Opinion of the Court. private individuals of the State of Alabama, as well as between citizens of said State and citizens of other States, was reversed. But it was said, in the course of the discussion in that case, that "it is urged that a portion of the telegraph company's business is internal to the State of Alabama, and therefore taxable by the State. But that fact does not remove the difficulty. This tax affects the whole business. without discrimination. There are sufficient modes in which the internal business, if not already taxed in some other way, may be subjected to taxation, without the imposition of a tax which covers the entire operations of the company.' In Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, in error to the Supreme Court of Texas, it was held that, in respect to its foreign and interstate business, a telegraph company is, as an instrument of commerce, subject to the regulating power of Congress, and, if it accepts the provisions of act of the July 24, 1866, (Revised Statutes, §§ 5263, 5268,) it becomes an agent of the United States, so far as the business of the government is concerned; and that the state laws, so far as they impose upon such company a specific tax on each message which it transmits beyond the State, or which an officer of the United States sends over its lines on public business, are unconstitutional; but it was said that "any tax which the State may put on messages by private parties, and not by agents of the United States, from one place to another exclusively within its own jurisdiction, will not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States." The case, in Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 127 U. S. 411, was one where the telegraph company, a corporation of the State of New York, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, against Ratterman, treasurer of Hamilton County, Ohio, seeking to restrain the collection of a tax on the gross receipts of the company, which were principally, but not wholly, derived from business between points within and points without the State of Ohio. The complainant, in its bill, expressed its willingness to pay and offered to pay taxes chargeable against its property and business within the State, but alleged that Opinion of the Court. the defendant refused to accept such partial payment, and demanded payment for the total assessment on all the gross receipts. The District and Circuit Judges certified a division of opinion to this court, as to whether a single tax upon the receipts of a telegraph company, which receipts were derived partly from interstate commerce and partly from commerce within the State, but which were returned and assessed in gross and without separation or apportionment, was wholly invalid, or invalid only in proportion and to the extent that said receipts were derived from interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the unanimous opinion of this court. The case of The State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, was cited as ruling that where the subjects of taxation can be separated so that that which arises from interstate commerce can be distinguished from that which arises from commerce wholly within the State, the court will act upon this distinction, and will restrain the tax on interstate commerce while permitting the State to collect that arising upon commerce wholly within its own territory. Accordingly the decree of the court below, following the opinion of the circuit judge, enjoining the collection of the taxes on that portion of the receipts derived from interstate commerce, and permitting the treasurer to collect the other tax upon property of the company and upon receipts derived from commerce entirely within the limits of the State, was affirmed. The question arose, and was determined in the same way, in the case of West. Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472. It there appeared that a statute of Alabama imposed a tax "on the gross amount of the receipts by any and every telegraph company derived from the business done by it in this State." The Western Union Telegraph Company reported to the board of assessors only its gross receipts received from business wholly transacted within the State. The board required of the company a further return of its gross receipts from messages carried partly within and partly without the State. The company made such further return, and the tax was imposed on the gross receipts as shown by the two returns. This mode of assessment was sustained by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Opinion of the Court. but this court held that the statute of Alabama, thus construed, was a regulation of commerce, and that the tax imposed upon the messages comprised in the second return was unconstitutional. In the discussion of the case, Mr. Justice Miller expressed himself as follows: "The principle is, in regard to telegraph companies which have accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, (Rev. Stat. § 5263 to § 5268,) that they shall not be taxed by the authorities of a State for any messages, or receipts arising from messages, from points within the State to points without, or from points without the State to points within, but that such taxes may be levied upon all messages carried and delivered exclusively within the State. The foundation of this principle is that messages of the former class are elements of commerce between the States and not subject to legislative control of the States, while the latter class are elements of internal commerce solely within the limits and jurisdiction of the State, and, therefore, subject to its taxing power." See, likewise, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. The reasoning of these cases needs no reinforcement, and their conclusions are readily applied to the case in hand. The express terms of the ordinance restrict the tax to "business done exclusively within the city of Charleston, and not including any business done to or from points without the State, and not including any business done for the government of the United States, its officers or agents." It is claimed that the Postal Telegraph Cable Company is not within the terms of this ordinance, because it does not do any business exclusively within the city of Charleston; that its city offices are merely initial points for sending and receiving messages, and that, irrespective of the messages sent or received outside of the State, the interstate messages are not between points within the city; and that, if license exactions were allowed to and made by the various cities in the State, great injury and wrong would be done to the telegraph company. But this is a hardship, if such exists, that it is not within our province to redress. If business done wholly within a State is Opinion of the Court. within the taxing power of the State, the courts of the United States cannot review or correct the action of the State in the exercise of that power. It is further contended that the ruling of the cited cases does not cover the case of a telegraph company which has constructed its lines along the post roads in the city of Charleston, and elsewhere, and which is exercising its functions under the act of Congress as an agency of the government of the United States. It is obvious that the advantages or privileges that are conferred upon the company by the act of July 24, 1866, (Rev. Stat. §§ 5263–5268,) are in the line of authority to construct and maintain its lines as a means or instrument of interstate commerce, and are not necessarily inconsistent with a right on the part of the State in which business is done and property acquired to tax the same, within the limitations pointed out in the cases heretofore cited. It was upon the doctrine of these cases that the court below acted in refusing the injunction and dismissing the bill, and its decree is, therefore, Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BROWN and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissented. INDEX. ADMIRALTY. 1. A steamship entering or leaving the port of New York in a fog through which vessels cannot be seen when distant more than a quarter of a 2. It is the duty of a steamship, hearing a blast from a fog-horn on its 3. It is within the discretion of the court below to refuse to find a fact 4. The requirement in article 12 of the International rules and regula- |