Miscon apprentice. and the plaintiff of the other part, the said C. H. L. put himself apprentice to the plaintiff to learn his trade of a blacksmith for the term of three years; and the defendant covenanted that the said C. H. L. should diligently serve the plaintiff, and that he should not absent himself from the service of the plaintiff without the plaintiff's consent during the said term. 2. The said C. H. L. has not, during the said term, diligently served the plaintiff, but has unlawfully absented himself, and still absents himself, from the service of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims £50. Defence and Counter-claim. 1. While the said C. H. L. was faithfully serving the plaintiff, duct of an the said plaintiff not only threatened to do him grievous bodily harm, but actually assaulted him and inflicted personal injury upon him, and the said C. H. L. fearing, and having good and Master may moderately chastise his apprentice. in his book on "Master and Servant," (3rd ed. 110), has suggested that The When at the time the indenture of apprenticeship was signed the defendant's business was a partnership carried on in London but subsequently the partnership was dissolved, and two of the defendants continued the same class of business at Derby, and their partners remained in London, it was held by the Court of Appeal (1) that the apprentice was not bound to obey a command to go to Derby, because there is an implied stipulation that the contract of apprenticeship is to be performed at the place where the business was carried on when the indenture was signed; and (2) that as the business in its entirety was not carried on by the defendants who went to Derby, they were not the successors of the original firm, and therefore not entitled to the apprentice's obedience. (Eaton v. Western, 9 Q. B. D. 636.) But when an apprentice is part of his master's family there is authority that he is bound to follow the latter to any part of England, though not abroad. (Coventry v. Windal, 1 Browl. 67.) As to the powers of justices to settle disputes between masters and apprentices, and cancel indentures of apprenticeship, see 38 & 39 Vic. c. 90, ss. 5 to 7. reasonable cause for such fear, that if he remained longer in the service of the said plaintiff grievous bodily harm would be inflicted upon him, left the said service before the expiry of the term for which he was apprenticed, which is the grievance complained of. Counter-claim. And by way of counter-claim the defendant says :— 1. By the indenture referred to in the statement of claim, the said plaintiff covenanted with the said defendant, that he would teach and instruct the said C. H. L. in the trade of a blacksmith during the said term. 2. Before the happening of the events set out in the second paragraph of the plaintiff's statement of claim, the said plaintiff neglected to teach and instruct the said C. H. L. in the trade of a blacksmith aforesaid, to the loss and injury of the defendant. The defendant claims : £50 damages for the plaintiff's breach of his covenant. Counterclaim for neglecting to teach the apprentice. Arbitration. See Award. Architect (a). Claim against an Architect for withholding his Certificate, and alternatively against the Employer. 1. In June, 1880, the defendant A. C. was the architect of the defendant J. B., in connection with the building of a mansion house for the said J. B. at Hounslow. (a) An architect employed to determine questions between a builder Liability of and employer may be sued for neglecting to perform the functions he an archihas undertaken to perform. (See Kimberley v. Dick, L. R. 13 Eq. 1; tect. 41 L. J. Ch. 38; 25 L. T. 476; 20 W. R. 49.) It has been held that if the employer induce the architect fraudulently to withhold his certificate the employer is liable to be sued for inducing the architect to act 2. The defendant A. C. with the view of earning his commission as such architect, induced the plaintiff to tender for the mason's work in the said building for a sum of £1000 and as the architect of the defendant J. B., and by the authority of the said J. B., he accepted the plaintiff's tender, and orally agreed with the plaintiff that, as soon as the work was done in a sound and workmanlike manner, he would certify his satisfaction, so as to enable the plaintiff to recover the price thereof from the said J. B. 3. The plaintiff duly executed the said work in a sound and workmanlike manner, but the defendant A. C., in collusion with the defendant J. B., and in fraud of the plaintiff, refused, and still refuses, to certify his satisfaction with the same, and the plaintiff has not yet been paid the said sum of £1000. The plaintiff claims :- £1000 from the defendant J. B. or in the alternative from the defendant A. C. the sum of £1000 by way of damages. Definitions of assault and battery. Assault and Battery (a). 1. Statement of Claim for an Assault. 1. The plaintiff has suffered damage from personal injuries to the plaintiff, caused by the defendant assaulting him on the 1st of May, 1882, and beating him about the head and shoulders. Particulars of expenses :— Mr. Jones, surgeon The plaintiff claims £100. £20 0 0 in this manner. (Batterbury v. Vyse, 32 L. J. Ex. 177.) And so where the architect, having agreed with the plaintiff to give his certificate when the work was completed, fraudulently withheld it, in collusion with the employer, it was held the former was liable in damages. (Ladbrooke v. Barrett, 46 L. J. C. P. 798; 36 L. T. 616; 25 W. R. 649.) He cannot, however, be held liable for mere errors of judgment in the discharge of his duty of adjudicating. (Kimberley v. Dick, supra.) (a) An assault has been defined as "an attempt to do a corporal injury to another, coupled with a present ability, or any act or gesture from which an intention to commit a battery may be implied" (Read v. 2. Statement of Claim for an Assault, Trespass, and Trover combined. 