Apr. 1902.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, C. J. missive. We think upon this ground alone appellant has failed to show sufficient title to maintain its action. Arriving at this conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss some other important objections argued by counsel for respondents." But the facts in the case differ somewhat from those now under consideration. There the owners of the land granted 400 feet of right of way to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. The company thereafter located its line of road across the premises, and continued to operate the same. Thus the entry in that case was by the consent of the grantor and it was observed: "It would seem, at any rate, to require some act upon the part of the owner of the servient estate which actually prevents the use of the right of way when required for the purposes of the railroad company, to give notice of adverse claim of right." In the present case the attitude of the parties has been hostile from the inception of the right. But we do not think, upon principle, and what we now regard as the better authority, that the right of way of a railroad company is excepted from the running of the statute of limitations in this state. The same contention was made in the case of Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ely, 25 Wash. 394 (65 Pac. 555, 54 L. R. A. 526). It was there observed: "It is the contention of the appellant that the statute does not run against it, for the reason that the right of way is granted in the interest of the public, and that it would be against public policy to allow the company to alienate its right of way, thereby depriving it of the power to carry on the business in aid of which the franchise was granted, and that it must necessarily follow that, if the company could not alienate its lands, public policy would equally prevent an alienation through process of law; that the statute of limitations presupposes a grant by the true owner; and the appellant's predeces Opinion of the Court-HADLEY, J. [28 Wash. sor having been the true owner, and the title to the land having been acquired by the defendants subsequent to the acquiring of title by the appellant, that no grant by the true owner had ever been made, and consequently that the statute of limitations did not apply. The statute of limitations, we think, is not based upon such a thought, but is purely and essentially a statute of repose, in the interest of the stability of titles and of good morals. One holding land adversely to the rights of another can be divested only by the action of the other, even with a better right, within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations; and this is true, even though he may have originally entered under a void grant or sale. But his claim ripens into a perfect title and becomes absolute, if such possession is not disturbed within the time prescribed. As is said by 3 Washburn on Real Property (5th ed.), p. 176: The operation of the statute takes away the title of the real owner, and transfers it, not in form, indeed, but in legal effect, to the adverse occupant. In other words, the statute of limitations gives a perfect title. The doctrine is stated thus strongly, because it seems to be the result of modern decisions, although it was once held that the effect of the statute was merely to take away the remedy, and did not bind the estate, or transfer the title.' That the statute of limitations is a statute of repose has been decided by all modern authority, including many decisions from this See Wickham v. Sprague, 18 Wash. 466 (51 Pac. 1055)." See, also, Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 154 Ill. 533 (39 N. E. 563); Matthews v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 110 Mich. 170 (64 Am. St. Rep. 336, 67 N. W. 1111); Gregory v. Knight, 50 Mich. 61 (14 N. W. 700); Coleman v. Flint & P. M. R. R. Co., 64 Mich. 160 (31 N. W. 47); Big Rapids v. Comstock, 65 Mich. 78 (31 N. W. 811); Donahue v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 165 Ill. 640 (46 N. E. 714); Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Houghton, 126 Ill. 233 (18 N. E. 301, 1 L. R. A. 213, 9 Am. St. Rep. 581). The statute for the re covery of real property or the possession thereof is $4797, Bal. Code, as follows: "The period prescribed in the preceding section for the commencement of actions shall be as follows:-Within ten years,-1. Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action." Section 4807, Id., is as follows: "The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall apply to actions brought in the name of the state, or any county or other public corporation therein, or for its benefit, in the same manner as to actions by private parties. An action shall be deemed commenced when the complaint is filed." It may be clearly observed that under this statute there is no exception in favor of the state or public rights saving them from the application of the statute. The judgment is reversed, with direction to the superior court to enter judgment in favor of appellants dismissing the action. WHITE, FULLERTON, HADLEY, ANDERS, MOUNT, and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. 