such contract. But, for the reason already given, the statute does not apply. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Earl, Peckham, and Gray, JJ., who dissent on first ground. Passenger may place Money in Trunk without_communicating Fact to Carrier. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. York, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 623. PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. V. POLLOCK. (Texas Supreme Court.) Passengers' Baggage Sleeping-Car- Liability of Car Company. While a sleeping-car company does not assume towards personal baggage taken into a car by a passenger the duties and liabilities which the common law imposes upon common carriers as to ordinary freight, or upon an innkeeper as to guests, it is responsible in the same way as any common carrier for a failure to perform the duties which devolve upon a common carrier in relation to baggage of a passenger which is not given into its exclusive custody; and if, through a failure of the company to exercise reasonable care, the passenger's baggage is stolen, the company is liable therefor, even though the train to which the car is attached belongs to another company. APPEAL from District Court, Marion County. Burry, Scott, & Fones and Todd & Rowell for appellant. Facts. STAYTON, J. This action was brought by the appellee to recover the value of a valise and its contents, consisting of such articles as persons travelling need and usually carry with them. The cause was tried without a jury, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The facts are undisputed, and are, in substance, as follows: At Marshall the appellee engaged and paid for a berth in the sleeping-car of the appellant, attached to a train on the Texas & Pacific Railway, his destination being Dallas. He entered the sleeper, carrying his valise, which he placed on the floor of the smoking-room. When the train arrived at Terrell, about night, it was ascertained that a wreck between that place and Dallas would cause some delay, and the train backed down to the depot and stopped. Pollock then went to the telegraph-office to ascertain how long car. the train would be delayed, leaving the porter and conductor of the Pullman car in the sleeper. After remaining at the telegraphoffice a short time, he returned, and, on entering the car, found that his valise was missing, and that the porter was not in the He, however, found the conductor in the rear end of the sleeper, to whom he made known his loss; whereupon the conductor informed him that he was then on his first trip as conductor, and not familiar with the details of his duties. The loss occurred on the 27th of October, 1886, and the train reached Terrell about six or seven o'clock P.M. The doors of the sleeper were open when appellee returned to it after going to the telegraph-office. The evidence tends to show that the porter knew that the appellee deposited his valise on the floor of the smoking-room of the sleeper. Liability of sleeping-car company for baggage. The conclusions of the law and fact found by the judge who tried the cause seem not to have been asked, or, at least, are not found in the transcript. There is no evidence tending to show the true relations between the railway company and the appellant, or tending to show the true relations of the appellant to persons who, after having acquired the right to be transported and to occupy a berth in its sleeper, entered it with their baggage, further than as this may appear from the statement already made. Enough, however, appears, to show that the appellant assumed to the appellee the duties of a carrier; and while it is evidently true that it did not assume the duties and liabilities which the common law imposes upon common carriers as to ordinary freight, or the liabilities which the innkeeper assumes to guests, yet we see no reason why it should not be held responsible, just as any common carrier would be held responsible, for a failure to perform the duties which devolve upon the common carrier in relation to the baggage of a passenger which is not given into the carrier's exclusive custody. In The true rule in this class of cases we believe to be that asserted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Lewis v. Sleeping-Car Co., 28 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 150. that case it is said, "that, while it is not liable as a common carrier or as an innholder, yet it is its clear duty to use reasonable care to guard the passengers from theft; and if, through want of such care, the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen, the company is liable therefor. Such a rule is required by public policy and by the true intent of both the passenger and the company, and the decided weight of authority supports it. Sleeping-Car Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474; Palace Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. 78; Palace Car Co. v. Gaylord, 23 Amer. Law Reg. 788." The facts that a railway company to whose train a sleepingcar may be attached may not own such car or control its internal management, and that the same may be under the control of a company who does own and operate such car, and that the main compensation for transportation may be paid to the company to whose train the sleeper is attached, do not deprive the company so owning and operating a sleeping-car of the character of a passenger carrier; for the contract of such a company is not only that the passenger may sit and sleep in the car during the journey for which he contracts, but it goes farther, and binds the owner of such car to transport the passenger in it or some like carriage to his place of destination, the passenger having paid the fare demanded by both companies. If passengers by railway train retain the exclusive custody of their baggage, then the carrier is not responsible for its loss, unless this results from the carrier's negligence; and the failure of a passenger to use reasonable care in reference to it will defeat his right to recover. In the case before us, the court below, in the absence of conclusions of fact and law showing to the contrary, must be presumed to have decided this case in accordance with the rules we have announced. This involved a finding of fact that the valise was lost by reason of the failure of appellant to use such care as the law requires, and without failure on the part of the appellee to use that care required of him. Under the evidence we are not prepared to hold that such a finding of fact was not authorized, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered. Liability of Sleeping-Car Company for Loss of Passengers' Baggage. — See Lewis v. New York Sleeping-Car Co., 28 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 148; Dargan v. Pullman P. Car Co., and note, 26 Ib. 149-153. KANSAS CITY, ST. JOSEPH, & COUNCIL BLUFFS R. Co. V. RUDEBAUGH. (Kansas Supreme Court.) Passengers' Baggage - Limiting Liability - Stipulation on Ticket.