As on one greater day will yet befall, When all that ever breathed shall, at the sound Of trumpet, gather the high seat around, Where judgment will be given;-0 not alone Would evil from its folds and hidden bound Break forth, but things more glorious than have known The light of day, or in the world's proud front have shone : Dreams of poetic skyey grain, which words Could ne'er embody-thoughts of moral good, Of holiness, to which no form affords Than faith administering)-love, and And joy, tricked out in gracious beams, bedewed With all the beauty which doth never WE have been led into this subject by the following paragraphs, which we quote from the letter of a very able correspondent : "MR EDITOR,-I have just read the paper of Philotheus- On the Proof of Miracles,'-which does equal honour to his talents and principles. His views of this important fundamental argument are stated with very considerable terseness and precision, and indicate a mind superior to slavforming its own determinations on ish imitation, and very capable of grounds and for reasons peculiar to itself. My present object is not to controvert a single position of Philotheus. With an exception or two of a trifling nature, regarding rather the form than the substance of his statement, I coincide entirely with all he has said on the subject. But different minds view the same argument or proposition through different media. What appears conclusive to one man's understanding may assume a very different aspect when subjected to the scrutiny of another mind familiarized with different trains of association, and habituated to other forms of rea 3 F soning and demonstration. The subject of Miracles, notwithstanding all that Campbell, Douglas, Farmer, and others, have so well and ably written concerning it, is by no means exhausted. Campbell's answer to Hume was, indeed, regarded, at the time of its first appearance, and even subsequently, as an unanswerable refutation of the Essay on Miracles; and it has, accordingly, formed the nucleus of every work into which I have looked on the subject, and which has been given to the public posteriorly to the date of that elaborate, ingenious, and admirable piece of reasoning. But error, it seems, never dies. The boasted argument of Hume, with which Campbell had grappled so fiercely, appeared to be completely demolished, and no one thought of the matter farther than merely to mention, as a thing of course, about which there could be no controversy, that the sophism which had 'gravelled' a miracle-mongering Jesuit, of some parts and learning,' among the cloisters of the Abbey of La Flèche, had been torn to shreds, and scattered, in derision, to the winds, by the unsparing hand of the merciless Aberdonian. Yet, mirabile dictu! and just to prove that sophistry possesses a sort of immortality, forth issues the redoubted tome of La Place on the Doctrine of Probability, which, indirectly, but mischievously, affected to prove, by demonstration, that the truth of a miracle is a mathematical impossibility. We all remember the elaborate, profound, and truly scientific account given of that work in the Edinburgh Review, and we also remember, with sorrow, the observations with which it concludes. But death has consecrated the fame of its amiable, and, in this instance at least, we hope mistaken, author; and, recollecting the many virtues that adorned his private character, and the great name which he has bequeathed as a legacy to his country, to be enrolled in the proudest page of her literary and scientific annals, I cannot find in my heart to speak of that ill-starred admission of his faith in those terms which I would otherwise, without scruple, have applied to it. At all See Hume's Letter to Dr Campbell, on the publication of his book on Miracles, prefixed to that work. events, this book revived the controversy. In what I have to subjoin, I shall speak, in the first place, with reference to the pretended irrefragable argument of Hume; and, in the next place, I shall endeavour to show, that the argument drawn from the doctrine of Probabilities is utterly hostile to the sceptical hypothesis, and applies, with singular felicity, to the numerical expression of the value of a given aggregate of human testimony.” We would have continued here the argument of our ingenious correspondent, did we not feel it to be a more immediate duty to vindicate the memory of a great and good man from an aspersion which has been heedlessly thrown upon him, and which, arising at first from indiscreet zeal, has been continued of late in a much more violent form, from motives which we do not pretend to investigate. We mean the late MR PLAYFAIR, to whom our correspondent evidently alludes, to which he refers has always been as the paper in the Edinburgh Review ascribed to him. We have just looked into the passage in that paper upon which all the outcry was raised, and-instead of being an insidious attack upon miracles as the foundation of religious belief-we find it to be a very sage exposition of Mr Hume's doctrine limited to the subjects of philosophy and of common life, in its application to which alone it is stated to be a sound doctrine. "The first author, (says the reviewer,) we believe, who stated fairly the connection between the evidence of testimony, and the evidence of experience, was Hume, in his Essay on Miracles, a work full of deep thought and enlarged views, and, if we do not stretch the principles so far as to interfere with the truths of religion, abounding in maxims of great use in the conduct of life, as well as in the speculations of philosophy. "Conformably to the principles contained in it, and also to those in the essay now before us, if we would form some general rules for comparing the evidence derived from our experience of the course of nature with the evidence of testimony, we may consider physical phenomena as divided into two classes, the one comprehending all those, of which the course is known from experience, to be perfectly uni form; and the other comprehending those of which the course, though no doubt regulated by general laws, is not perfectly conformable to any law with which we are acquainted; so that the most general rule that we are enabled to give, admits of many exceptions. The violation of the order of events among the phenomena of the former class, the suspension of gravity for example, the deviation of any of the stars from their places, or their