June, 1902.] it Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. of the was not alleged in the complaint that prior to the commencement action the respondents were in possession or entitled to the possession, or ever had any right of any kind whatsoever over the premises; that there is no allegation that the appellant was put in possession by the respondents; that the allegations in regard to the leasing by the respondents to appellant are insufficient and vague; that there is no sufficient allegation in the complaint connecting the respondents with any right to the possession of the premises. We think the complaint, taken in connection with the notice, which was made part thereof, is sufficient to show that the appellant was in possession of the premises under the alleged lease. The complaint was not demurrable. The possession of the appellant under the alleged lease can be reasonably inferred from the matters which are set forth. This is sufficient. Harris v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779 (63 Pac. 549). The appellant assigns as error the entry of the judgment for restitution and for double damages on the verdict. Section 5510, Bal. Code, upon which the appellant relies, has no application to summary proceedings under the act of 1891, supra. The section applicable to the verdict in summary proceedings is § 5542, Bal. Code. It provides, "If upon the trial the verdict of the jury, or if the case be tried without a jury the finding of the court, be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, judgment shall be entered for the restitution of the premises," etc. Nothing is said as to the form of the verdict. Here the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff for $175. Under the pleadings this amount was for damages for the unlawful detention of the property. Under § 5542, supra, the court was expressly authorized to pronounce a judgment for double this amount Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [28 Wash. as well as for restitution of the premises. The verdict rendered is in effect a general verdict. Such a verdict determines all the material questions of the controversy properly pleaded in favor of the party for whom the verdict is rendered. The jury could not have found a verdict for damages unless it necessarily found that the defendant unlawfully detained the premises. Besides, the court prepared two forms of verdicts, and said to the jury when they were about to retire to deliberate: "I have two forms of verdict prepared, gentlemen; one, giving the title and number of the cause, 'We, the jury in the above entitled cause, do find for plaintiff in the sum of $ If you find for the plaintiff, fill in the amount you find in their favor. And the other, 'We, the jury in the above entitled cause, do find for the defendant." No exception. was taken to this instruction of the court, and objection to the form of the verdict, under such circumstances, should not now be entertained. The appellant set up as a separate defense that he entered into a verbal agreement with the respondents whereby the premises were let to him for the period of one year, from July 30, 1901, to the 29th of July, 1902, at the agreed monthly rental of $156 per month, to be paid on the 8th day of each and every month; that appellant has performed and kept the conditions to be performed by him. The reply denied the allegations of the answer as to the separate defense. The appellant attempted to show that, in addition to the $156 per month which he was to pay to the plaintiffs, he was to pay to the Seattle Brewing & Malting Company the sum of $50, on the 20th day of each and every month, for license money advanced by said Brewing & Malting Company when the license to carry on the business of selling spirituous liquors on the leased premises was secured; that on the 20th of July, the 20th of August, and the 20th of September this amount was paid by the appellant to the Brewing & Malting Company. The court excluded the testimony as immaterial, to which an exception was taken. The exclusion of this testimony is assigned as error. Afterwards the offer was renewed, and the appellant, over the objection of the respondents, was permitted to show the payment of this money to the Brewing & Malting Company. If error was committed in excluding the testimony when first offered, it was cured by the subsequent action of the court in permitting the appellant to introduce the testimony. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs to the respondents. REAVIS, C. J., and FULLERTON, HADLEY, ANDERS, DUNBAR and MOUNT, JJ., concur. [No. 4271. Decided June 24, 1902.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON on the Relation of C. J. Harkins, Respondent, v. OTIS ROUNDTREE, Appellant. ELECTIONS PASTING NAMES ON BALLOTS FAILURE TO MARK BALLOT Where there was but one set of candidates to be voted for upon the official ballot used in a general election, and the voter pasted the name of another person over that of one of the candidates and cast his ballot without making an X after the names of any of the candidates, his vote should be counted, since Bal. Code, § 1376, provides that a ballot is not void, unless it is impossible to determine the elector's choice; Id., § 1403, provides that no ticket shall be lost for want of form, if the board of judges can determine to their satisfaction the person voted for and the office intended; and Id., § 1362, provides that "nothing in this chapter [relating to elections] shall prevent any voter from writing or pasting on his ballot the name of any person for Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [28 Wash. whom he desires to vote for any office, and such vote shall be counted the same as if printed upon the ballot and marked by the voter." Bal. Code, § 1362, passed in 1890, and providing that where a name is pasted on a ballot, the vote shall be counted the same as if printed upon the ballot and marked by the voter, was not repealed by Id., § 1370, passed in 1895, which declares, in providing for the method of marking ballots, that any elector may paste over any other name the name of any person for whom he may wish to vote, since the act of 1895 was merely amendatory of existing statutes and did not undertake to supersede the provisions of the old law, except in the matter of marking the ballots with an X after, instead of before, the names of candidates. SAME- IDENTIFICATION MARKS. Neither the placing of a paster upon an official ballot, as allowed by law governing elections, nor the failure to mark the ballot with an X, when but one set of candidates is being voted for, can be held to be a violation of Bal. Code, § 1380, which prohibits an elector's placing any mark upon his ballot by which it may be identified. Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County.-Hon. ALONZO E. RICE, Judge. Reversed. Millett & Harmon, for appellant. Maurice A. Langhorne, for respondent. The opinion of the court was delivered by WHITE, J.-On the 4th day of December, 1901, an election was held in the town of Winlock, a municipal corporation of the fourth class, for the purpose of electing two councilmen to serve for a period of two years each, and a treasurer for one year. Previous to said election a caucus of the citizens of Winlock was held, and a ticket nominated. The persons nominated at said caucus, and whose names subsequently were placed upon the official ballot, were Howard Darrah and C. J. Harkins for councilmen, and H. A. Baldwin for treasurer, there being but one June, 1902.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. ticket on said ballot, and said ticket being designated as the "Citizen's Ticket." Otis Roundtree was not nominated, either by caucus or petition, and his name was not printed on the official ballot, but he was voted for by the citizens of Winlock, who pasted his name on the official ballot. The returns of the said election were duly certified to the council, and, when canvassed it was determined that C. J. Harkins had received 60 votes for councilman, Howard Darrah 87 votes and Otis Roundtree 62 votes. Darrah and Roundtree were declared elected, took the oath of office and entered upon their duties as councilmen of said town. This action was commenced by C. J. Harkins, relator and respondent, against Otis Roundtree, appellant; the information, among other things, alleging that there had been counted for appellant four votes to which he was not entitled, four electors having voted ballots on which the name of Otis Roundtree was pasted over the name of the relator, C. J. Harkins, and no more names were left on the ballot or ticket than the elector was entitled to vote for, but no cross or mark was placed opposite the name of Roundtree, nor were the four ballots marked with a cross at any place whatsoever. These ballots were counted for appellant, giving him two votes more than were cast for relator. The issue is narrowed to the legality of these four votes so counted for appellant, and the law of the case was argued upon appellant's demurrer to the information. Ther court overruled the demurrer. Appellant excepted, elected to stand upon his demurrer, and refused to plead further, whereupon formal proof of allegations was waived, and judgment was entered against appellant, to which he duly excepted. Thereafter he filed formal exceptions, and now brings the case to this court on appeal, asking that |