to be just." It is most evident that the Secretary cannot, without a full examination of the case, be prepared to determine whether or not the decisions of the judge be just; and it must therefore follow as equally evident, that it is his right and duty to make such full examination and to determine, upon the whole case of law and fact, whether the decision of the judge be just. It is inconsistent to sup. pose that the Secretary, who is expressly required to determine whether the decisions of the judge be just, should nevertheless be bound and controlled in his judgment by that very decision upon the justice of which he was to determine. There is nothing in the act from which it

can be inferred that the decision of the judge was intended to have any technical or other effect or control over the judgment of the Secretary: on the contrary, such an interpretation would be subversive of the object and policy of the act, which in this particular was obviously to guard the treasury by requiring the free and independent concurrence of both the judge and the Secretary in favor of these claims, as the combined and only sanction that should authorize their payment. It has been urged on the part of the claimant that the decision of the judge is to be considered as an award of an arbitrator or arbitrators, and that the Secretary is precluded from all investigation in relation to it, and is bound by it, unless it be impeached ou some ground of fraud or corruption in the judge. This proposition is manifestly at variance with the express purpose and intent of the act of Congress. That act requires the Secretary to deter mine whether the decision of the judge "be just," while the proposition. contended for precludes altogether that inquiry, and turns the Secretary aside to some impeachment of the motives and conduct of the judge. It is needless to argue further to show that there is nothing in the proceedings authorized by the act of Congress, nothing in the decision, that can be justly regarded as assimilated or analogous to submission to arbitration, and an award founded thereon. But if the act of Congress could be regarded as bearing any resemblance to a submission to arbitration, then it is clear from the terms of the act that the United States did not agree to be bound by the decision of a single arbitrator; and that the Secretary of the Treasury is just as much of an arbitrator as the judge of the superior court of St. Augustine, and his concurrence as essential to the making and validity of any award by them.

To proceed at once to a direct answer to your first question, my opinion is that the Secretary of the Treasury is not to act by "setting aside or modifying," in terms, the award or decree of the judge; but that the Secretary is invested with a jurisdiction as plenary to decide upon the whole case as the judge himself; and that in his revision and decision thereof, he ought to decide according to his judgment of the justice of the case, uncontrolled by the previous decision of the judge; and that the decision of the judge, in its effects, is set aside or modified just to the extent of the disagreement or concurrence therein of the Secretary. The Secretary has no authority, strictly speaking, to "recommit"-that is, to make any order for recommitting-that would be legally binding on the judge, and constrain him to open the case for new proceedings and readjudications before him. The Secretary and the judge are independent of each other in the discharge of the respective duties assigned them by the act of Congress. The Secretary can send no mandate to the judge. But still it would appear to me to be consistent with the equitable purposes of that act, for the Secretary, where, from the imperfect preparation of the case, he finds himself unable to concur in the decision of the judge, to recommend such further proceedings and examinations before the judge as the equity and justice of the case may seem to him to require. This recommendation would, no doubt, be persuasive with the judge to re open the case, upon the application of the claimant, and in this way only can the Secretary aid a claimant in obtaining a re-investigation of his claim.

In respect to your second question, it appears to me unnecessary to go into the general question of interest, or the liability or obligation of gov

ernment to pay it. In this instance, the single inquiry is not whether interest ought, in justice, or on any principle of analogy, to be allowed; but whether the judge has been invested with any authority to award it. And this depends upon the proper construction of the act of Congress of the 26th of June, 1834. His whole and sole authority is derived from that act; it is the standard by which his jurisdiction must be measured and limited. What is it? By the terms of the act he is "authorized to receive and examine and adjudge all cases of claims for losses occasioned by the troops" in the service of the United States in 1812 and 1813. Interest on the amount of such "losses" is certainly a thing very distinguishable and different from the "losses" themselves. It may be that justice would have required in this case the allowance of interest, as well as of the principal that was lost. But Congress alone was competent to determine the extent of its obligations, and to give or withhold authority for the allowance of the principal; that is, the value of the property lost, with or without interest. The whole subject was before them for consideration and legislation; and the question of interest was as important in amount as the principal. They did legislate and provide for the liquidation and payment of claims for losses, but made no provision for any claims of interest. The inference, to my mind, is irresistible, that they did not intend to authorize the allowance of interest. It is confidently believed, that in all the numerous acts of Congress for the liquidation and settlement of claims against the government, there is no instance in which interest has ever been allowed, except only where those acts have expressly directed or authorized its allowance.

I feel myself constrained, therefore, to entertain the opinion that, so far as relates to the allowance of interest, the decision of the judge is unwarranted and erroneous.

Yours, &c.,

J. J. CRITTENDEN.

Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. T. EWING,

MEDAL-TO WHOM TO BE DELIVERED,

Where a medal was ordered to be struck, and, before the resolution of Congress had been executed, the individual for whom it was intended died, it was deemed proper that it should be struck and delivered to the decedent's son and administrator.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

June 22, 1841.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your note of the 21st instant, and, in answer to the inquiry it contains, have only to state, that Morgan Neville being dead, the medal directed by the act of Congress of July 2, 1836, to be struck and delivered to him, may be legally delivered to his eldest son, who is also his administrator.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. J. CRITTENDEN.

Hon. JOHN BELL,
Secretary of War.

THE RETURNS OF POSTMASTERS.

A proviso touching the duties of postmasters, to make returns of emoluments received from boxes, contained in a general appropriation bill, to take effect at the commencement of a fiscal year then future, to be considered as having effect from the date of its passage.

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 9th instant, in which, after reciting from the act of the 3d of March last, making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of government, the proviso requiring postmasters to make returns of all emoluments received from boxes, &c., you proceed to say: "As this proviso is appended to the appropriation of $1,050,000 for compensation of postmasters, which does not itself take effect except from the 1st of July, 1841, when our fiscal year begins, a doubt has arisen whether it should be considered as operating from the passage of the act, or only from the time at which the ap propriation commences. Therefore, I respectfully ask your opinion of the construction of the law in the matter here presented.'

My impression is, that the proviso in question must be considered as taking effect from the passage of the act of which it forms a part. Some doubt may be cast on the subject by the facts you have stated in the paragraph quoted from your letter, and by the peculiar phraseology of part of the proviso; but it still seems to me that these circumstances will not warrant you in postponing, by construction, the operation of the proviso, against the general rule that acts of Congress are to be understood as taking effect from their passage. There should be no departure from that rule, except in a clear case; and that exception does not appear to be suf ficiently made out in this instance.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,

Hon. F. GRANGER,

Postmaster General.

J. J. CRITTENDEN.

THE CASE OF LIEUTENANT DRANE.

A lieutenant having written a letter to the Secretary of War, which, though not intended as such, was considered a resignation by that department, and the writer accordingly dropped from the rolls, but afterwards restored by the President to his station and rank, is entitled to be paid as lieutenant during the time he was kept out of the service.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

July 12, 1841. SIR: Your letter of the 30th of the last month, concerning the case of Lieutenant A. Drane, was duly received, together with the papers that ac. companied it, and which are returned herewith. In the year 1835 Mr. Drane, being then a lieutenant, was struck from the rolls of the army, and put out of service by the proper authorities of the War Department. This proceeding against him was founded on a letter of his to the Secretary of War, which was interpreted into a resignation. Drane denied the inter pretation of his letter, protested against his exclusion from the army, and appealed successively to Presidents Jackson and Van Buren for redress;