late commerce no common carrier subject to its provisions can take itself out of such control and make itself a purely private carrier by special contract, no matter what particular or peculiar traffic may be offered for carriage. However different this carriage of a mixed shipment of animals, goods, and passengers in specially constructed cars from place to place along the line, according to the demands of the shippers' business, may have been from the transportation of passengers, horses, animals, and goods, in the carrier's usual trains, the mandate of the law that all rates and charges shall be published and filed, and open to all shippers of like property, without discrimination for similar service rendered, appears to be inconsistent with any lawful contract for rates intended to be exclusively confined to a single shipper.

CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE THE STATUTE.

It has been judicially determined that the Attorney-General may, upon request made by this Commission, in discharge of its duty to execute and enforce the provisions of the act, direct the institution and prosecution in the name of the United States of suits to compel obedience to the statute, and without formal preliminary investigation and report by the Commission. (U. S. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 65 Fed. Rep., 903.) As stated in our last report to Congress, this operates to shorten the procedure in cases where investigation is not required to make it appear to the Commission that the act is being violated. It also demonstrates how much efficient regulation can be aided by statutory amendments which do not aim to take from the carriers their opportunity for review in the courts, but which do have for their object the summary enforcement of the prohibitions and requirements contained in the law. The decision in this case holds that a suit under the original act (February 4, 1887) could not be maintained by the United States, but that such a proceeding is proper since the amendments of March 2, 1889, and February 10, 1891, whereby the twelfth section is made to authorize and require the Commission to "execute and enforce the provisions of this act," and to require district attorneys under the direction of the AttorneyGeneral, to institute, upon the request of the Commission, "all neces sary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of this act, and for the punishment of all violations thereof."

The court says:

Now, these amendments mean something. They are couched in the language of a grant of new authority, and impose additional requirements as to the rights and duty of the Commission to see to it that the law is enforced. And a significant fact in this connection is that this enactment follows, and might appear to be the logical sequence of the condition of things prior to the passage of the amendments, as shown by the report of the Commission on the 1st day of December, 1891, and of the rulings of the courts in reference to the powers of the Commission prior to the passage of these amendments.

Attention is called to the fact that the orders of the Commission made in previous years were then going through the slow process of enforcement by the courts. This

is what is by the counsel for the defendant forcibly styled "the circumlocution of procedure in the hitherto established ways." To avoid this "circumlocution" and afford a speedy remedy is obviously desirable if it can be accomplished.

The only practicable remedy would seem to be by an equitable injunction against such practices, and it would appear eminently right and just that the Government should move in the matter for the protection of its citizens, and to enforce obedience to its laws on the part of this great corporation, acting in its capacity of a quasi public servant. These views are in harmony with and supported by many adjudicated cases maintaining the authority and duty of the sovereign to protect the public interests from unjust invasion and violation.

Further on in the opinion the court again refers to the effect of the amendments in the following language:

This was after four years' trial of the practical operations of the Commission, and painful experience of its inherent defects, so far as concerned the ultimate and final relief sought for by the honest citizen contending against the abuses practiced by these great corporations.

This decision was rendered on September 14, 1894, upon defendant's demurrer to the bill, and it is understood that the trial of the case is still pending in the same court. The value of this new mode of proceeding directly in the courts in cases where violations are plainly indicated can not be questioned, particularly after several cases, now pending in the Supreme Court, and involving construction of various important regulating features of the statute, have been decided; and yet the "circumlocution of procedure" is diminished by proceeding in the courts in the first instance only to the extent of cutting off a preliminary investigation by the Commission, which, on account of its wide scope and freedom from technical rules, can not be dispensed with in the great majority of cases. Many individuals and communities may be, and often are, injuriously affected by inequitable adjustments of rates, and the necessity for speedy relief arises not only from the duty of the Federal Government to protect the public interests from unjust invasion, but from the well-ascertained facts that rate conditions and commercial situations are liable to frequent change, and that the consequences of unjust charges, reaching far beyond the interests of shippers, and affecting many connected or related transactions, constitute situations where the damage caused can not be repaired.

