disposing of land under a submission by the parties, is not the act of the law, and that such act is void if the submission be not in writing.1 Johns. (N. Y.) 520; Jackson v. Bull, 2 Caines, (N. Y.) 301; Robinson v. Garth, 6 Ala. R. 204; Ennis v. Waller, 3 Black. (Ind.) 472; Evans v. Ashley, 8 Missouri R. 177; Alexander v. Mury, 9 Ib. 510. 1 Gratz v. Gratz, 4 Rawle, (Pa.) 411. DECLARATIONS OF TRUSTS, AS AFFECTED BY THE 7TH, 8TH, AND 9TH SECTIONS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. SECTION 7. All declarations or creations of trusts or confidences, of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect. SECTION 8. Provided always, that where any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements, by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law, or be transferred or extinguished by an act or operation of law, then, and in every such case, such trust or confidence shall be of the like force and effect as the same would have been if this statute had not been made; anything herein before contained to the contrary notwithstanding. SECTION 9. All grants or assignments of any trust or confidence, shall likewise be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same, or by such last will or devise, or else shall likewise be utterly void and of none effect. CHAPTER VI. TRUSTS IMPLIED BY LAW. § 79. It seems to be essential to our obtaining a clear understanding of the policy and spirit of this part of the Statute of Frauds, which concerns the proof of trusts in real estate, that we first of all compare it with other sections in which the subject of title in real estate is treated; namely, the fourth, which forbids an action upon any verbal contract for the sale of lands, and the first and third, which generally forbid the creation or transfer in præsenti of an estate in lands. § 80. The States of Kentucky and Virginia, while substantially reënacting the fourth section, have altogether omitted the seventh from their legislation. In the first of these States, where an agreement was made between two parties, that one of them should make a purchase of land for the joint benefit of both, and one made the purchase, and it was then agreed that the other should advance half the money and be equally interested in the purchase, it was argued that, in order to carry the transaction into effect, it should be considered as a trust, and not as a contract for a sale of half the land, because, in the latter view, the fourth section would prevent any remedy upon it. The court said: "If the trust is considered as created by the agreement of the parties, if it does not come within the letter, the liberality of construction which is alone calculated to prevent the mischief to be prevented by the statute emphatically requires that it should be brought within the influence of the statute. Then, after remarking that a trust arising by implication of law from existing facts and circumstances is always excepted from the operation of the statute, the court add: "1 "It is evident that the trust in the present case, if it can be so denominated, is one created by contract, and consequently within the statute. The same court, upon another occasion, where land had been conveyed by one party to another in trust for the grantor, and upon an agreement that the grantee should recon⚫vey to any one to whom the grantor might afterwards sell, treated the transaction as a contract for land, and, there being no written evidence of the arrangement, denied relief in equity on the ground of the statute. Here was apparently a clear case of trust, to which the court applied the section which in terms extends to mere contracts for the purchase or sale of land. In Virginia, on the other hand, where the statute stands in the same way, the seventh section being omitted and the fourth retained, it has been said, (in a case, however, where the point was not directly presented,) that the latter would not apply to a trust created verbally, which would accordingly be good in that State; and the court based its opinion on the simple fact of the legislature's omission of the trust section and retention of the other, as conclusive of their design to allow a trust to be proved without writing; adverting also to the circumstance that in England it was thought necessary to enact the seventh section expressly providing for trusts, although the fourth section of the statute of Charles contained larger language than the corresponding section of the Virginia statute, namely, that the former included contracts for "any interest in or concerning land," words which were wanting in the latter. 8 § 81. In Pennsylvania, no part of the English statute is reenacted except the first three sections, which relate to the actual conveyance of lands; and the courts of that State have made a distinction between cases where the grantor at the time of the conveyance verbally declares the trust, and cases where 1 Parker v. Bodley, 4 Bibb, 102. 2 Chiles v. Woodson, 2 Bibb, 72. 3 Bank of the U. S. v. Carrington, 7 Leigh, 266. |