the day of ―, A. D. the said J. C. was brought before J. S. H., esquire, a trial justice in and for said county of, at, in said county of, by virtue of a warrant in due form of law, issued under the hand and seal of the said trial justice as aforesaid, at —, in said county of upon the complaint on oath of J. B., of ―, in the county of —, wherein the said J. B. complained that [here recite the substantive allegations of the complaint]; upon which complaint the said J. C., having been then and there ar raigned by the said trial justice as aforesaid, pleaded thereto that he was not guilty; and whereas, after hearing and fully understanding the testimony touching said complaint, it then and there appeared to the said trial justice, on the whole examination, that the offense charged in said complaint had been then and there, as set forth in said complaint, committed; and that there was probable cause to charge the said J. C. with the commission of the said offense: whereupon the said offense not being within the jurisdiction of the said trial justice as aforesaid, for trial, the said J. C. was then and there, by said J. S. H., justice as aforesaid, ordered personally to appear at the supreme judicial court, to be holden at —, in and for said county of -, on the day of, A. D. —, then and there, in said court, to answer to the accusation set forth in said complaint and abide the order of said court thereon, and to recognize with sufficient sureties, in the sum of dollars, agreeably to said order, to personally appear at said court, to be holden as aforesaid, then and there, in said court, to answer to said accusation and abide the order of said court thereon; and whereas the said J. C. neglected and refused to recognize with sufficient sureties for his personal appearance at said court, to be holden as aforesaid, as was required by said trial justice as aforesaid, and was thereupon by reason of such neglect and refusal committed to the jail in said county of —, by virtue of a warrant of commitment, in due form issued, under. the hand and seal of said trial justice, to be kept in said jail until the said J. C. should recognize with sufficient sureties as required by said trial justice as aforesaid, or be otherwise discharged by due course of law. And whereas, afterwards, to wit, on the day of A. D., at the jail in said, we, A. B. and W. K. K., esquires, two justices of the peace and quorum, in and for said county of on application of the said J. C. committed as aforesaid, and pursuant to the order aforesaid, after due inquiry into the case, then and there ordered that the said J. C. be admitted to bail by recognizing, with. sufficient sureties, in the sum of dollars, in accordance with the order of the said trial justice first above named, to wit, to personally appear at the said supreme judicial court to be holden as aforesaid, then and there, in said court, to answer to the accusation set forth in said complaint and abide the order of said court thereon. Now, therefore, if the said J. C. shall personally appear at the supreme judicial court to be holden as aforesaid, and then and there in said court, answer to the accusation set out in said complaint and abide the order of said court thereon, then this recognizance shall be void; otherwise shall remain in full force. A. B., Justice of the Peace and Quorum. Mittimus when the offense is not bailable. [Same as No. 22 to *, then] ་ Whereupon, the offense not being within the jurisdiction of me, the said justice, for trial, and not being bailable, it was then and there ordered by me, the said justice, that the said J. C. be committed to the jail in in said county of and there be safely kept until discharged by due course of law. And you, the keeper of said jail, in the name of the State of Maine, are hereby commanded to receive the said J. C. into your custody in said jail, and him there safely keep until he shall be discharged by due course of law. Hereof fail not at your peril. Given under my hand and seal, at —, in said county of the day of, in the year, &c. J. S. H., Trial Justice. on As a general thing, the only pleas in use are the pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty." Special pleas in bar are sometimes used in the following cases: A plea of previous acquittal or conviction. The constitution of Maine, in section 8 of article 1, says, "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." This provision is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy more than once for the same offense, and hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. The plea of a former conviction for the same identical crime is a good plea in bar. This depends upon the same principle as the former, that no man ought to be twice brought in danger for the same offense. 4 Bl. Com., 335 and 336. But there may be many mistrials, none of which will be a bar. Form of plea of former acquittal, or conviction. [Name of county], ss. Before J. S. H., a trial justice at in said county ~, A. D. — State (J. B. complainant) v. J. C. me And the said J. C., in his own proper person, comes into court here, and, having heard said complaint read, says that said complaint ought not to be further prosecuted against him, the said J. C., because he says that heretofore, to wit, [here copy the record of acquittal, or conviction, in the past tense, omitting the word " where it occurs, then say] as by the record thereof remaining appears; which judgment is in full force, and not reversed or annulled. And the said J. C. says that he, the said J. C., and the said J. C. so convicted (or acquitted) are one and the same person, and not other and different persons, and that the said offense of which he, the said J. C., was so convicted (or acquitted), and the offense set forth in this complaint, are one and the same, and not other and different. And this he, the said J. C., is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment, and that he may be discharged. Replication. J. C. And the said complainant, who prosecutes for said State in this behalf, says that said State ought not to be precluded from prosecuting said complaint, because, he says, that there is not any record of said conviction (or acquittal), as the said J. C. has in his plea alleged. And this he prays may be inquired of by said justice. And the said J. C. doth the like. Defects in the complaint are taken advantage of, by a motion to quash the complaint. The motion should be reduced to writing. CHAPTER XXX. OFFENSES AGAINST THE LIVES AND PERSONS OF 1. