215 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19; Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, distinguished. As to the form of proceeding by which a violation of § 4 is to be prosecuted, it is enough to say that § 5440 looks solely to the nature of the act which the conspiracy contemplates, and not to the nature of the remedy given for that act. It is enough that the object of the conspiracy is an act criminal in its own quality. United States v. Chouteau, 102 U. S. 603. The operation of § 5440 does not depend upon the amount or extent of punishment imposed for the "offense against the United States." Death, imprisonment, fine, forfeiture—each suffices, if the wrongful act is public in nature and therefore a crime. Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590. For cases of conspiracy under § 5440 to commit offenses under the statutes regulating railroads, where only a money penalty attached to the offense, see Thomas v. United States, 156 Fed. Rep. 897; United States v. Clark, 164 Fed. Rep. 75; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, 587; Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 448. Assisting or encouraging the importation or migration of alien contract laborers is naturally and usually a course of action rather than a single act, and is therefore closely analogous to engaging in a business or occupation, which may be averred generally without details. In an indictment for aiding and abetting a crime it is enough to say that the defendants aided and abetted, without particularizing the acts of aiding or abetting. Cases supra and United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360, 363; United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 138, 141. Mr. Herbert Parker, Mr. Charles C. Milton and Mr. Henry H. Fuller, for defendant in error, submitted: The demurrer to the second count was properly sustained. Section 4 of the Immigration Act of 1907 will not support an indictment for conspiracy under § 5440, Rev. Stat. An offense against the United States which may be the basis for an indictment for conspiracy under § 5440 must be such an offense as will itself support an indictment. United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145, 148; United States v. Payne, 22 Fed. Rep. 426, 427. Although 4 has attempted to define a crime, there has been provided no punishment for such offense within the language of the act itself, other than the penalty recoverable by a judgment in a civil suit. As to the effect of this, see, and also distinguish, United States v. Tsokas, 163 Fed. Rep. 129, 131; United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. Rep. 602; United States v. Kellam, 7 Fed. Rep. 843. The determination of the case of United States v. Stevenson, No. 292, simultaneously argued, must determine this case also, and, if it shall be held that § 4 of the Immigration Act of 1907 sets forth no offense for which an indictment will lie, then the demurrer to the second count must be sustained. MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court. This case was argued and submitted with No. 292, just decided. The indictment herein in its second count charges a conspiracy, under § 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, to commit the offense of assisting alien contract laborers to migrate into the United States, in violation of the statutes of the United States. Inasmuch as the court below had already reached the conclusion, in considering the former case (No. 292, ante), that assisting alien contract laborers was not punishable as a crime by indictment under the Immigration Act, it held that it followed that to conspire to assist such migration was not an offense against the United States within the meaning of § 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. That section provides: "If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty of not less than one thousand dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars, and to imprisonment not more than two years." Inasmuch as we have already held that Congress, in making the assistance of contract laborers into the United States a misdemeanor, has made the same a crime indictable as such under the Immigration Act of 1907, it must necessarily follow that if two or more persons, as is charged in the indictment under consideration, conspire to assist such importation, they do conspire to commit an offense against the United States within the terms of § 5440 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. In this view, applying the principles laid down in the opinion in case No. 292, ante, we think that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the second count of the indictment. Nor does it make any difference that Congress has seen fit to affix a greater punishment to the conspiracy to commit the offense than is denounced against the offense itself; that is a matter to be determined by the legislative body having power to regulate the matter. Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590. Judgment reversed. EVERETT v. EVERETT. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 1. Argued October 22, 1909.-Decided November 29, 1909. Where the fundamental fact in issue in a suit by a wife for separate maintenance is whether there was a marriage, and the court having jurisdiction finds that the wife's petition should not be granted but should be dismissed, the courts of another State must, under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, regard such decree as determining that there was no marriage even though the husband may have asserted other defenses; nor can the wife, in a suit depending solely on the issue of whether there was a marriage, prove by oral Statement of the Case. 215 U.S. testimony, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, that the decree may have rested on any of the other defenses asserted by the husband. 180 N. Y. 452, affirmed. THIS is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York upon the ground that the final order of that court, entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals of New York in this case, failed to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings in a certain action determined in the Probate Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts. The facts out of which this question arose may be thus summarized: The present plaintiff in error, Georgia L. Everett, on or about April 1st, 1897, brought this action in the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York, against the defendant in error, Edward Everett, alleging that she and the defendant were lawfully intermarried in that county before a Justice of the Peace, on the thirtieth day of October, 1884; that under the false pretense that that marriage would never be recognized by his family, and that a ceremonial marriage would have to take place before a Minister of the Gospel, the defendant, on or about December 17th, 1887, fraudulently instituted an action in the same court to have the above marriage annulled; that the plaintiff had a valid defense to such action, but in consequence of fraudulent representations to her by the defendant she made no defense therein, by reason whereof a decree was rendered on or about April 9th, 1888, declaring that the alleged marriage between her and the defendant was null and void; and that they had lived and cohabited together as husband and wife from the date of said marriage down to and including June 1st, 1891. The specific relief asked in this case, brought in 1897, was a judgment that the decree of April 9th, 1888, in the case brought in 1887, be vacated and set aside, and that it be adjudged that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant was binding and in full force and effect. The defendant, by answer, controverted all the material 215 U. S. Statement of the Case. facts alleged in this case relating to the obtaining of the above decree of April 9th, 1888. He set forth various grounds of defense, but none of them raised any question of a Federal nature. He made, however, a separate, special defense herein based upon the record of certain proceedings in the Probate Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts. The allegations of the answer as to those proceedings were substantially these: That on or about February 21st, 1895, the present plaintiff, Georgia L. Everett, brought an action against him in the Probate Court of Suffolk County Massachusetts, claiming to be, as was the defendant, a resident of Boston, and also claiming to be his lawful wife; that he had failed, without just cause, to furnish suitable support for her and had deserted her; that she was living apart from him for justifiable cause; that she prayed that such order be made for her support as the court deemed expedient; that process was duly issued out of the said court and served on this defendant and he duly appeared; that on or about March 21st, 1895, on motion of this defendant, the court ordered the plaintiff to file in that case full specifications as to how, when and where she became the lawful wife of the defendant; that pursuant to that order, on or about April 1st, 1895, the plaintiff filed in the said Probate Court her specifications, wherein she stated that she was married to this defendant on or about October 31st, 1884, in Brooklyn, New York, by John Courtney, Esq., Justice of the Peace, and further that a legal marriage according to the laws of the State of New York was entered into in that State between her and this defendant on or about April 15th, 1888, by mutual consent, consummation, acknowledgment and cohabitation in that State, and that such consent, acknowledgment and cohabitation continued in New York, and also in Massachusetts, from April 15th, 1888 to May 30th, 1891, at which time, she alleged, this defendant deserted her. She also stated in her petition in the Probate Court "that her marriage with this defendant was still-to wit, on April 1, 1895of legal force and effect. Yet defendant deserted her on or |