United States of Mexico and of the depositions upon which the warrant was issued, and, as agent of Mexico, to "receive the said Eduardo Ramirez from the proper authorities of the United States of America." We shall not further quote from the papers, as there is no question but that requisition had been duly made for the extradition of Ramirez. The evidence before the district judge consisted of the depositions, together with oral testimony that they would be admissible in evidence in the courts of Mexico, and in addition the ambassador to Mexico and the chargé d'affaires certified that they were "properly and legally authenticated, so as to entitle them to be received for similar purpose by tribunals of Mexico, as required by the act of Congress of August 3, 1882." There is also in the record a paper headed “Statement of the weight of the carloads of wheat imported by Eduardo Ramirez, made by this Federal tribunal by virtue of the data shown in the books of the railroads," and a large number of exhibits.

The district judge committed Ramirez to the custody of the United States marshal for the Territory of Arizona, to abide "the order of the President of the United States of America in the premises." The writ of habeas corpus under review was then issued by the Supreme Court of the Territory and appellee discharged from custody. It was ordered, however, that if an appeal should be taken to this court he should be remanded to the custody of the marshal, to be released upon giving bail in the sum of $25,000, under the provisions of rule 34. Bail was subsequently given and the appellee discharged from custody.

The Supreme Court of the Territory expressed the view that the writ of habeas corpus could not be made to perform the office of a writ of error, and that, therefore, if the district judge had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the accused and the offense charged was within the terms of the treaty of extradition, and there was before him "competent legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment as to whether

the facts are sufficient to establish the criminality of the accused for the purpose of extradition, such decision cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus." The court cited Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, 508, and Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 104. And considering further the extent of a court's power of review over the judgment of the committing magistrate upon the facts, said, "but such court is not to inquire whether the legal evidence of facts before the commissioner was sufficient or insufficient to warrant his conclusion," citing In re Stupp, 12 Blatch. 501; Ornelas v. Ruiz, supra, and Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270. The cases cited establish the propositions expressed by the court, but the learned court's application of them to the facts of this record is challenged. The court expressed the opinion that all of the conditions of commitment were established, except that there "was no competent legal evidence of the fact of forgery itself of the documents in question." That is, that there was no legal evidence of the forgery of what are called in the complaint "railroad wheat certificates" and "tickets" in the depositions of the witnesses. We are unable to agree to this conclusion. They were either forged or issued by mistake, and the supposition of a mistake is precluded by the evidence. The books of the railroad showed the true weights; the mistake or forgery was in the certificates or tickets. Exclude the former and forgery is established. If a mistake was made, it is certainly strange that it should have escaped notice until the Mexican treasury had been defrauded of $11,944.94. Besides, the reparation for a mistake was payment of the amount in default, not by flight from the accusation of forgery and crime. Then, too, ample opportunity was given in Mexico to explain the certificates, but explanation was not attempted. It was not attempted in Arizona, and from these negative circumstances, as well as from the positive testimony of the witnesses, it certainly cannot be said that there was substantially no evidence to justify the judgment of the commissioner that a crime had been committed, and as little can it

be said that there was not probable cause to believe that the accused had committed it. We have set out the evidence somewhat fully. It shows that the Mexican treasury was defrauded by the "House of Ramirez" of $11,944.94, and that appellee was "second chief" of the house and the one to whom C. Ramirez had transferred it. It appears, therefore, that he was the principal, if not the only beneficiary, of the fraud. It is true that Manuel Rosas and Francisco Enriquez, the custom house revisors, stated that they received the "tickets" from Manuel Ramirez; but from the testimony of the latter and other evidence it may be reasonably concluded that accused acted in conjunction with him, in fact, prepared and directed the whole affair. It is certainly not out of the bounds of reason to suppose that he who was benefited by the fraud contrived and executed it, and not his subordinate or employé. It is, however, objected that there is no evidence in the record "tending in any way to prove that any of the alleged certificates were forged or altered or changed by any person whatsoever." Indeed it is asserted by the appellee "that the evidence, so far as it proves or tends to prove anything, proves that the certificates were genuine certificates issued by G. W. Bowman, chief of the station of the Sonora Railroad." To complete these contentions a reference is made to the complaint, in which it is alleged that the certificates, in order to appear authenticated, purported to show that they were signed, sealed or stamped by the railroad, containing the words gross weight, tare, net weight, and initialed with the letters "G. W. B.," and if so worded and initialed would have been so authenticated as to have shown true weight of the wheat in the cars. There is no evidence, it is said, of these allegations, or that it was the duty of the custom house officer to accept any so-called weight certificates as evidence of the true weight of the wheat to be imported. It is probable that the Supreme Court of the Territory yielded to these contentions, and that they were the basis of its decision that there was no legal evidence before the commissioner of "facts tend

ing to prove the commission of the offense charged, to wit, the crime of forgery,

We, however, cannot concur in these contentions, and, without going over the evidence to show a precise or technical adaptation of it to the allegations, it is enough to say that we think the evidence shows not only that a crime was committed, but shows its character and by whom committed with sufficient certainty and strength to satisfy the statute and to justify the order of the commissioner committing the accused to await the action of the executive department.

It is further contended that the statements of Rosas and Enriquez were unsworn to, and because unsworn to were not admissible in evidence; that "under the common law and the law of Arizona the unsworn statement of no witness is competent upon a preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate," and would not justify a commitment for trial in Arizona. It is hence contended that it was not sufficient to justify the extradition of the appellee. In re Egita, 63 Fed. Rep. 972; In re McPhun, 30 Fed. Rep. 57; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 457, are adduced to sustain the contention. The answer to the contention is that the statute providing for extradition makes the depositions receivable in evidence and provides that their sufficiency to establish the crime shall be such as to create a probability of the commission by the accused of the crime charged against him. This is the principle announced by the cases cited by the appellee. Other contentions are made but we do not think that they need special mention.

Order reversed and the cause remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error and Appellant. 215 U.S.

TIGLAO v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

ERROR TO AND APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

No. 37. Argued November 1, 1909. Decided January 3, 1910.

Writ of error and not appeal is the proper method to bring up to this court a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a case affecting title to land in Court of Land Registration. Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U. S. 449.

In this case the grant involved was made without authority by subordinate officials, was void ab initio, and conveyed no title to the original grantee or those holding under him.

A man cannot take advantage of his ignorance of the law, and where all that is done to give him a title is insufficient on its face, the grantee is chargeable with knowledge, does not hold in good faith, and in such a case prescription does not run from the date of the instrument under which he claims.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Aldis B. Browne, Mr. Alexander Britton, Mr. J. H. Blount and Mr. Evans Browne for plaintiff in error and appellant:

The concession of 1873 made by the Municipal Board of Mabalacat did transmit to plaintiff in error's grantor certain rights. Book 4, Title 12, Law 1 of the compilation of Spanish Colonial Laws printed in 1828 in House Doc. No. 121, 20th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 38; see also 3 Philippines, 540; Law 8, Book 4, Title 12, Laws of the Indies permitting applications for land grants in townships where there is a court. As to occupation ripening into title, see Solicitor General's brief in Cariño Case, 212 U. S. 449.