We now need to increase the Militia, to provide it with field artillery, and to create a divisional organisation as thoroughly efficient as that of the national army of Switzerland. Assuming the required strength of our second line to be 250,000 with 80,000 Reserves to be gradually formed, the drain entailed upon our great population would be trivial. If, by confining the Volunteer force to the large towns which alone provide suitable material for such a body, we could cut down its numbers to about 100,000 and transfer the balance to the Militia, our military strength would be immensely increased without raising an additional man. Some Volunteer battalions could doubtless be converted into Militia at once by their own consent, and the mere knowledge that the Militia establishment would be maintained, if necessary, by the ballot might suffice to secure the requisite quota.

Since the application of the existing ballot law was discussed in the January number of this Review, there have been widespread manifestations of a total misunderstanding of the whole subject. The Militia ballot has been ignorantly or purposely confused with conscription, and moving pictures have been drawn of the sufferings entailed upon British families by forcibly withdrawing the sons, imprisoning them in barracks, and deporting them to distant stations. If one tithe of what M. Urbain Gohier and others have written is literally true, we can well understand the dread which conscription may excite in France. Even in Germany the ruthless severance of the sons from their families for a period of two or more years, and the iron discipline of the barracks may be bitterly resented, although there is no evidence of any general sentiment of dislike. Among the voiceless masses of Russia, upon whom, owing to long service and the vast distances over which troops are dispersed, compulsion falls with exceptional severity, a dread of conscription is evidently natural. Between conscription in the continental sense and the application of the Militia ballot in this country there is no real analogy. We already maintain 105,000 Militiamen without the aid of the ballot. This number could easily be increased, and the physical standard raised, by ceasing to neglect the force, and by a small addition of pay. On the assumption of an establishment of 250,000, an annual contingent of 22,000 completed if necessary by the ballot would be the very outside requirement. This moderate number of men voluntarily enlisted or chosen by lot from all ranks of the people would then, during five years' service, secure a compulsory annual holiday at the expense of the country. They would not be imprisoned in barracks. They would learn habits of discipline and of order, which would increase

I regard this as a minimum figure. The annual cost of this force would not exceed 2,000,000l. Taking into consideration the present Militia charges and the reduction of those of the Volunteers, the actual increase to the estimates would be under 1,000,0001.

their value in the labour market. Over them would, of course, hang the liability to serve in any part of the empire during a great war; but such wars are not of annual occurrence, and in the general disturbance which a great contest would entail the embodiment of 330,000 men-if it proved necessary-would be of relatively small account. It is surely unjust to represent the application of the Militia ballot as an arbitrary and oppressive measure which would revolutionise the economic conditions of Great Britain.

While politicians have, for the most part, scorned the idea of the ballot, or misrepresented its scope and its effect, there has been no evidence that the working classes regard the proposal with any misgiving, or that, if the matter were properly explained to them in its essentially democratic light, they would not readily accept the small sacrifice which the security of the empire demands. In a remarkable letter to the Times, 10 Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb, who have earned the right to speak for the people, after calling attention to the well-known abuses of the ballot at the beginning of the century, go on to state:

From our knowledge of working-class opinions, we venture to suggest that no scheme involving the compulsory service in barracks for one or more years continuously of the whole adult male population arriving at the age of 18-21, or any compulsorily raised section of it would be tolerated by the working-class electorate.

This is, of course, conscription, which is alike unnecessary, undesirable, and impossible in this country." Mr. and Mrs. Webb, however, add significantly:

But this does not mean that compulsory military training would necessarily be objected to.

The practical question is, therefore, whether a small section of the working classes would accept a compulsory annual holiday, to be devoted to military training. If, as I believe, complete acquiescence would be obtained by proper explanations, and by a guarantee that the ballot, if necessary, would be enforced without respect of persons, our problem of military defence can be solved.

The following is a brief summary of the forces of the empire, and of the several duties which they ought to be rendered capable of performing in war:

(1) The Royal Navy.--To hold and maintain the sea communications of the Empire. This can be done only by offensive

10 Published the 22nd of February 1900.

" In the debate of the 12th of March, one of the military members is reported to have made the following amazing statement: 'As to compulsory service, he agreed that the present was not the time to propose it; but it would be necessary should we ever find ourselves at war with a great Power.' The idea that compulsory service,' with all the changes it would entail, must wait till we are actually engaged in a great war needs no comment.

cases.

action, by observing and bringing to action, if possible, an enemy's squadron, by hunting down his commerce-destroyers if they go to sea, and by providing convoys to British merchant vessels in certain If the Navy is not enabled to perform the duty of keeping our sea communications generally intact, the Empire cannot be defended or held together. If that duty is performed, over-sea invasion of the Queen's dominions is impossible, and it remains only to provide adequate local defence against 'small raids.' 12 In addition it should be the duty of the Admiralty to provide, by extending the organisation of the Royal Marines, the necessary garrisons of the small naval stations abroad, leaving to the Army such places of arms as Malta, Gibraltar, and South Africa. Finally submarine mines, in the few cases in which these questionable adjuncts are suitable to the needs of the British Empire, should be provided and maintained by the Navy.

