Acceptance of a Decision of the Railroad Labor Board Makes the Ruling Binding Hoey v. New Orleans Great Northern Railroad Company. (Supreme Court, Louisiana, 105 Southern 310.) This was an action to recover wages based upon a decision of the Railroad Labor Board which the road had accepted. In November, 1920, the plaintiff was discharged from the defendant's employ. The plaintiff contended that this discharge was without hearing and in violation of the national agreement between the defendant and plaintiff's union by which the plaintiff was employed. The plaintiff brought the issue before the United States Railroad Labor Board and in May, 1922, it decided that plaintiff should be reinstated with seniority rights unimpaired and paid for all time lost less any amount he may have earned in other employments since his discharge. The plaintiff brought suit upon this decision declaring himself at all times ready to accept the reinstatement. It appeared that the road had accepted the decision of the Railroad Labor Board by notifying the plaintiff to return to work on August 27, 1922, and that by its vice-president and general manager had written the plaintiff that it was ready to pay the money due for time lost and requested the plaintiff to submit an account of money earned in other employment. The plaintiff did not return to work because of the shop men's strike then being prosecuted by his union and the road thereafter failed to reinstate him or pay the money. As to the right of the plaintiff to refuse to return to work during the strike without forfeiting his rights under the decision of the Railroad Labor Board, the Court said: "Petitioner alleges that, while he was always ready and willing to comply with the decision and return to work, he was unable to do so when he received the foregoing letter, for the reason that he was a member of the Railway Employes' Union, which at the time was on a strike, and that he so advised the defendant company, with reservation of his right to report for service as soon as the strike was settled. We think plaintiff was within his legal rights in refusing to go back to work while his labor organization was engaged in a strike." The Court summarized the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that the decisions of the Railroad Labor Board are not enforceable in courts, but held that where the losing party had accepted the decision and the moral benefits flowing from the fact of its acceptance, it was thereafter bound by its decision. The Court said: "The defendant company had the right to reject or to accept the award of the Labor Board. It elected to accept it. In doing so, it was obviously aware of the pecuniary and other material benefits it would secure from such action. The publication of the board's decision and defendant's refusal to abide thereby was forestalled by its notification to plaintiff of its acquiescence therein. The good will of the public was retained, with the consequent retention, and possible increase, of its business and earnings. Its rejection of the decision would have had the opposite effect. The public would have looked upon the railroad company as a corporation willing to incur and encourage disputes with its employes, rather than as one desirous of cooperating with them in the interest of the public business. Having the ill will of the public, defendant's business would decrease, and its receipts, and consequent earnings, would necessarily diminish. "On the other hand, the plaintiff was, by defendant's notification of its desire to comply with the board's decision, misled, to his detriment, to forego the immediate exercise of his legal right to require and the failure of the defendant company to comply the publication by the Labor Board of its decision therewith. "In these circumstances, we think the defendant ably estopped from contesting, the award of the Labor company has ratified and acquiesced in, and is equit Board." The plaintiff's suit for salary due for time lost was limited by the plaintiff to the date of the notice to report to work so that the possible issue of his right to recover for the time the strike existed and after the strike ended did not arise. The Supreme Court of Louisiana directed the entry of judgment for the plaintiff. The State May Deny an Alien the Right to Fish and a Resident the Right to Employ an Alien to Fish for Him Lubetich v. Pollock. (United States District Court, 6 Federal [2d] 237.) Section 4, chapter 90, Laws 1923 of the State of Washington, declares it unlawful for anyone not a citizen of the United States to fish in its waters ex cept with a hook and line. One Lubetich, a citizen, employed Hronchich, an alien, to fish for him for commercial purposes and sought to restrain the enforce ment of this statute against the alien on the ground that it interfered with the alien's rights to engage in a lawful occupaion, trade, or business, and denied the citizen who employed him freedom of contract, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The injunction was denied and the act upheld on the ground that fish in the waters of the state were by immemorial tradition and decisions of many courts regarded as the property of the state and that in determining who should take its fish and under what conditions, the state merely determined the conditions with which it would part with its own property. The Court said: "Obviously it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws when a lawmaking body, regulating, not its own property, but private business, undertakes to deny to aliens the right to engage in lawful trade or labor; but it is difficult to comprehend how there can be any such violation when the Government, in its capacity of owner and proprietor of property, refuses to allow an alien the right to share therein on equal "We conclude that the statute under review is not unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, so far as Hroncich, the subject of Italy, is concerned; and if he is lawfully denied the right to engage in fishing, palpably Lubetich is not deprived of any constitutional protection by being denied the right to enter into a contract for the performance of labor which would be in violation of the laws of Washington. Let it not be forgotten that the right of Lubetich, a citizen of Washington, to take fish from the waters of that state, is subject to the conditions imposed by the state Legislature, and his freedom of contract cannot be asserted to the point where it infringes upon the right of the state to deal with its own property." Conviction for Solicitation to Commit Malicious Injuries During the Shop Crafts' Strike Reversed for Errors in the Trial of the Case State v. Schleifer. (Supreme Court of Errors, Connecticut, 130 Atlantic 184.) The accused was indicted by the state of Connecticut for the common law crime of solicitation. It appeared that on November 22, 1922, in connection with the shop crafts' strike then in prosecution against the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railway, the accused addressed a meeting of strikers in New Haven, saying: "You will never win the strike with soft methods. You young men ought to go out on the bridge. Don't use eggs, use coal or indelible ink. Break foreman's windows at their homes. Watch the scabs when they come from work, lay for them, especially on pay day. Take them in a dark alley and hit them with a lead pipe. That is the softest thing you can use. Reimburse yourselves for what we have sacrificed for five months. Don't forget to bump off a few now and then, so Mr. Pearson will know that you are not get ting cold feet. You car men know how to take a brake shoe off. Take the brake shoe and put it under something that will put the cars off the irons. A little sand or emery in the journal boxes will help greatly. Don't be satisfied with trimming the engines. Put some of the cars on the bum. Also, if convenient, put something in between the frames and rods of engines on sidings. Get busy young fellows, and trim these scabs. Things are running too smooth on the New Haven Road, but let me hear from you while I am here. Go ahead and rip things and don't let the injunction stop you from trimming these scabs. Don't forget to tie them up with derailments. You boys ought to cut them all up.” After a trial lasting several days the accused was found guilty. He appealed and the conviction was reversed on the ground of errors in the admission of evidence. Letters showing that the accused had preached anarchy were introduced, but without evidence of the meaning which he attached to the word "anarchy." It was held that introduction of letters showing his teaching on this point was error. It was held error to introduce in evidence copy of an order of injunction issued by the federal court against striking employes of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad reciting acts of violence and enjoining the further commission of such acts, where it appeared that the accused was not a party to the proceedings. It was held error to admit testimony as to the evidence of police protection during the strike and the large number of acts committed and conviction of strikers which followed these acts. Certain pamphlets distributed by the defendant relating to the Mooney case were introduced as exhibits to affect the credibility of the accused as a witness in his own defense. Upon addressing the jury the state's attorney referred to these pamphlets and to the Mooney Case and to the fact that the bomb outrage Iwith which that case was involved occurred on Preparedness Day during the assemblage of a great crowd. Holding up the pamphlets, the State's attorneys said: "These things do happen, Sirs." The speech of the accused was made just prior to the large gathering which attended the Yale-Harvard football game in New Haven in 1922. The Court held upon appeal that the statement of the prosecuting attorney implied to the mind of the jury that the accused had intended to incite his hearers to a similar crime upon the vast gathering for the football game, and that his statement was prejudicial and improper. The judgment of conviction was reversed. A Strike Will Not Excuse Failure to Deliver Cars After Acceptance of Order for Cars Without Notice to Shipper of Probable Delay Due to Strike Warner v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company. (Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri, 274 Southwestern 90.) The plaintiff sued the defendant for losses sustained upon cattle shipped by the plaintiff because of delay in furnishing cars and delay in the delivery of cargoes after shipment. The defendant pleaded as excuse the existence of the shop crafts strike at the time the cars were ordered and during the shipment. As to the applicability