COMPELLING WITNESSES TO GIVE TESTIMONY WHICH MAY CONNECT THEM WITH CRIMINAL TRANSACTIONS.

In the matter of Theodore F. Brown, already mentioned in this report, held for contempt in the western district of Pennsylvania, the United States circuit court says, in the opinion by Judge Buffington, to which is appended the unqualified concurrence of Circuit Judge Acheson, that

The question is one of grave importance to the petitioner, as involving his alleged constitutional rights, and to the general public as involving the enforcement of the interstate-commerce law. It is clear that if the witness is justified in his refusal

to answer, the enforcement of that law is virtually impossible, since violations thereof can be proved only by those who would refuse to answer.

The decision is that "the infamy or disgrace to a witness which may result from disclosures made by him are not matters against which the Constitution shields; "that

In practical effect the legislative act throws a greater safeguard around the petitioner than the constitutional provision; that before he testified he could have been charged with a violation of the interstate-commerce law, in which case the amendments only protected him against compulsory self-crimination, but under the legislative act, when he has testified, the law excepts him from its operation, makes that which was before a possible crime a mere matter of indifference and shields him from subsequent prosecution; that the sweeping words of the statute—as broad as human language can make them--afford absolute indemnity to the witness, no crime exists as to him—it is not a pardon, not an act of amnesty-no charge can be made against him, for it is illegal to even prosecute him.

The court further says:

To our mind, the constitutional provision, in words and purpose, is plain. In the Counselman case the witness was protected from the manifestly self-criminating answers which would have disclosed facts upon which a prosecution, to which he was still left exposed, could be based. But owing to the act of 1893 no such consequence can ensue if the present petitioner is made to answer. Such being the case, the constitutional provision does not concern him, and if it does not, the act which compels him to testify is not unconstitutional.

The reasons and authorities given in this opinion for sustaining the constitutionality of the act of 1893, and the intimation contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in the Counselman case, also referred to elsewhere in this report, that Congress could legislate so as to completely protect the witness, within the meaning of the constitutional provision, justify the expectation that the Supreme Court will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Under a contrary decision it would be next to impossible to enforce the penal provisions of the law in cases of such violations as rebates, drawbacks, illegal special rates, and the many other devices contrived to secretly infringe the statute, while, on the other hand, an affirmance of this judgment will of itself largely serve to bring about general observance of published tariff charges. It will also do away altogether with the annoying and reckless pretension of self-incrimination on the part of many unwilling witnesses, which, with utter disregard of truth, has been several times advanced in civil as well as criminal proceedings when it seemed very probable that such witnesses could have had no responsible connection with crime of this description.

DUTY OF CARRIERS TO SHOW THE ENTIRE CHARGE FOR TRANSPORTATION FROM DEPOT TO DEPOT BY SINGLE ITEMS IN THE TARIFF SHEETS.

On this point, and as showing how shippers may be confused by intricate or unintelligible tariff schedues, we quote the following from the opinion of the United States circuit court, northern district of

Illinois, in the case of Keenan v. Receivers of Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company (64 Fed. Rep., 992):

The freight demanded covers the entire service of the carrier from depot to depot. It is in law the compensation not only for the actual carriage, but also for the facilities furnished for loading and unloading, The service is a single one, and the compensation is likewise single. The law will not permit the charge for such single service to be divided. A carrier can not make up its bill of charges in items, one for loading, one for carriage, one for personal service of attendants, one for delivery, etc. The freight is not an aggregate of separate charges, but a single charge. This policy of the law is not because a particular shipper might not deal with the carrier as intelligently in the case of one method as in the other, but because the public is not so likely to deal intelligently with a series of items as with a single freight rate. The shipper may be intelligent or unintelligent, ignorant or educated, accustomed to business or inexperienced in such affairs, deliberate and careful, or hasty and uninquiring.

