Section 7.

OPERATIONS ON SHORE;

LANDING A BATTALION;

ATTACK OF A POSITION; BIVOUAC. DISEMBARKING TROOPS BEFORE AN ENEMY.

OPERATIONS ON SHORE.

On the Employment of Small-arm Men, when Landed for Service.

Although there are a vast number of manœuvres laid down in the Field Exercise for the Army it is notorious that but very few, and those simple ones, are used in real warfare. It should be remembered that 'drill in the army is as much a mode of securing discipline as a preparation for war.' As this is not the case with seamen, it is obvious that they need only practise those movements which are required on actual service; and it cannot be too often repeated that they are very few, and very simple. A knowledge of a great many details of drill by no means implies a power of applying them. No officer is fit to command even the smallest body of men whose aptitude for war is determined by the strength of his memory alone. It is incontestible that the grave dislike and distrust with which the practice of Infantry manœuvres has ever been received by Naval officers has been due to the unpractical shape in which they have generally been presented to them. Common sense revolts from the tedious study of mere 'parade' and 'barrack square' formations, which it is foreseen are of no practical value in the field. While the present practice is derisively termed and to a great extent rightly-mere playing at soldiers, it should be remembered that the English sailor possesses when rightly trained, qualities in the very highest degree valuable for the warfare of the present day; his activity, intelligence, independence, self-reliance, and above all, his almost daily habit of facing danger of some sort, are of the very first importance, and with careful instruction will go far to make him the beau-ideal of a fighting man.

Train him, then, so as to develop these qualities to the utmost, and do not make the grave mistake of trying to drill into him what may be considered the only faults of our soldiers :-a too great stiffness, precision, and regularity of movement. How much of the little time which can be spared to this subject is devoted to an

attempt to imitate the wall-like regularity of the British Line— destroying the very essence of a blue jacket-while the elements of fighting remain uncared for and unknown.

To deny the utility of this training for seamen is to ignore the great importance of the tactics which were so signally successful under Lord Dundonald, and the power which a fleet has, with its numerous steam launches, of harassing an enemy's coast, cutting his communications, destroying his depôts, and keeping his coast garrisons in a constant state of alarm. Some of the finest feats in the last war were performed by French sailors, both as Infantry and Artillery: witness the recapture of Le Bourget and the defence of the Paris forts. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, no mean authority, says on this point; "Though I above all things hold to our proper role of 66 seamen, I have not the less constantly protested against the "opinions of those who despise our landing parties. It would be, "indeed, lamentable if the 5000 to 6000 picked men of a fleet were "not always capable of executing a simple reconnaissance, coup-de“main, or short expedition.”

But to be able to do this we must give up "playing at soldiers" and "turn to " in real earnest. When relieved from the tedious mass of details which at present encumber it, the study of the minor operations of war is as interesting as it is important.

Movements in the Field.-With regard, then, to manoeuvres, we may say that the power of skirmishing in a thoroughly efficient manner is of the first importance: in former days the way was prepared by the skirmishers, while the real attack was delivered by the line; now the skirmishers do the main work themselves, and afterwards secure it by the final charge. The success of skirmishing depends almost entirely upon the skill with which the sectional commanders handle their men, and all officers should be thoroughly acquainted with their work in this respect. A company which can wheel, or form fours, to either flank, and form to the front and rear, in addition to skirmishing, may be said to be thoroughly efficient for all practical purposes. In Battalion Drill we may dismiss at once all mere parade movements; Naval Officers have far too much to learn now adays, to burden their memories with these cumbrous and useless

details. For the remainder, Secs. 4; 7; 3 of 10 and 11; 1 of 13; 14; 17; 18; 19; 22; 1 of 25; 2 of 26; 1 of 29; with the skirmishing, contain all that is necessary.

Detailed arrangements for Landing a Battalion of Six Companies (50 Men in each) and 4 Guns for Six Days.

We will now proceed to give a brief idea, first, of the organisation of a battalion for landing, with a few precautions to be observed in conducting the march; and secondly, of the manœuvres which will be required, and the mode of applying them. It should be remembered that the same skill is required, whether dealing with 100 or 10,000 men; and that an action, however small, can only be brought to a successful issue without undue loss of life by acting in accordance with recognised and approved methods.

The above force has been selected as one which could be easily furnished by a squadron of 3 or 4 ships, and the length of time specified allows for a march inland of about two days for the purpose required.

The subjoined strength is that authorized by the Gunnery Manual, 1873, but it should be remarked that the number of spare ammunition-men and stretcher-men is probably double what would be actually required. The spare men could be employed in the transport of baggage and supplies.