of the strike as a defense of the failure to furnish cars, the Court said: "The shopmen's strike, pleaded as an excuse for delay in furnishing cars in this case, had been in existence approximately five months at the time plaintiffs ordered the cars. The requests for cars were in writing and accepted by defendant's agent at Phillipsburg. There was some evidence that defendant's superintendent of transportation, Mr. Daggerell, assured plaintiffs, prior to the time of this order, that their orders for stock cars would be taken care of. This was denied by Mr. Daggerell. Plaintiffs knew the strike had been in effect, but were not notified that defendant would be unable to furnish cars on that account. After requesting the cars on October 28th, for November 6, 1922, plaintiffs had their stock ready for shipment at Phillipsburg on that date. The car was not furnished, on the interstate shipment, until November 26th, and for 20 days plaintiffs were compelled to feed and care for said cattle, awaiting the car. During that period, plaintiffs made several inquiries as to the furnishing of the cars. There is no evidence that defendant at any time informed plaintiffs of its inability to furnish the stock cars; the strike had been in existence for a long period of time; new men had been hired in large numbers to take the of timely notice, that the cars would be furnished at the time requested, and were justified in bringing their stock to defendant's station, on that date, for shipment. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the strike defense, granting it to be a good excuse under other conditions, was not available to defendant as to counts 1 and 3." As to the strike as an excuse for delay in shipment, the Court said: "In so far as interstate shipments are concerned, we are of the opinion that a strike of a railroad's employes, which is set up as an excuse for delay under a stipulation in a shipper's contract exempting the railroad from liability on account of delay in transporting, is not, as a matter of law, negligence attributable to railroad company, and that such stipulation, if made in good faith, is a valid one. The railroad company is bound, however, to exercise diligence to overcome the effect of the strike, and may be liable for negligence in that respect. "On this phase of the case, not to unduly prolong this opinion, it is sufficient to state that defendant produced evidence tending to prove the strike was unavoidable and that it endeavored to overcome the effect of the strike by hiring new men and attempting to induce the old employes to return and in other ways. Plaintiffs' evidence contradicted this, and tended to show the strike was brought about by defendant's efforts to reduce wages, and that defendant could have overcome the effect of the strike by settlement, but would not deal with the strikers, as such, on any basis. The question was one for the jury on places of strikers, and live stock was being shipped the second count of plaintiffs' petition and the trial to a greater extent than in the year 1921. The fact that plaintiffs knew of the existence of the strike would be no notice as to defendant's inability to furnish cars; they had a right to assume, in the absence court erred in giving the peremptory instruction as to the second count." The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed. Damages May Not Be Recovered for Failure to Give a Service Letter as Required Unless It Is Proved that Such Failure Is the Cause of Inability to Secure Employment Soule v. St. Joseph Railway, Light, Heat & Power Company. (Kansas City Court of Appeals, 274 Southwestern 517.) The laws of Missouri require that when an employe of any corporation quits or is discharged it shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager upon the request of the employe to issue a service letter "setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employe to such corporation and the duration thereof truly stating for what cause if any such employe has quit such service." The dedendant discharged the plaintiff and gave him a letter, the body of which merely stated, "The bearer of this letter, Mr. Harry A. Soule, whose signature appears below, worked for this company as motorman from July 15, 1918, to September 12, 1921." The plaintiff sued, alleging that because of defendant's refusal to give plaintiff the service letter required by the statute he had been unable to secure other employment and that he earned from $145.00 to $150.00 a month in the defendant's employ. Upon trial of the case to a jury, the plaintiff secured a verdict in the sum of $300.00 upon which judgment entered and the defendant appealed. Evidence was offered by the defendant to show that if the service letter stated the cause of the plaintiff's discharge as required by statute, it would have stated that his record as an employe was unsatisfactory. This evidence was refused on the ground that it was immaterial, since in no event could the employer's failure to give the service letter as required by the statute be excused. Reversing the judgment, however, the Court upon appeal said: "There is no testimony tending to show that the failure to give the statutory letter had anything to do with the failure of plaintiff to obtain employment. It is true that he exhibited the letter given him to persons who did not employ him, but the record fails to