28 359 [No. 4183. Decided April 18, 1902.] TITLE GUARANTEE AND TRUST COMPANY, Appellant, v. APPEAL SUPERSEDEAS BOND- SUFFICIENCY. Where a judgment required a party to pay a certain sum of money and costs, and, further, to perform certain acts within a period of thirty days, or in default of such performance, a money judgment in certain sums would be awarded against the party, on 41 295 Opinion of the Court-MOUNT, J. [28 Wash. appeal therefrom a supersedeas bond fixed by the court in a sum larger than double the amount of the money judgment and $200 additional, but less than double the amount conditionally required to be paid, is sufficient, under Bal. Code, § 6506, which provides that the appeal bond shail be in a penalty of not less than $200 in any case, and, "in order to effect a stay of proceedings, the bond, where the appeal is from a final judgment for the payment of money, shall be in a penalty double the amount of the damages and costs recovered in such judgment, and in other cases shall be in such penalty, not less than two hundred dollars, and sufficient to save the respondent harmless from damages by reason of the appeal, as a judge of the superior court shall prescribe." Appeal from Superior Court, Clarke County.-Hon. ABRAHAM L. MILLER, Judge. Motion to dismiss denied. E. B. Seabrook, Coovert & Stapleton, and W. W. Cotton, for appellant. Milton W. Smith and N. II. Bloomfield, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by MOUNT, J.-Respondent moves to dismiss this appeal upon the ground that the bond is insufficient. The bond is in the usual form, conditioned as an appeal and supersedeas, and is in the sum of $60,000. This court has frequently held that a supersedeas bond, to be effectual on appeal, must be in double the amount of the money judg ment appealed from, together with $200 additional as an appeal bond. Pierce v. Willeby, 20 Wash. 129 (54 Pac. 999); Town of Sumner v. Rogers, 21 Wash. 361 (58 Pac. 214); Galloway v. Tjossem, 22 Wash. 103 (60 Pac. 129); Beezley v. Sessions, 22 Wash. 125 (60 Pac. 130). The judgment appealed from in this case, omitting the formal parts, is as follows: "Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law made and filed herein on the 13th day of September, 1901, it is, this 13th day of September, 1901, considered, Apr. 1902.] Opinion of the Court-MOUNT, J. ordered, and adjudged that the defendants herein have and recover of and from the plaintiff the sum of $29,477.79, with interest thereon from this date at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, together with the costs and disbursements of this suit, taxed at $89.10. "And it is further considered, ordered, and adjudged that the plaintiff pay or cause to be paid and satisfied of record a certain mortgage made and executed by Columbus McDonnell and Margaret McDonnell to Balfour, Guthrie & Co., and assigned to Vincent Cook, within thirty days from the date hereof, and that, if said mortgage is not paid and satisfied within said thirty days, that the defendant have and recover of and from the plaintiff the sum of $6,795.81, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent. per annum from this date; and it is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff satisfy of record a certain. judgment obtained by E. A. Wintler against Columbus McDonnell and Margaret McDonnell in the superior court. of the state of Washington for Clarke county, on the 10th day of April, 1894, and thereafter assigned to Robert F. Hall, and a certain judgment obtained by C. W. Slocum against Columbus McDonnell and Margaret McDonnell in the superior court of the state of Washington for Clarke county, on the 16th day of April, 1896, and thereafter assigned to Robert F. Hall. "And it is further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff turn over to the defendant all moneys collected under a certain mortgage upon certain real property situated in the county of Walla Walla, state of Washington, made and executed by Annie Beine to Columbus McDonnell, and assigned by him to Vincent Cook, as security, or, in case that the money due under said mortgage has not been collected. to turn over to said defendants said mortgage and notes secured thereby within thirty days from the date hereof, and that, in case plaintiff fails to turn over said moneys or said mortgage and notes within said thirty days, that defendants have and recover of and from said plaintiff the sum of $1,201.23, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent. from this date. To all of which judgment. plaintiff, by its attorneys, duly excepts, which exception |