1. On the 3rd of June, 1881, the defendant broke and entered the plaintiff's premises, No. 60, George Street, Strand, in the county of Middlesex, and unlawfully trespassed therein. Coker, L. J. 22 C. P. 201); so riding after a person and obliging him to run away to avoid being beaten is an assault; so lifting a stick and threatening to strike another with it if you are so near to that other that you can put your threat into execution if you choose. A battery, which always includes an assault, is, however, something more than an assault. It is the actual doing an injury, be it ever so small, in an angry or revengeful or rude or insolent manner, as by spitting in a man's face, or violently jostling him out of the way. (B. N. P. 15.) It is essential both to an assault and a battery that the act complained of should be done against the will of the person assaulted. Hence a touch or stroke in jest, where the parties are jesting with each other and taking liberties by mutual consent, is no assault; so touching a friend to engage his attention is no assault (Coward v. Baddeley, L. J. 28 Ex. 260); but it is not essential to an assault that it should be wilful. A negligent act is just as actionable as a wilful one, although no doubt in the result the measure of damages awarded by the jury would be very different. A wife, after being divorced from her husband, cannot sue him for an assault committed upon her during coverture. (Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. D. 436; 45 L. J. Q. B. 277 ; 34 L. T. 177 ; 24 W. R. 345.) A negligent act may be an assault. Justifications of an assault. The defences that have been set up and sustained to actions for assault are somewhat numerous :-1. From what has been already said as to an assault excluding consent, it follows that a plea that the assault was committed by the leave and licence of the plaintiff is a good answer. (Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 473, 477; Latter v. Braddell, 50 L. J. C. P. 166.) 2. Again, a plea that the injury was unavoidable, the result entirely of a superior agency, and the conduct of the defendant free from fault, has been sustained. (Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38.) 3. A defence that the plaintiff made the first assault, and that the defendant's battery was in self-defence, is a good answer. This defence was called Selfson assault demesne; and it has been decided with reference to it that it defence. is not every assault that will justify every battery, and that it is a matter of evidence whether the assault was proportionable to the battery. Thus, if A. strikes B., B. cannot justify drawing his sword and cutting off B.'s hand. 4. Another defence is that the defendant was possessed of a Assault in house, that the plaintiff without his licence entered and disturbed him, defence of whereupon he requested the plaintiff to depart, and on refusal gently a man's laid hands on him to turn him out. This plea refers merely to the case house. of one who trespasses without violence in the house of another; in the case of one making a forcible entry, the plea is different. 5. If the plaintiff enters forcibly into the defendant's house, the latter may resist force by force without any previous request to depart. 6. Where the plaintiff wrongfully holds possession of land against the will of the freeholder, who assaults him while endeavouring to regain possession, no action will lie. (Harvey v. Bridges, 14 M. & W. 437. See also Blades v. Higgs, L. J. 30 C. P. 347.) 7. Where the action is brought in respect Moderate of an assault committed upon a youth, it is a good answer that the chastiseassault complained of was moderate and reasonable chastisement in ment. flicted by a parent or a schoolmaster, or in the case of an apprentice by the lad's master (see ante, p. 132). 8. Constables and those acting in Constables the execution of warrants may justify necessary assaults committed by executing them in the execution of their duty. Provided the warrant under which warrants. 2. On the same occasion the defendant struck and assaulted the plaintiff, and seized a certain piano, belonging to the plaintiff, then in his said house, and removed it from the said premises, and converted it to his own use. The plaintiff claims : (1) A return of the said piano, or £50, its value. (2) £100 damages for the said trespass, and the said assault. Defence. 1. The defendant did not break and enter the plaintiff's said premises, as alleged, or at all. On the day named he quietly and peacefully entered the same, under the express leave and licence of the plaintiff. 2. The said piano, which the defendant seized, was the property of the defendant. they act is not void on its face, and does not issue from a court without jurisdiction, they are protected by such warrant, even though it be afterwards set aside for some irregularity; but when the warrant is set aside, those who put the law in motion, as the client or solicitor, would probably be liable for the acts of the constables. 9. Assault is one of those cases where the party aggrieved has an alternative remedy. He can seek redress either in the civil courts or in a criminal court; but he canWhere case not have both remedies. Therefore it is a good answer to an action for has been assault that the defendant was summoned by the plaintiff before a determined magistrate for the same assault, and that the magistrate heard the case by justices. and either dismissed it or inflicted a penalty upon the defendant which the latter has endured, and that he "forthwith " gave a certificate of his having heard and disposed of the case. (See the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 45.) On this statute it has been decided that a person who has been convicted of a common assault on a married woman, and who has paid the whole amount adjudged to be paid, may rely on the protection given by it as a bar to an action against him by the husband for the loss he, as such husband, has sustained by the assault on his wife. (Masper v. Brown, 45 L. J. Com. P. 203; 1 C. P. D. 97; 34 L. T. 254; 24 W. R. 369; Holden v. King, 35 L. T. 479; 25 W. R. 62; 46 L. J. Ex. L. 75.) Statute of 10. A plea of the Statute of Limitations is of course good, the one point Limitation. to be noticed about this defence in connection with this form of action being that the plaintiff's remedy is barred, not after six, but after four years. 11. It was once thought, and so decided, that where the assault complained of turned out to be a felony for which the defendant had not been prosecuted, the defendant might avail himself_of_this, and the to a felony. plaintiff must be nonsuited (Wellock v. Constantine, L. J. 32 Ex. 285; 2 H. & C. 146); but this view was declared to be erroneous in the more recent case of Wells v. Abrahams (L. R. 7 Q. B. 554; 26 L. T. 433; 20 W. R. 659; 41 L. J. Q. B. 306); and, since In re Shepherd, ex parte Ball (48 L. J. Bank. 57; 10 Ch. D. 667; 40 L. T. 141; 27 W. R. 563), and Roope v. D'Avigdor (10 Q. B. D. 412), it must be taken to be quite discredited. Where assault amounts |