disclose any evidence that any such persons refused to employ him on account of the fact that the letter did not show that he left defendant's employment under circumstances that showed no dereliction of duty on his part. To say that he was refused employment because he was not given the letter from defendant to which he was entitled would be indulging in mere speculation, and a verdict based on specu lation cannot stand." PUBLICATIONS OF THE LEAGUE History of League for Industrial Rights In the Industrial Relations Series 1. The Open Shop and Industrial Liberty-An analysis of the spirit of liberty in the 2. Mr. Gompers under Cross-Examination-Excerpts from Mr. Gompers' testimony 3. The Struggle for Industrial Liberty-An outline of the development of law pro- Social Control of Industrial Warfare-An argument in support of the proposed laws of Two Proposed Statutes of the League—and supporting memorandum. The Open Shop-A debate between Andrew Furuseth, president of the International Seamen's Union, and Walter Gordon Merritt, associate counsel of the League. Factory Solidarity or Class Solidarity-An apt and careful analysis of intra-factory organizations in comparison with the old type of unions. Evils and Remedies in the Building Trades—A review of the malpractices of trades unions in the organized building trades. DISCUSSION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS Amid the rapidly shifting scenes of industrial and social life of today, uniformity of ideas is neither to be desired nor expected, and the cause of truth will be best served by placing before men of industry any important discussion of industrial relations. It is in this spirit that our association intends to publish information under this title, without advocacy of the ideas therein contained. Credit Unions Legalized in Twenty-four States M. Desjardins, in 1900, organized La Caisse Populaire in Levis, Province of Quebec, Canada. He modeled it after the original Raiffeisen rural banks and the Schulze-Delitzsch system used by workers in the cities of Germany. Nine years later Messers E. A. Filene and Pierre Jay established by legislation a similar institution in Massachusetts known as a Credit Union. Since that time twenty-four states have legalized the establishment of such unions. Credit unions, one or more, are operating under corporate charters in twenty states. In most states there are only a few, and those are in the experimental stage. In four states they have been organized a little over a month, in accordance with newly enacted laws in those states. The purpose of a Credit Union is threefold; (1) To promote thrift among members of a group, (2) To create credit for them at legitimate rates of interest, and (3) To educate them in matters having to do with the management and control of money. The groups may be rural or urban, comprising farmers, factory workers, clerks, railroaders, women's clubs, fraternal orders, etc. How Funds Are Accumulated Funds are accumulated by the sale of shares, generally at $5.00 par. A credit union aims to help those who are least able to save, and for that reason permits of payments in weekly or monthly installments, as low as ten and twenty-five cents. Stress is put more upon regularity of payment than upon the amount paid. Additional funds are secured by the deposits, likewise very small, of members of the union. The success of a credit union depends largely upon the habit of saving which it creates among its members. Loans Money thus accumulated is used in making provident loans to members exclusively. The Credit Union National Extension Bureau found instances in which working people were struggling to keep even with the excessive usury charged by loan sharks into whose clutches they had fallen. In states where the legal rate on small loans is 36 and 42 per cent by subterfuges the loan sharks were exacting 180 and even, in one case, 240 per cent interest. A credit union is able to make loans at bank rates. The loans are repayable on a weekly basis, and are generally short-term loans. No officer of a credit union may borrow or, without special permission of the loan committee, even endorse for a borrower. Each member of a union has one vote, regardless of the number of shares he may hold or the deposits to his credits. Membership is restricted to shareholders, but is open to any person whose work or place of residence makes him a natural member of a group having related or common interests. A new member owning but one share is required to subscribe to a proportional part of a loan granted him in shares, which he pays for as he repays the loan. Preference is given to small loans; and a statement of the purpose of the loan must be set forth in the application for it. A man's character and standing in the union are first considerations in granting a loan. One of the underlying purposes of a credit union is to afford relief from financial worry which dissipates man's energy. To that end the probable effect upon the borrower bears more weight than the strength of the security he may offer. Types of Loans Rural credit unions aid farmers in purchasing necessary stock, implements, fertilizer, seeds, etc., and in profiting by cooperative buying. The Lowe's Grove, (N. C.) credit union in six years saved $30,000 on $250,000 worth of supplies which it bought for its members. Urban credit unions make remedial loans arising |