MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

It appears that the trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that, as to the offense charged, the statute, properly construed, does not include the defendant. The case is, therefore, one which may be brought to this court. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370. But our inquiry is limited to the particular question decided by the court below. Id. 398.

Counsel for defendant invokes what is sometimes known as Lord Tenderden's Rule, that where particular words of description are followed by general terms the latter will be regarded as referring to things of a like class with those particularly described-ejusdem generis. The particular words of description, it is urged, are "owner, importer, consignee, agent." The general term is "other person," and should be read as referring to some one similar to those named, whereas the defendant was not owner, importer, consignee, or agent or of like class with either. He was not making or attempting to make an entry. He represented the Government, and, contrary to his duties, was rendering assistance to the consignee who was making the entry. But, as said in National Bank of Commerce v. Ripley, 161 Missouri, 126, 132, in reference to the rule:

"But this is only a rule of construction to aid us in arriving at the real legislative intent. It is not a cast-iron rule, it does not override all other rules of construction, and it is never applied to defeat the real purpose of the statute, as that purpose may be gathered from the whole instrument. . . . Whilst it is aimed to preserve a meaning for the particular words, it is not intended to render meaningless the general words. Therefore, where the particular words exhaust the class, the general words must be construed as embracing something outside of that class. If the particular words exhaust the genus there is nothing ejusdem generis left, and in such case we must give the general words a meaning

outside of the class indicated by the particular words or we must say that they are meaningless, and thereby sacrifice the general to preserve the particular words. In that case the rule would defeat its own purpose."

See also Gillcock v. The People, 171 Illinois, 307, and the cases cited in the opinion; Winters v. Duluth, 82 Minnesota, 127; Matthews v. Kimball, 70 Arkansas, 451, 462. Now the party who makes an entry, using the term "entry" in its narrower sense, is the owner, importer, consignee or agent, and it must be used in that sense to give any force to the argument of counsel for defendant, but used in that sense the term "other person" becomes surplusage. In § 1 of chap. 76, Laws of 1863, 12 Stat. 738, is found a provision of like character to that in the first part of the section under which this indictment was found, but the language of the description there is "owner, consignee or agent." This was changed by § 12, chap. 391, Laws 1874, 18 Stat. 188, to read "owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person," and that description has been continued in subsequent legislation. Evidently the addition in 1874 of the phrase "other person" was intended to include persons having a different relation to the importation than the owner, importer, consignee or agent. Congress was broadening the scope of the legislation and meaning to reach other persons having something to do in respect to the entry beyond that which was done by the owner, importer, consignee or agent, or else the term "other person" was a meaningless addition. Now the defendant was a person, other than the owner, importer, consignee or agent, by whose act the United States was deprived of a portion of its lawful duties. His act comes within the letter of the statute as well as within its purpose, and the intent of Congress in the legislation is the ultimate matter to be determined.

The fact that he could not be punished in all respects as fully as the owner, in that he had no goods to be forfeited, is immaterial. United States v. Union Supply Company, decided this day, post, p. 50.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

WATERMAN v. THE CANAL-LOUISIANA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, EXECUTOR.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.

No. 306. Submitted February 25, 1909.-Decided November 8, 1909.

The equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts is derived from the Federal Constitution and statutes and is like unto that of the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789; it is not subject to limitations or restraints by state legislation giving jurisdiction to state courts over similar matters.

While Federal courts cannot seize and control property which is in the possession of the state courts and have no jurisdiction of a purely probate character, they can, as courts of chancery, exercise jurisdiction, where proper diversity of citizenship exists, in favor of creditors, legatees, and heirs, to establish their claims and have a proper execution of the trust as to them.

Although complainant in this case asks in some of her prayers for relief which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court as being of a purely probate character if the allegations of the bill support them the court may grant other prayers for relief which are within its jurisdiction, and, as a court of equity, shape its decree according to the equity of the case.

Where the bill does not seek to set aside the probate of a will or interfere with the possession of the probate court, the Federal court of equity, in a case where diverse citizenship exists, may determine as between the parties before the court their interests in the estate and such decree will be binding upon, and may be enforced against, the

executor.

It will be assumed that the state probate court will respect the decree

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Argument for Appellant.

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of the Federal court having jurisdiction settling the rights of parties in an estate, and the denial of effect of such a decree presents a claim of Federal right which can be protected by this court. While a Federal court of equity cannot, either under the forty-seventh rule in equity or general principles of equity, proceed to adjudication in the absence of indispensable parties, if it can do justice to the parties before it without injury to absent persons it will do so and shape the decree so as to preserve the rights of those actually before the court, without prejudice to the rights of the absentees.

In this case the absent party was not of the same State as complainant and had no interest in common with complainant and while a proper, was not an indispensable party, as his interests were separate and could be protected by retention of his legacy by the executors subject to adjudication in another suit.

THE facts, which involved the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. E. Howard M'Caleb, and Mr. E. Howard M'Caleb, Jr., for appellant:

As to the jurisdiction of the Federal court:

Any creditor, heir or legatee who is a citizen of another State has the right to institute his suit in the Federal court against executors and administrators and all other parties interested, who are citizens of the same State as decedent, to determine the validity and extent of his rights and claims in the property of the estate; nor is he deprived of his original right to maintain and to try his suit in the Federal court by his failure to present his claim to the state court as provided by the administration statutes of the State. Here are a few of the authorities: Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Bank v. Vaiden, 18 How. 503; Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 588, 589; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430; Lawrence v. Neilson, 143 U. S. 215, 224; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 570; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73; Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276; Green v. Creighton, 23 How. 90.

To sustain appellees' contention that the state court, hav

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Argument for Appellant.

ing acquired jurisdiction over the succession, is alone competent to entertain and determine every issue which may arise in the progress of the cause, whether it be as to the construction of the will, the rights of heirs and legatees to the estate, and the claims of creditors which may be asserted against it, whether such parties be citizens of other States or not, until the administration is terminated, the funds distributed and the executor discharged, would be to deny the judicial power of the United States conferred by the Constitution as extending over "controversies between citizens of different States and force such citizens into the state courts in order to have their complaints heard. This is answered by Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 347; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679.

Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 89, is claimed to be decisive against the Federal jurisdiction over this bill, but it can be distinguished as in that case the only question was as to the power of the Circuit Court to annul a will admitted to probate. It was held that, where the laws of a State afforded a remedy by contest in proceedings supplementary to the original probate proceedings, such a contest was not inter partes, and hence not within the designation of "a suit at law or in equity." It was further held that, where the construction and effect of the will is wholly subordinate to the sole issue of probate, Federal jurisdiction did not attach under the rule "that no instrument can be effective as a will, no rights in relation to it can arise until preliminary probate has been first made." Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485. But here there is no contest over the existence or non-existence of the will, and such a question is, therefore, a moot one. In Louisiana, an action to set aside a will already admitted to probate is strictly and purely an independent action in nullity between parties. Unlike the Washington statutes, involved in Farrell v. O'Brien, the judgment setting aside the will only binds the parties, inures only to the benefit of the particular contestant, and is not operative as to the whole world. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10. As to