courses in the heavens, &c. these are facts, of which the improbability is so strong, that no testimony can prevail against it. It will always be more wonderful that the violation of such order should have taken place, than that any number of witnesses should be deceived themselves, or should be disposed to deceive others. "It is here very well worth attending to, how much the extension of our knowledge tends to give us confidence in the continuance of the general laws of nature, and to increase the improbability of their violation. Suppose a man not at all versed in astronomy, who considers the moon merely as a luminous circle, that, with certain irregularities, goes round the earth from east to west nearly in twenty-four hours, rising once and setting once in that interval. Let this man be told, from some authority that he is accustomed to respect, that on a certain day it had been observed at London, that the moon did not set at all, but was visible above the horizon for twenty-four hours; there is little doubt that, after making some difficulty about it, he would come at last to be convinced of the truth of the assertion. In this he could not be accused of any extraordinary and irrational credulity. The experience he had of the uniform setting and rising of the moon was very limited, and the fact alleged might not appear to him more extraordinary, than many of the irregularities to which that luminary was subject. Let the same thing be told to an astronomer, in whose mind the rising and setting of the moon were necessarily connected with a vast number of other appearances; who knew, for example, that the supposed fact could not have happened, unless the moon had deviated exceedingly from that orbit in which it has always moved; or the position of the earth's axis had suddenly changed; or the atmospherical refraction had been increased to an extent that was never known. Any of all these events must have affected such a vast number of others, that as no such thing was perceived, an incredible body of evidence is brought to ascertain the continuance of the moon in her regular course. The barrier that generalization, and the explanation of causes thus raises against credulity and superstition, the way in which it multiplies the evidence of experience, is highly deserving of attention, and is likely to have a great influence on the future fortunes of the human race. "Against the uniformity, therefore, of such laws, it is impossible for testimony to prevail. But with those laws that are imperfectly known, and that admit of many exceptions, the violations are not so improbable, but that testimony may be sufficient to establish them. In our own time it has happened, that the testimony produced in support of a set of extraordinary facts, has been confirmed by a scrupulous examination into the natural history of the facts themselves. When the stones, which were said to have fallen from the heavens, came to be chemically analyzed, they were found to have the same characters, and to consist of the same ingredients, nearly in the same proportions," &c. "Here, therefore, we have a testimony confirmed, and rendered quite independent of our previous knowledge of the veracity of the witnesses. The truth of the descent of these stones on the evidence of testimony alone, would have been long before it gained entire credit, and scepticism with respect to it would have been just and philosophical. In certain states of their information, men may, on good grounds, reject the truth altogether."-Edin. Rev. Vol. xxiii. pp. 328–331. We have no hesitation in saying, that all this admirable and luminous statement, in as far as religion is out of the question, (and the exception is distinctly made,) is perfectly correct, and coincides very nearly with the opinion of Philotheus, as it is detailed in our last number. We imagine that inquirer has got to the bottom of the question more completely than either Mr Hume or Mr Playfair, but he practically coincides with the latter, that is, he admits the truth of Mr Hume's dilemma to hold, in by far the most numerous cases, unless where the probability of the miracle can be shown. But no such probability can be shown, except in the case of a beneficent religion. A niracle for no purpose or a bad purpose, is the most improbable thing in the world; and we are of the opinion of Mr Hume and Mr Playfair, that all the testimony in the world could not prove it. Suppose the Christian Religion were a tissue of wickedness and absurdity like the superstitions of the Hindus, would it be possible to prove the truth of the miracles wrought in evidence of it? Certainly not. But being the religion that it is, nothing can be more probable, than that it was introduced into the world in a miraculous manner. The probability of the miracles being once established, then all the evidence which goes to prove them has its effect upon the mind, like the evidence for any other facts;-but were the religion which they support utterly abominable in itself, then we maintain, that it would be impossible to give any credit to them. Mr Playfair, however, excludes the subject of religion altogether, and is merely speak ing of violations of the laws of nature with a reference to philosophy and the conduct of life, and he is quite right in saying, that where the laws of nature are distinctly established, the evidence for any violation of them ought never once to be looked at. This applies very accurately to all stories in profane history which speak of such violations, and to all the foolish stories of witches and ghosts which once prevailed, to the great annoyance of men in common life. Here an argument such as Mr Hume's is a very convenient one. The facts are utterly incredible, and, therefore, the evidence which supports them is not so much as to be examined. It may be very curious and very staggering, but still it is much more probable that it should be false, than that the events should be true. If there is no probability to be found for miracles in such circumstances, the evidence which details them ought never to be inquired into. We certainly wish that Mr Playfair had stated more fully the limitation of his doctrine, as Mr Hume did not limit it in that manner, and we know, that Mr Playfair regretted his not having done so. We had not the honour of being very intimately acquainted with that amiable and enlightened man, but we shall ever consider it as a fortunate circumstance