(2) The Regular Army.-To provide and maintain the normal garrisons of India, Egypt, and certain stations abroad. To hold at least 40,000 men in this country in full readiness to reinforce India or any portion of the Empire, to attack an enemy's outlying positions at the outset of a great war, or to carry on a small campaign. To be able to mobilise six additional infantry divisions and three cavalry brigades within a week for service in any portion of the Empire as the requirements of a great war might dictate. To maintain the requisite machinery for supplying the losses of the troops in the field. To provide the permanent nucleus of garrison artillery for the defence of the home ports.

(3) The Militia.-To provide eighteen fully organised divisions available for any service during a great war, capable of being mobilised in a fortnight, in whole or in part, and to form a second line to the regular Army, or to furnish field troops for home defence. To supply garrisons to the home ports in the absence of regular troops. To fill up the garrison artillery at the home ports to fighting strength during a great war.

(4) The Yeomanry.-To be converted, as is now contemplated, into mounted infantry, and to be trained in reconnaissance work for home defence only. To perform mounted duties at the home ports in the absence of regular cavalry, and to supply mounted men to mobile forces formed during a great war to repel 'small raids' upon our coast line.

(5) The Volunteers.-To be regarded as a purely home defence force, to assist in garrisoning defended ports, and in forming mobile columns to repel raids on undefended portions of the coast line.

12 Mr. Wyndham in the House of Commons, the 12th of February 1900.

(6) Colonial Forces.-To provide the small bodies required for local defence, and in addition to hold in readiness field forces of agreed strength to serve, if the need arose, in any portion of the Empire during a great war. The Imperial as distinguished from the purely sedentary local troops to be closely affiliated to the regular Army, and occasionally, as Mr. Chamberlain has proposed, to exchange stations with it. The repatriation of the 100th Royal Canadian Regiment, which has been the subject of a petition signed by all classes in the Dominion, would be an admirable first step towards the affiliation of the regular Army with the Colonial Forces which have so greatly distinguished themselves in South Africa. The present Colonial Defence Committee to be strengthened by the addition of the Agents General, and to be entrusted with full responsibility for advice and for maintaining harmony of objects and uniformity of ideals. Larger questions to be discussed by a Council of Imperial Defence, meeting every five years.

The above rough sketch supplies, at least, a basis for framing organisation which would alike render our empire safe from aggression, and provide us with a formidable force for counter-attack. To fix the requirements of the empire, and to lay down the duties of the forces which are intended to fulfil them, is the necessary first step in the direction of true national defence. Our persistent habit has been to wrangle over portions of the subject, to pander to the claims of individual forces, and to seek for arguments to defend useless expenditure. We have now to go back to the bed-rock of principles, and to make our armed forces suit our national requirements.

The present war has furnished a great object lesson, and already there are signs that it will be widely misread. Faced only by two small Republics the vast resources of the empire have at length begun to tell heavily at the seat of war. This was inevitable; but the long period of national humiliation, and the weakness of our opponents, which gave time to restore the situation, are in danger of being forgotten. The revelation of the potentialities of the empirepotentialities fully realised by all careful students of imperial conditions are only too likely to engender a fatal complacency. There is thus urgent need for words of grave warning. The greatest lesson of the South African campaign is that the present condition and organisation of our military forces are neither adequate nor adapted to the requirements of the great war in which we may at any time be involved.

G. S. CLARKE,

THE INSUFFICIENT PROPOSALS OF

THE WAR OFFICE

LORD ROSEBERY has been described as a pessimist, and has been charged with exaggeration, because he has declared that the condition in which the country stands is alarming and that the attitude of foreign nations towards the Empire constitutes a serious danger. There is, however, a great difference between panic and alarm; panic is of no use under any circumstances, but alarm and the consciousness of danger are often the necessary prelude to effective action. Nor is the refusal to look real dangers in the face a mark of courage. No doubt the original observer who first witnessed the ostrich bury its head in the sand on the approach of danger hastened to communicate the fact to the literary and scientific world not as an example of the bravery of the ostrich but rather of its want of wisdom. So also it may be said of nations, that to shut their eyes and refuse to see what is before them is not a proof of valour, but rather an indication of folly. For beyond question the situation in which the country at present stands is a grave one, and, unluckily, official assurances as to the goodwill and friendly feeling of foreign Governments towards this country are not of much more value now than they have been at any previous time. It is probably true to say that such assurances could have been given, and usually have been given with equally good faith, during the three weeks previous to the commencement of any great war. All the world knows that in 1870 Lord Granville, from his exalted post of observation as Foreign Minister, surveyed the political firmament and reported that there was not a cloud in the European sky. All the world knows also, that a fortnight after this important ministerial pronouncement war was declared between France and Germany. There seems no evidence that Ministers have lost their love of saying smooth things, and of crying 'Peace, peace,' where there is no peace. When a Cabinet Minister, especially if he be a member of the Council of Defence, tells an anxious public that 'all's well,' it is correct and courteous to receive the assurance with the respect due to any words coming from so distinguished a source. But it would be a very grave mistake if the people of this country were to attach the slightest importance to the statement as a guide to their actions, or