2

An indictment under the act of 1866, chap. 60, in which it is charged,
that the defendant did unlawfully enter upon the premises of the pros-
ecutor, he, the said defendant, having been forbidden to enter on said
premises, and not having a license so to enter, &c., is sufficient.
v. Whitehurst, 85.

State

1. Confederate money, taken in good faith, should be received at its scaled
value, in all fiduciary transactions: Therefore, a guardian who paid the
taxes due from his ward's estate, with his own Confederate money, can
only receive credit for the value thereof according to the Legislative
scale. State ex rel. Cox v. Peebles, 10.

2. Good faith requires that any profit which arises from a transaction of
the guardian in the management of the ward's estate, must be for the
benefit of the ward, and not of the guardian. Ibid.

3. A defendant, in the exercise of due diligence, in collecting a bond due a
ward, is not required to foresee the fact, that under the construction
given to the homestead law, it would be held to apply to pre-existing
debts; nor the fact that a levy before the adoption of the Constitution
would hold good, notwithstanding the provisions of such law. Wells v.
Sluder, 55.

4. A party who at first refuses to receive Confederate money in payment of
a debt due a ward, is afterwards prevailed upon so to do, by the declar-
ations of the obligor, yields to a groundless fear, and is liable to the
ward for the amount so received. Ibid.

5. A guardian who, in 1862, exchanged North Carolina six per cent. bonds
for North Carolina eights, when his wards were full of age, and after-
wards received the semi-annual interest on such bonds, and gave the
guardian their receipt for the same when the bonds were turned over to
to them, is not responsible for the same, though they werre lost by the
results of the war. Pearson v. Caldwell, 291.

6. In a suit on a guardian bond, evidence, that the court house of the
county in which the bond was taken was burned with many official pa-
pers in 1862, and that search had been made among the papers of a de-
ceased person who was Clerk at the time of burning, and who was in
the habit of keeping some of the official papers at his residence, and
that no bond given by the guardian of the plaintiff had been found,

was held sufficient to authorize the introductory of secondary evidence
of the execution and contents of the bonds declared on. Harrrel v. Hare,
658.

7. A certified copy of the extracts from the records of the County Court,
that at August Term, 1850, the guardian of the plaintiff and other mi-
nors,
renewed his bond by entering into another bond in the sum of
$3,000 with the present defendant and another as his sureties, is compe-
tent evidence to prove the existence and due execution of the bond de-
clared upon; and a certiñed copy of the guardian's return is also com-
petent as tending to establish the amount due at the date of the return.
Ibid.

8. An action against a guardian for an account and settlement with his
ward, should commence in the Probate Court; the mistake in the juris-
diction, (as an irregularity,) is cured either by waiver, as when defen-
dant answers the complaint, or otherwise pleads to the merits, or by the
merits, or by the operation of remedial statutes. Clodfelter v. Bost, 733.
9. When the defendant in 1854 took the guardianship of the plaintiff, who
as heir of a soldier killed in the Mexican war, was entitled to a pension
from the U. S. Government, which facts within the knowledge of the
guardian were sufficient to put him on enquiry as to such pension, and
where the guardian had been remiss in other duties: Held, that he
was responsible for such pension from 1854 until his ward became of age.
Ibid.

HEIR AT LAW.

See AGREEMENT, 3, 4;

"FIXTURES;

"PLEADING, 6.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. The doctrine of years ago, that a husband had the right to whip his wife,
provided, he used a switch no larger than his thumb, no longer governs
the decisions of our Courts; and the opinion, more in accordance with
our present civilization, that a husband has no legal right to chastise his
wife under any circumstances, prevails.-State v. Oliver, 60.

2. To entitle a husband to an estate as tenant by the curtesy, before the
adoption of the Rev. Code (1st January, 1:56,) a seizen in deed was neces-
sary; and under the rules prescribed in chap. 38 of the Rev. Stat., (1st
January, 1838,) a seizen in deed was also necessary, in case of the parent's
claiming a life estate upon the death of his child. Now under the pro-
visions of the Rev. Code, chap. 38, rules 1 and 13, neither actual nor
legal seizen is necessary to make the stock in the devolution of estates.
Sears v. McBride, 152.

3. At common law, neither the husband nor the wife is allowed to prove the
fact of access or non-access; and as such rule is founded "upon de-
cency, morality and public policy," it is not changed by chap. 43, sec. 15,
Bat. Rev., (C. C. P., sec. 340,) allowing parties to testify in their own
behalf.-Boykin v. Boykin, 262.

4. Where there was an agreement between a husband and wife that if the
wife would join him in a conveyance of a certain tract of land descended
to the wife from her father, she should have another tract in lieu of the
one so conveyed: Held, that when the husband received the money for
the land conveyed as before set out, he held it upon trust for his wife,
and that his estate became responsible therefor.-Dula v. Young, 450.
5. Held further, that the heirs at law of the wife are entitled to the land
agreed to be substituted for that of the wife, free from the incumbrance
of the husband's debts.-Ibid.

INDICTMENT.

1. It is not necessary to constitute a riot, that the facts charged should
amount to a distinct and substantative indictable offense; it is sufficient,
if such facts shall constitute an attempt to commit an act of violencə
which, if completed, would be an indictable offence. State v. York
et al., 66.

2. An indictment, in which it is charged that the defendant "did profanely
curse and swear, and take the name of Almighty God in vain," &c., "to
the common nuisance," &c., charges no offence, and cannot be sus-
tained. State v. Powell, 67.