The service of the carrier is for one as well as the other. A single charge presents to him at once the whole problem. A series of charges might confuse him and leave uncertain what, in the end, the aggregate would be. For illustration, many roads centering in Chicago reach their passenger stations over other lines. Would it be tolerable to permit them to sell tickets from New York or Louisville to Chicago at a single rate and then impose a further terminal charge at this end of the line? Would such practice be made less intolerable by the fact that the company actually carried the passengers on its own line within the corporate limits, thus fulfilling the letter of the contract, or by the fact that the additional terminal charge was posted, along with other rates, in the station of departure? The practical objection is that the public generally knows or ascertains the locality of the company's station within the city of destination, but in few instances consults the posted passenger rates. If the public did consult the posted rates, it would only be confused by any method other than that of a single rate, for travelers do not usually carry pencils and tabs, and the majority would be unable to figure out satisfactorily the results of tabulated statements. The law comes to their rescue by requiring the carrier to name, under a single and definite item, the cost of its entire undertaking, from station to station. Any other rule would expose those who are entitled to the service of the carrier to hardships and injustice that can easily be avoided, and open up opportunities to dishonest or tricky carriers that should not be tolerated.

* * #

TERMINAL CHARGES.

The above cited decision in Keenan v. Receivers of Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company also construes that portion of the sixth section of the act to regulate commerce which refers to terminal charges. The law provides for posting at stations for public inspec tion of

schedules showing the rates and fares and charges for the transportation of passengers and property which any such common carrier has established and which are in force at the time upon its route. The schedules printed as aforesaid by any such common carrier shall plainly state the places upon its railroad between which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain the classification of freight in force, and shall also state separately the terminal charges and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or determine any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates and fares and charges.

The court held that where a railroad company has for years made the stock vards at Chicago its depot for live stock delivery, its pub

lished rate on live stock to Chicago covers delivery at the stock yards, and it can not make an additional terminal charge for such delivery; and that

the duty of the defendant company in this case, therefore, is to carry the live stock offered to it at Kansas City to its station of delivery in Chicago at a single charge without the imposition of other charges under any name or pretext.

It is further held that a terminal charge in addition to the rate from station to station is proper where a further service is required, as when the shipper may not wish his goods delivered at the station, but at some other point in the city, reached perhaps over another railroad's tracks, or by some other method of transportation. The court says:

A terminal charge for this service is proper, both because it is not included in the carrier's undertaking as held out to the public generally and because such additional service to a special shipper without charge would be unfair to his competitors. In such cases the law permits, and the interstate commerce act expressly recog nizes, the right of a terminal charge. The only limitations are that the additional charge be reasonable and that the amount be announced in advance so that the particular shipper wishing the additional service may be advised of the amount of his increased obligation.

The Commission is informed that the Illinois Railroad Commission has also declared the additional or switching charge in relation to live stock at Chicago to be illegal.

During the present year we were led to inquire into this switching or terminal charge upon complaint of a consignee at a place in Ohio of the collection from him of a charge of $1 per car in addition to the tariff rate on live stock shipped from Chicago, and it transpired on investigation that this additional charge arose at Chicago, and was not shown upon the carriers' tariffs either as part of the rate or as a terminal charge. This failure to show the entire transportation cost upon the rate sheets was promptly corrected by the carriers. The question whether the switching charge at Chicago on outgoing shipments could be regarded as a terminal charge which might, through separate notation on tariffs, be legal, was reserved by the Commission until further investigation in connection with a number of similar carriers' charges that are made at Chicago on various classes of goods. We also had occasion to say that the imposition of a switching or terminal charge on live stock when destined to local or noncompetitive points, and the absorption of such charges by the carriers, without increasing the rate, when the stock is shipped to competitive stations, was clearly illegal, and should be immediately discontinued.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF RAILROAD RECEIVERS.

in Clarke v. Central Railroad and Banking Company et al. (66 Fed. Rep., 16), the late Mr. Justice Jackson rendered a decision in regard to alleged misconduct of the receiver of that corporation, wholly exonerating that official from blame; but the court took occasion to say