-A limitation inserted in a railroad ticket, limiting the liability of the company to $100 in case of loss of baggage checked by virtue of the purchase of said ticket, is not binding on the purchaser of the ticket, unless, with a knowledge of such limitation, he agrees to it. ERROR to District Court, Atchison County. Action by the defendant in error, before a justice of the peace in Atchison County, to recover the value of a trunk and its contents. Trial, and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the District Court of Atchison County. court, and judgment thereon in favor of the plaintiff, defendant in error, for $211.25 and costs. Defendant brings error. The opinion states the facts. Trial by the E. S. Gosney and Jackson & Royse for plaintiff in error. CLOGSTON, C. Facts. This action was brought to recover the value of a trunk and its contents, which plaintiff in error received as baggage to be transported over its road and connecting lines to Mitchell, Dakota Territory. The findings of fact by the court show the following: That on the twenty-eighth day of August, 1884, plaintiff, defendant in error, desiring to go from Atchison to Mitchell, Dakota Territory, applied to the defendant at Atchison for a ticket from Atchison to Mitchell, and was by the agent informed of the price of a ticket or fare between said points, which amount the plaintiff paid, and was given a ticket. The ticket received by the plaintiff was what is called a "skeleton ticket," with coupons attached, giving the names of the different roads over which plaintiff would travel in going from såid Atchison to said Mitchell. At the time of receiving said ticket the agent made no statement of the contents of the ticket to the plaintiff, and she made no examination of the ticket. The heading of the ticket contained these words: "Special limited ticket. Good for one continuous first-class passage, when (-) stamped by the company's agent, subject to the following contract: In selling this ticket for passage over other roads, this company acts only as agent, and assumes no responsibility beyond its own line. None of the companies. represented in this ticket will assume any liability on baggage except for wearing apparel, and then only for a sum not exceeding $100." Below this printed matter was left a blank space for the signature of the purchaser, and also for a witness. Plaintiff was not required to and did not sign said ticket, and it was not witnessed or signed by any one. No reduction of fare was made by reason of the stipulation contained in the ticket. This ticket was for a passage, first, over the defendant's road from Atchison to Council Bluffs; from Council Bluffs, over the Chicago & North-western Railway and the Sioux City & Pacific Railroad, to Sioux City; from Sioux City, over the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul Railway, to Mitchell, Dakota. After receiving this ticket, the plaintiff presented it to the baggage agent at the union depot at Atchison, and with it her trunk, containing the usual wearing apparel of the plaintiff, and requested that the same be checked, which was done, and she received a check for the transportation of said trunk from Atchison to Mitchell over the lines named in said ticket. Plaintiff boarded the defendant's train at Atchison, and defendant took charge of and placed said baggage upon the train, and the same was transported to Council Bluffs. When it arrived there, the trunk was, by the defendant's agent in charge of the train, assisted by the employees of the union depot at Council Bluffs, unloaded from the baggage-car, and placed upon a truck for the purpose of being transported into the depot. The defendant had also received as baggage, somewhere between Atchison and Council Bluffs, a box containing three jugs. of sulphuric acid. The top of this box was covered with a cloth only. In unloading the baggage, this box was placed on the top of the truck containing the trunk of the plaintiff, and in this condition the truck was rolled into the baggage-room of the union depot by the employees of said depot; and, in removing the baggage from the truck, they first attempted to remove the box containing the sulphuric acid, and the contents of one of the jugs was spilled, and run over the baggage and the trunk of the plaintiff, the acid escaping by reason of the cork having been eaten up or destroyed by the acid, and the trunk and its contents were saturated by the acid, and all of its contents destroyed and burned up, save and except two or three articles. Plaintiff, on arriving at her destination, presented her check, and was informed that her trunk had not arrived; whereupon she went to a hotel and remained nine days, at an expense of $11.25, waiting for her trunk to arrive. Finding that it did not come, she returned to Council Bluffs, and there learned of the destruction of the baggage, and the articles saved therefrom were turned over to her. Afterwards she returned to Atchison, and commenced this. action for the value of the trunk and its contents. The first objection to this judgment is, that the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant; contending that, as this action was brought under sect. 50, Code Civil Proc., it (the defendant) did not come within the provisions of said section, under the facts shown in this case. The evidence shows, and the court found, that the defendant run its train over its Objection to jurisdiction. main line in Missouri, and at Atchison crossed the Waiver. bridge owned by the bridge company to the union depot over the tracks owned by the Union Depot Company, which company was composed of seven railroad companies, among which was the defendant. Defendant backed its train over the bridge to the union depot, where it received baggage and passengers for transportation over its line. No evidence was shown |