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Mar. 1902.]

Opinion of the Court

WHITE, J.

had served the written notice testified to by Mr. Stanford; that plaintiff's attorney was informed, over the telephone, that Mr. Bell was now on his way to the court house. The court then ruled that testimony as to the written notice was unnecessary. Thereupon the plaintiff rested." This ruling of the court was proper. The requirements of notice, as a reference to the statute shows, are solely in cases where the lease has not expired, but the tenant has failed to pay rent, or to observe some other provisions of the lease. The case of Lowman v. West, 8 Wash. 355 (36 Pac. 258), relied upon by the appellants, was a case where the tenant had failed to pay rent; and the action was brought under subd. 3 of § 5527, supra, where a notice is specifically required. This case is not, therefore, any authority for an action brought under subd. 1 of this section, which provides that the tenancy is terminated without notice.

Appellants urge that the respondent did not sufficiently prove its corporate existence below, and that on that ground their motion for a nonsuit should have been granted. Respondent replies that the general denial did not raise that issue. We do not think it necessary, under the circumstances of this case, to pass directly upon that question. The first paragraph of the complaint, which alleged the corporate existence of the respondent, was passed over by the appellants, and they specifically pleaded to every other paragraph of the complaint except the fifth, which was an allegation that the respondent had made demand upon the appellants that they quit and vacate said premises, and appellants had refused and still refuse so to do. The fifth denial in the answer is that said appellants deny all the other allegations in said complaint contained. This manner of pleading had a tendency to mislead the respondent into supposing that the first allegation of the complaint

Opinion of the Court

WHITE, J.

[28 Wash.

was admitted, inasmuch as it was not specifically denied. In addition to this, the affirmative defense set up by the appellants recognized the corporate existence of the respondent, and asked for the specific performance of a verbal agreement to convey to the appellants the land they were occupying. There was some evidence also offered, and not objected to, which we thing prima facie established the corporate existence. George II. Stanford testified that he was president of the Stanford Land Company, a corporation, the plaintiff in the case; that, by virtue of an agreement between the Stanford Land Company and the said Everett Improvement Company and W. J. and B. J. Rucker, the premises described in said lease and in plaintiff's complaint in this case became the property of the witness George H. Stanford by a contract, which contract he had subsequently duly assigned to the Stanford Land Company, a corporation, and said Stanford Land Company was the owner thereof at the time of the commencement of the action. This was not the best evidence of the fact of the corporate existence of the respondent, and, had that particular objection been urged to the testimony and called to the attention of the court at the time the motion for a nonsuit was made, a different question would arise. No specific objection was made to the character of this testimony, and, that being the case, we will not now consider. whether it was proper evidence, or the best evidence, of the fact testified to. As was said in Edwards v. Carr, 13 Gray, 238:

"It is very important that no objection to a verdict be brought before this court by an exception which was not in some form taken at the trial, especially in cases where there is ground to believe that if it had been then brought to the attention of the judge and the adverse counsel, it

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might have been avoided by an amendment, or by a more specific direction of the judge, sustaining or overruling it." State v. Hyde, 22 Wash. 551 (61 Pac. 719). In Yakima National Bank v. Knipe, 6 Wash. 348 (33 Pac. $34), testimony of a similar character, to establish the corporate existence, was admitted.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed with costs. REAVIS, C. J., and DUNBAR, FULLERTON, HADLEY, MOUNT and ANDERS, JJ., concur.

[No. 4140.. Decided March 21, 1902.]

OLYMPIAN-TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY, Appellant, v. JOHN BYRNE et al., County Commissioners of Thurston County, Respondents.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

RECORDS

CORRECTION.

A board of county commissioners has power to amend its records, even after adjournment, so as to make them show the true orders made by the board.

SAME CONTRACTS -BID FOR PUBLIC PRINTING CONDITIONAL AC

CEPTANCE.

The acceptance by a board of county commissioners of a bid for printing, on certain conditions, which the bidder refused to agree to would not constitute a contract which the bidder could enforce.

SAME INTERVENING RIGHTS.

The fact that the entry of an order on the records of the county commissioners accepting a bid for printing unconditionally was corrected about one month subsequently, by making the records show that a condition had been ordered attached to the acceptance, would not give the bidder any intervening rights between the original entry and date of correction, where nothing had been done under the proposed contract, which in fact could not have been operative until some three weeks subsequent to the date of the correction, and there is nothing to show that the

Opinion of the Court- MOUNT, J.

[28 Wash.

bidder relied upon the unconditional acceptance shown by the record to his disadvantage.

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Laws 1901, p. 385, § 3, which provides that the county treasurer shall make publication of summons in delinquent tax cases "in the official newspaper of the county," provided the charge therefor does not exceed ten cents for each description, and that, if such publication cannot be made in said newspaper at said price, the county treasurer may cause such publication to be made in any other newspaper of general circulation published in the county, at a cost not to exceed said price, does not contemplate that the county treasurer shall contract for the publication of the delinquent tax list, except upon the failure to publish such list by the official newspaper of the county selected by the commissioners, and it is within the power of the commissioners to include such tax list in the contract let by them for public printing.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County.Hon. MASON IRWIN, Judge. Affirmed.

Troy & Falknor, for appellant.

George H. Funk and J. W. Robinson, for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MOUNT, J.-The county auditor of Thurston county, under the provisions of § 371, Bal. Code, published a notice that the board of county commissioners would, on May 7, 1901, "receive sealed proposals for the public printing of Thurston county, for the term of one year." The appellant and others submitted bids therefor. Appellant's bid was as follows:

"Olympia, Washington, April 17, 1901. To the Honorable Board of County Commissioners, Thurston County, Olympia, State of Washington. Gentlemen:

The undersigned hereby bids and proposes to do the public printing of Thurston county, in the Weekly Olympian,

Mar. 1902.]

Opinion of the Court

MOUNT, J.

in contemplation of the attached notice to publishers during the ensuing year beginning July 1, 1901, at the price of one-fourth of one cent per square of 250 ems nonpareil for the first insertion, and for one-eighth of one cent per square for each subsequent insertion. The circulation of the Weekly Olympian during the year averages hundred and fifty copies.

Respectfully submitted.

OLYMPIAN-TRIBUNE PUBLISHING COMPANY,

seven

By S. A. MADGE, President, etc."

On May 7, 1901, the board of county commissioners accepted the above named bid upon condition that the delinquent tax list should be included therein at the same rate, and the clerk of the board entered the following in the minutes of the journal of proceedings: "Contract was awarded to the Olympian-Tribune Publishing Company.” Three days later, viz., on May 10, 1901, the board caused the following order to be entered on the minutes:

"The county attorney is directed to prepare a contract with the Olympian-Tribune Publishing Company for the county printing for the year beginning July 1, 1901, in accordance with their bid. Said contract to specifically include all county printing, including publication of delinquent tax foreclosure list. Bond fixed in the sum of $5,000."

The board on the same day adjourned its session to June 4, 1901. The minutes of the meetings of the board for May 7, 8, 9 and 10 were published by the clerk prior to the next session. The board reconvened on June 4, 1901, and on the 6th, upon the reading of the minutes for approval, the board, being of the opinion that the minutes with reference to the contract for the public printing as entered by the clerk on May 7th, did not express the true action of the board, caused to be inserted in the minutes of May 7th the following: "On condition that the delinquent tax list be

6-28 WASH.

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