3. In an indictment under the 95th section of chapter 32 of Bat. Rev., the
charge that the defendants "unlawfully and wilfully did kill, injure and
abuse one cow, one heifer, the property," &c., "which said cow and
heifer were then and there in an inclousure, not then and there sur-
rounded by a lawful and sufficient fence," is sufficient. State v. Paint-
er, 70.

4. The defendant sold to the prosecutor four barrels of crude turpentine,
representing "that they were all right, just as good at bottom as they
were at top," &c., and when examined the barrels contained only a
small quantity of turpentine on the top of each, the rest of the contents
being chips and dirt: Held, that the defendant was guilty of cheating
by false tokens. State v. Jones, 75.

5. An indictment to be good, must set forth with plainness and certainty,
all the essential facts constituting the offence; the charge must be ex-
plicit enough to support itself, for if all the facts alleged in the indict-
ment may be true and yet constitute no offence, the indictment is insuf-
ficient. State v. Eason, 88.

6 To an indictment for injuring a public school house, the defendants, for
a defence, set up a claim in a third person to the house alleged to be
injured, and justified the permission of such claimant, to commit the
acts complained of: Held, that the charge of the Judge below, "if the
jury believed the defendants honestly were of the belief that the house
was the property of" such claimant, "and he had a right to give it to
them, they were not guilty; but if the defendants did the acts com-
plained of, willing to run the risk of a suit, or careless whether
they had a right or not, that would not protect them, they would be
guilty," was as favorable as the defendants could ask, and was no good
ground for a new trial. State v. Roseman & Trexler, 235.

7. A defendant cannot be convicted of that which he is not charged.
Therefore, where the Judge below, upon the trial of an indictment,
charging the defendant with breaking and entering into the house of the
prosecutor and stealing therefrom, charged the jury "that if they be-
lieved, the defendants, (however they may have got into the house,)
broke out of it, they were guilty:" It was held, to be error, and to en-
title the new defendants to a new trial. State v. McPherson & Wil-
liams, 239.

8. In an indictment containing two counts, one for larceny and the other
for receiving stolen goods, the jury may bring in a general verdict of
guilty, the grade of punishment being the same for each offence. State
v. Baker, 530.

See PERJURY.

INJURY TO A SCHOOL HOUSE.

See SUPRA, 6.

INJUNCTION.

1. When the allegations in the complaint upon which it is sought to set up
injunctive relief, are fully met by the answer, the restraining order first
issued will be set aside, and an injunction until the hearing refused.—
Woodfin v. Beach, 455.

2. When the dissolution of an injunction would be equivalent to a dismis-
sal of the action, if a reasonable doubt exists in the mind of the Court,
whether the equity of the complaint be sufficiently negatived by the
answer, the Court will not dissolve the injunction but continue it to the
hearing.-Lowe v. Commissioners of Davidson, 532.

INTEREST.

The rule for computing interest on a bond given in South Carolina, is to
calculate the interest upon the principal for the first year, setting the
interest aside, and then for the second, third and so on until the time for
the first payment. Then calculate the interest on each year's interest to
the same time, and apply the payment first to the extinguishment of this
interest, and the surplus, if any, to a reduction of the principal. If the
payment is not sufficient to pay this interest, first extinguish the interest
calculated on each year's interest, and apply the surplus to the principal
interest as far as it will go. If the payment is not enough to satisfy the
interest on the interest, it is set aside, and neither stops nor bears interest.
Bratton v. Allison, 498. (See Memoranda, 739.)

JUDGES CHARGE.

1. It is prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiffs, for the presiding Judge on
the trial below, to charge the jury that "the plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover in any event, and if the issues were found in their favor, he
would set aside the verdict," and afterwards to submit the issues to be
passed upon by the jury to "say how the matter was." Dula v. Young,
450.

2. When on the joint trial of two prisoners for murder, the presiding Judge
directs the acquittal of one, remarking at the time: "I shall direct an
acquittal as to him, although I think it not improbable that he was
there," the other prisoner not being in any manner prejudiced by such
remark, has no right to complain and is not entitled to a new trial.
State v. Martin, 628.

3.

What are the termini or the boundary of a grant or deed is a matter of
law; where these termini are is a matter of fact for the jury. Therefore,
where there was evidence tending to establish a certain corner at a pai-
ticular place, it was error in the presiding Judge to say, as a conclusion
of law, the corner was at a different place. Clark v. Wagoner, 706.
See BILLS, BONDS, &c., 9, 10;

"DAMAGES, 1;

"EVIDENCE, 1, 15;

"INDICTMENT, 6, 7;

"LARCENY, 1;
"NEW TRIAL;
"PRACTICE, 15.

JUDGMENT.

The lien on land acquired by a docketed judgment shall not be lost in favor
of a judgment subsequently doeketed, unless the plaintiff in the latter
take out execution and give the plaintiff in the former twenty days no-
tice before the day of sale by the sheriff, and the plaintiff so notified
shall fail to take out execution and put it into the sheriff's hand before
the day of sale. Rule 19, 63 N. C. Rep. 669. Dougherty v. Logan, 558.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 15.

JURISDICTION.

1. The jurisdiction conferred on our former Courts of Equity by the ordi-
nance of the 23d of June, 1866, in favor of creditors following assets into
the hands of fraudulent alienees, is concurrent with that given to Courts
of Law by chap. 46, secs. 44, et seq. of the Rev. Code. Humphrey v.
Wade, 280.

2 Statutes which merely give affirmatively jurisdiction to one Court, do
not oust that previously existing in another Court. Ibid.

See EXECUTORS, &c., 7, 10;

"GUARDIAN, &C., 8.

"JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, 4.

"PROBATE Courts, 4;

"SUPERIOR COURTS, 2, 3.