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied.1 (a) There is but one crime denominated murder, although there are two degrees of that crime, liable to different punishment.2 manner (b) An indictment for murder need not set out the ". in which and the means by which," the killing was perpetrated.2 (c) An indictment, alleging that the accused, on a day, and at a place named, in and upon the body of a person named, "feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and him, the said " person named, "then and there feloniously and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder," &c., will sustain a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree under the statute of this State.2 2. When murder is committed with express malice aforethought, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpe 1 R. S. c. 118, § 1.-2 State v. Verrill, 54 Me. 408. trate a crime punishable by death, imprisonment for life, or for an unlimited term of years, it shall be deemed murder of the first degree and punished with death. 8 (d) Express malice is, when one with a sedate deliberate mind, and formed design, does kill another, which formed design is evidenced by external circumstances, discovering the inward intention; as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm.* (e) Malice is implied by law from any deliberate, cruel act, committed by one person against another, suddenly, without any, or without a considerable provocation. And all homicide is, as a general rule, presumed to be malicious, until the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, to be made out by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him.* 3. When murder is committed otherwise than is set forth in the preceding section, it shall be deemed murder of the second degree, and punished by imprisonment for life.5 4. The jury, finding a person guilty of murder shall find whether he is guilty of murder in the first or second degree. When a person is found guilty of murder by confession in open court, the court from testimony, shall determine the degree of murder, and sentence accordingly. (ee) A verdict that "the defendant is guilty of the murder whereof he stands indicted," is not a finding that he is guilty of murder of the first degree, and not a compliance with this statute. ба 5. Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought, or commits manslaughter as defined by the common law, shall be punished by imprisonment not more than ten years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars." 6. Whoever wilfully and maliciously displaces a switch or rail, disturbs, injures, or destroys any part of an engine, car, signal, track, or bridge of any railroad, or places any obstruction thereon, with intent that any person or property passing on the same should be thereby injured, and human life is thereby destroyed, shall be deemed guilty of murder of the first degree, and punished accordingly. If human life is thereby endangered and not destroyed, or property is injured, he shall be punished by solitary confinement not more than sixty days, and afterwards by imprisonment and hard labor during life, or for a period of not less than ten years.8 3 R. S. c. 118, § 2. State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468.-R. S. c. 118, § 3.-6 R. S. c. 118, § 4.-6a State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564.-7 R. S. c. 118, § 5. R. S. c. 118, § 6, and Public Laws of 1873, c. 108. 7. Any person, having charge of a steamboat used for conveyance of passengers, or of the boiler or other apparatus for generating steam therein, who, through ignorance, gross neglect, or for the purpose of racing, creates or allows to be created such a quantity of steam as to break such boiler, apparatus, or machinery connected therewith, and thereby human life is destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment not more than four, nor less than two years; and if human life is endangered and not destroyed, by imprisonment less than one year, and by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars.9 8. Any person residing in this State, who within it engages to fight a duel, and fights such duel without the State, and thereby inflicts a mortal wound on any person, of which he dies in this State, shall be deemed guilty of murder of the first degree, and punished accordingly; and he may be indicted and tried in the county where the death happens.10 9. A person, who, by an engagement made within the State, is the second to either party in such duel and present when a mortal wound is inflicted, of which the person dies within the State, shall be deemed an accessory before the fact to murder of the first degree, and he may be indicted, tried, and punished, as the principal may be.11 10. A person indicted under either of the two preceding sections, or under the thirteenth section of this chapter, may plead a former conviction or acquittal of the same offense, in another State, which, being admitted or established, shall entitle him to an acquittal in this State.12 12 11. Whoever fights a duel with deadly weapons, or is present thereat as aid, second, surgeon, or as advising, encouraging, or promoting it, though no homicide ensues; or sends, or delivers a verbal or written message intended to be a challenge, though no duel ensues, shall be punished by imprisonment not more than twenty years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars; and be incapable of holding any office or place of honor, trust, or profit, for twenty years after conviction.18 12. Whoever accepts such a challenge, or engages to 9 R. S. c. 118, § 7.-10. R. S. c. 118, § 8.-11 R. S. c. 118, § 9.-12 R. S. c. 118, § 10.-13 R. S. c. 118, § 11. |