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decree under the principles of general law; and if, as in this case,
it does not involve passing on the nature and character of the
rights of the parties arising from the transaction of purchase and
sale, no Federal question is involved. Kenney v. Craven, 125.
See JURISDICTION;

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 15.

FIRE DAMAGE.

See ADMIRALTY, 1.

FOLLOWED CASES.

See CASES FOLLOWED.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

See PROCESS.

FOREIGN EXTRADITION.

See EXTRADITION, 5-8.

FORGERY.

See EXTRADITION, 7.

FRANCHISES.

Delay in completing work under statutory permission; effect of injunction

as excuse.

The fact that for a time work was enjoined at the instance of the
Government does not excuse the delay in completing work under
statutory permission within the time prescribed where the delay
exceeds the limit after deducting all the time for which the in-
junction was in force. Rio Grande Dam &c. Co. v. United States,
266.

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FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 7;
JUDGMENTS AND Decrees, 1.

GRANTS.

See LAND GRANTS;

PUBLIC LANDS, 3, 4, 5.

HABEAS CORPUS.

See EXTRADITION, 4.

HAWAII.

See CONTRACTS, 6.

HEPBURN ACT.

See COMMERCE, 4.

HOMESTEADS.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 2, 4.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

IGNORANCE OF LAW.

See LAND GRANTS, 2.

IMMIGRATION.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2;
STATUTES, A 4.

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 4;

CONTRACTS, 1;

CORPORATIONS, 1.

IMPERTINENT MATTER.

See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 18.

IMPORTS.

See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 2, 3.

INDIANS.

1. Choctaw-Effect of patent issued in pursuance of Treaty of Dancing
Rabbit Creek of September 27, 1830–Individual rights.

The grant in letters patent, issued in pursuance of the treaty of Dancing

Rabbit Creek of September 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, conveying the
tract described to the Choctaw Indians in fee simple to them and
their descendants to inure to them while they should exist as a
nation and live thereon, was a grant to the Choctaw Nation, to
be administered by it as such; it did not create a trust for the
individuals then comprising the nation and their respective
descendants in whom as tenants in common the legal title would
merge with the equitable title on dissolution of the nation. Flem-
ing v. McCurtain, 56.

2. Allottee; jurisdiction of United States over.

Although an Indian may be made a citizen of the United States

and of the State in which the reservation for his tribe is located,
the United States may still retain jurisdiction over him for
offenses committed within the limits of the reservation; and
so held as to a crime committed by an Indian against another
Indian on the Tulalip Indian Reservation in Washington, not-
withstanding the Indians had received allotments under the
treaties with the Omahas of March 16, 1834, and of Point Elliott
of January 22, 1835. Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488, distinguished,
the Indian in that case being an allottee under the general allot-
ment act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat. 388. United States
v. Celestine, 278.

3. Jurisdiction of United States over-Interest of Indians considered in
construction of Federal statutes.

Legislation of Congress is to be construed in the interest of the Indians;
and, in the absence of a subjection in terms of the individual
Indian to state laws and denial of further jurisdiction over him
by the United States, a statute will not be construed as a re-
nunciation of jurisdiction by the United States of crimes com-
mitted by Indians against Indians on Indian reservations. Ib.
4. Citizenship; suggestion by Congress in act of May 8, 1906.
The act of May 8, 1906, c. 2348, 34 Stat. 182, extending the trust
period of allottees under the act of 1887, suggests that Congress
believed it had been hasty in its prior action in granting citizen-
ship to Indians. Ib.

5. Jurisdiction over offenses committed on reservations.
United States v. Celestine, ante, p. 278, followed, as to continuance
of jurisdiction of United States over offenses committed within
the limits of an Indian reservation. United States v. Sutton, 291.
6. Introduction of liquor in Indian country; power of Congress to pro-
hibit and punish.

The Indians, as wards of the Government, are the beneficiaries of

the prohibition against the introduction of liquor into Indian
country; and, under the Washington enabling act, jurisdiction
and control over Indian lands remains in the United States, and
Congress has power to prohibit and punish the introduction of
liquor therein. Ib.

7. Reservations; limits not affected by allotments in severalty.
The limits of an Indian reservation are not changed by allotments
in severalty during the trust period, and, where the lands allotted
are subject to restrictions against alienation and to defeasance,
the prohibition against liquor continues to be effective. Ib.

INJUNCTION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5;

EQUITY, 1;

FRANCHISES.

INSOLVENCY.

See NATIONAL BANKS.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.

Omission in statutory definition of duress held not reversible error.
Stating only part of a statutory definition of duress in the charge
to the jury held not reversible error, it not appearing that the
defendant was hurt thereby. Snyder v. Rosenbaum, 261.

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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

1. Order of Commission; setting aside; power to make and not wisdom
the test of validity.

In determining whether an order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission shall be suspended or set aside, power to make-and not
the wisdom of the order is the test and this court must con-
sider all relevant questions of constitutional power or right, all
pertinent questions as to whether the administrative order is
within the scope of the delegated authority under which it pur-

ports to be made, and also whether even if in form it is within
such delegated authority it is not so in substance because so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to render it invalid. Interstate
Com. Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 452.

2. Instruments of interstate commerce under control of.

The equipment of an interstate railroad, including cars for trans-
portation of its own fuel are instruments of interstate commerce
and subject to control of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. Ib.

3. Power to consider question of distribution of coal cars.
The act to regulate commerce has delegated to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission authority to consider, where complaint is
made on that subject, the question of distribution of coal cars,
including the carrier's own fuel cars, in times of car shortage,
as a means of prohibiting unjust preference or undue discrimina-
tion. Ib.

4. Power to make arrangements for distribution of coal cars to shippers.
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company,

ante, p. 452, followed as to power under the act to regulate com-
merce of the Commission to make reasonable arrangements for
the distribution of coal cars to shippers, including cars for trans-
portation of fuel purchased by the railroad company for its own
Interstate Com. Com. v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 479.

use.

5. Power to require railroad to take into account its own fuel cars in
making distribution.

It is not beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to require a railroad in distributing its coal cars to take into
account its own fuel cars in order not to create a preference of
the mine to which such cars are assigned over other mines.
Interstate Com. Com. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 452.

6. Power to deal with preferential and discriminatory regulations of
carriers.

Under § 15 of the act to regulate commerce as amended June 29, 1906,
c. 3591, 34 Stat. 585, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
power to deal with preferential and discriminatory regulations
of carriers as well as with rates. Ib.

7. Instrumentalities of commerce within control of.

Even if commerce in regard to the purchase of coal at a mine on a
railroad line by the railroad company which supplies its own

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