that we happened to call on him a few days after the outcry was first raised against his doctrine, when he immediately entered upon the subject with that simplicity and candour for which he was so eminent. He stated, that he regretted exceedingly his having been misunderstood, which he had not thought possible, as there was not the slightest appearance of an insidious sneer against religion in all his paper, and as he truly and sincerely was thinking solely of physical events, without any reference to religion. He wished, he said, that he had been more explicit, since the mistake had taken place, as he could very easily have shown, that there must be a moral probability for all such miracles as are credible, and, if they want this, he then maintained that he was correct in his position, that no testimony could prove them. We the substance of the conversation above alI cannot possibly be mistaken as to luded to, as it made a great impression upon me, though, at this distance of time, I may be unable to state the precise words. It was in the year 1814, a week or two after the publication of the paper in question, that it took place. Mr Playfair himself opened the subject, and seemed very anxious that the misapprehension which had gone abroad should be removed. He said a hasty and inconsiderate attack had been made upon him, which, he thought, drift of his paper would ever have been beno one who candidly weighed the whole trayed into. He conceived it to be quite plain, that, in that speculation, he was occupied solely with reasonings that had no reference to religion at all, and the exception which he had made he had thought sufficiently explicit on that point. I remember distinctly his then expressing his regret that he had not spoken more at large of the moral probability of religious miracles, which, in his view of the question, was the circumstance upon whichi This, he said, he could very easily have their evidence mainly rested. done, but that the scope of his argument did not lead him into that consideration. 1 recollect farther, that he said he thought of going to Sir Henry Monereiff, and making the same explanation to are ourselves very much of the same opinion, an opinion which, if it is not sound, is certainly quite innocent, and is not, we think, such as will justify any one for saying of the person who holds it, supposing him to be a clergyman, that he is laying aside his gown and sneering at miracles!" DIALOGUES ON NATURAL AND RE VEALED RELIGION. PART III.-Objections Answered. CLEANTHES now began to speak as follows: Your observations, Philo, have brought to my mind a reflection which I have often made on the unexpected and apparently unaccountable effects produced by the study of natural philosophy on the minds of many ingenious inquirers in the present age. The views which the improvements in that science have opened into the secrets of nature have been such, as one should suppose, excellently adapted to increase our admiration of the wisdom of God, and to place the proofs of his existence beyond all possibility of dispute. In ancient times, the wisest among the philosophers, although without the advantages which modern science has conferred, yet accumulated, from their observation of natural phenomena, proofs upon this point which no candid mind could resist; how has it happened that the philosophers of the present age, surrounded on every hand, and wherever they direct their inquiries, by confirmations strong as proofs of holy writ," should yet, by a wonderful perversity of ingenuity, overlook them all; and while every discovery which they make is adding something to the august inagnificence of the temple of nature, why should they have become more him, but I do not know whether or not he did so. I have never heard of an objection on religious grounds having been made to any other of Mr Playfair's papers in the Edinburgh Review, so that the charge against him comes at last to this, that he published in that Review many of the finest speculations on scientific subjects which have been written in our day,—a charge, to which, I suppose, there is no man of science in the British dominions, whether clergyman or layman, who would have any great aversion to plead guilty. R. M. and more blind to the presence of that Almighty power which resides in the Holy of Holies? I am not disposed to think slightingly of philosophy, and I wish not to think unfavourably of man; but really these facts sometimes discompose my admiration of the one, and my natural sympathy with the other, and I am almost tempted to join the cry of the bigots, and to say that philosophy is a forbidden fruit, and that the absurd curiosity of the human mind is ever working its own misery and ruin. I can easily enter into your feelings upon this subject, replied Philo; at the same time, if it will help to reconcile you to science and its votaries, I think it is not difficult to point out the causes of the singular anomaly which you mention. The more that science becomes extended, the more is it necessary that those who labour in it should confine their view to particular departments; and though in each of these the most striking instances of design may be discovered, yet while they are contemplated apart, and without a reference to the whole scheme of nature, they rather appear to be curious than great, and do not suggest any strong impression of the wisdom from which they originate. The ancient philosophers, who knew much less than the moderns of the minute instances of design discovered in every part of nature, were yet more in the habit of contemplating the system as a whole, and were therefore more likely to be impressed with the religious sentiments of reverence and admiration. You will remark, too, that the inquiries of philosophy, as it has been improved by Lord Bacon, relate more to the methods by which things are accomplished, than to the designs which are had in view; in other words, the investigation of final causes has been banished from science, and the attention of the philosopher is limited to the investigation of the order of events, without inquiring into the contrivance from which it originates. He takes the machine of nature to pieces, he examines the manner in which its various movements are conducted, and although, in the course of this employment, contrivance must constantly be suggested to him, yet his thoughts are solely directed to the visible appearances be |