Mar. 1902.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. during the entire month of May, the period for which appellant seeks to obtain the pay check. It is conceded that no successor to the appellant has been appointed and confirmed. The appellant was, during the entire month of May, 1901, corporation counsel de jure, if any person was such corporation counsel after the 21st of May, 1901; and the principal question presented upon the merits of the case is whether, under the charter of the city of Spokane, the office of corporation counsel became vacant eo instanti on the expiration of the period of two years, so that an incumbent holding over until his successor was appointed and confirmed would not be entitled to any compensation for his services, or whether the incumbent holds over until the appointment and confirmation of a successor and is entitled to his salary until the happening of that event. Third, Did the appellant have an adequate remedy at law? Fourth, Was the comptroller lawfully exercising discretion and judgment in refusing to issue the warrant? Fifth, Was this a claim that the auditing committee created by the charter should first pass upon, before the comptroller was authorized to issue the warrant? The affidavit shows that the city of Spokane has enjoined upon the comptroller of the city the certification of a pay roll for the salaries of city officers fixed by charter or ordinance, and the issuance of a pay check upon the proper fund of the city treasurer for the amount of the salary; and the charter provides that the salary of corporation counsel shall be paid in warrants at the end of each calendar month. The performance of these acts is specially enjoined upon the comptroller as a duty resulting from his office, and clearly falls within the provisions of § 5755, Bal. Code. Since the relator is beneficially in Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [28 Wash. terested in the performance of these duties, through which alone he can receive his salary, he is clearly, under the statute, entitled to the writ prayed for to compel such performance when it is refused by the comptroller. That mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the certification of the proper pay roll and the issuance of the proper salary warrants, when the salary is fixed by law and the officer charged with the performance of such duties refuses to perform the same, is sustained by overwhelming authority. Mr. Merrill, in his work upon Mandamus, says: "This writ is the appropriate remedy to compel a municipal corporation, or an officer thereof, to audit the account of a public officer for his salary, or to draw a warrant therefor, or to pay such a warrant. It is considered that it would be a great hardship to compel a public officer to bring suit for his salary. When such salary is fixed by law, it is not necessary to audit it, since the auditing officers have no discretion to allow or reject it. Some courts, ignoring the delay, expense and uncertainty as to results, have refused the writ in such cases, because the object of the writ is to obtain money, and the same object might be attained by a suit against the municipality or on the bond of the delinquent officer. Such decisions controvert the proposition, that, when a claim has been allowed by the proper authority, the duty of an auditing officer to draw a warrant therefor is merely a ministerial duty, which will be enforced by a mandamus; and it controverts the proposition that, when accounts have been allowed by the proper officers or tribunals, the duty of payment by a public disbursing officer is merely ministerial, and that a mandamus will lie to compel the performance of such duty." Merrill, Mandamus, § 136. See, also, Id., § 126; High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3d ed.), § 351. "The remedy is frequently resorted to, to compel the drawing of warrants upon treasurers for and payment by Mar. 1902.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. the latter of the salaries of public officers. For this purpose it is the peculiarly appropriate remedy." 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Relief, § 1492. The charter of the city of Spokane, when adopted, provided that the compensation of corporation counsel should be $2,000 per annum. It further provided that this salary should be paid in warrants at the end of each calendar month, and it is further provided that the city council by ordinance may alter the salary. An ordinance was passed under this provision of the charter fixing the salary of corporation counsel at $2,400 per annum. It will be seen, then, that the salary was fixed by law, and in drawing a warrant therefor the comptroller was performing a merely ministerial duty. The respondent, however, contends that, since the right of relator to the relief sought depends upon his title to the office of corporation counsel, such question must necessarily be determined before his prayer can be granted, and that in a proceeding of this nature the court will not determine title to an office, and relies upon the decisions of this court in Lynde v. Dibble, 19 Wash. 328 (53 Pac. 370), and Kimball v. Olmsted, 20 Wash. 629 (56 Pac. 377). Lynde v. Dibble was a proceeding to compel the respondent to surrender to the relator the possession of the office of clerk of the municipal court of the city of Spokane. The respondent was in possession of the office, and was denying the relator's title. In Kimball v. Olmsted the relator had been removed from the office, and his successor appointed and inducted into office. The proceeding was to compel the mayor and council of the city to admit the relator to the office in question and recognize him as the legal incumbent thereof. In each of these cases there was a contest between two claimants to the office. In each the relator was out of the office, and the office was filled by an incumbent claim Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [28 Wash. ing title thereto. Notwithstanding the provision in the latter part of §5755, supra, we held that the relators in the cases cited. should proceed by quo warranto. In the case at bar the relator's title to the office comes only incidentally into question. There is no incumbent in office other than the relator himself. There is no claimant to the office, and, since it is impossible for relator to bring quo warranto against himself, the objection that quo warranto is the proper proceeding is without foundation. The present proceeding comes within the rule laid down in Williams v. Clayton, 6 Utah, 86 (21 Pac. 398, 399). It is, no doubt, true that, as a general proposition, the proceeding by quo warranto is the proper one in which to try the title to an office; but such trial of title, when the rule requires resort to quo warranto, means the right to the possession of the office when such possession is held by another and the purpose of the action is to oust the occupant. Eddy v. Kincaid, 28 Ore. 537 (41 Pac. 156); Harwood v. Marshall, 9 Md. 83; Merrill, Mandamus, §§ 146, 152. . It is next objected that the relator has an adequate remedy in an action at law against the city. This proceeding is not to compel the payment of money, although that may be the ultimate result, but to compel the respondent to perform a ministerial duty imposed upon him by law, and which is for the benefit of the relator; and, admitting that the relator might have abandoned his right to have his name inserted in the pay roll for the full month, and to have the proper pay check delivered to him, and have sued the city for the sum alleged to be due, this would have been no remedy as against the respondent, nor would it have afforded the same relief. The law requires the comptroller to certify to the proper pay roll, and to Mar. 1902.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. make out and deliver on demand to the officer a warrant in payment for his salary at the end of each calendar month. To deny the relator the right to enforce compliance with this duty would be to permit the comptroller to avoid a duty specially enjoined by law. Under the statute it is enough that the law requires the comptroller to perform these acts, and that the relator is interested in having them performed. "In order that the existence of another remedy shall constitute a bar to relief by mandamus, such other remedy must not only be an adequate remedy in the general sense of the term, but it must be specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case. It must be such a remedy as is calculated to afford relief upon the very subject of the controversy. For if it is not adequate to afford the party aggrieved the particular right which the law accords him, mandamus will lie, notwithstanding the existence of such other remedy. In other words, it is not merely the absence of other legal remedies, but their inadequacy coupled with the danger of failure of justice, that would result without interference by an extraordinary remedy which usually determines the propriety of this species of relief." Spelling, Extraordinary Relief, § 1375. See, also, Harwood v. Marshall, supra. The petition shows no refusal upon the part of the city, or the officers of the city, other than the respondent, to recognize the relator's title to the office of corporation counsel. The city has not, so far as appears in the case, through the officers authorized to speak for it—either its mayor or common council-authorized or sanctioned the action of the comptroller. The respondent, having assumed to take a certain position upon a question of law complicated by no dispute over questions of fact, must bear the responsibility of his position. The relief which |