Defence. That the Defendant's Creditors accepted a Composition, which has been paid. The defendant says: 1. On the 24th of May, 1883, the defendant compounded with his creditors, under the 126th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. 2. The defendant has duly paid the amount of the said composition to the plaintiff [or to H. B., by the composition resolutions appointed to receive and distribute the said composition]. 3. The plaintiff's name and address, and the amount of his debt, were duly stated in the defendant's statement of affairs. The plaintiff says that: Reply. (1) He denies that the defendant paid the amount of the composition to him [or to the trustee H. B.], although the time appointed by the composition resolutions elapsed before the commencement of this action. (2) As to the 3rd paragraph he joins issue. Defence. That the Defendant's Affairs were liquidated by Arrangement. The defendant says: 1. The defendant was discharged under a liquidation by arrangement, pursuant to the 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. 2. The debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27. Bills of Exchange (a). Drawer of a Bill of Exchange against Acceptor. The plaintiff's claim is against the defendant as acceptor of a bill of exchange for £500, dated September 5, 1883, drawn by the plaintiff, payable three months after date. Particulars :- Amount due £500 0 0 10 0 0 £510 0 0 Actions on bills. When defence allowed. (a) In actions upon bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques, the writ of summons may, at the option of the plaintiff, be specially endorsed under R. S. C. Order III. r. 6. The summary practice under the Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, is no longer in use. It is usual to endorse the writ specially, as the plaintiff is thereby enabled to apply for summary judgment under Order XIV. r. 1. Thereupon the defendant will not be allowed to defend the action unless he satisfy the judge at chambers that he has a good defence to the action. But the Court is disinclined to shut out the defendant's defence unless it is palpably bad, and, except between immediate parties, it is common practice to allow the defendant unconditional leave to defend when he says: "I was cheated out of the bill, and I suspect the plaintiff did not give value for the bill. Let me cross-examine him before a jury." A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer. The law regarding bills of exchange has been codified by the statute 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, which see. A bill may be accepted (sect. 18): (1) before it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise incomplete; (2) when it is overdue, or after it has been dishonoured by a previous refusal to accept, or by non-payment; (3) when a bill payable after sight is dishonoured by non-acceptance, and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to have bill accepted as of the date of first presentment to the drawee for acceptance. The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer (s. 17). An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following conditions, namely: (a) It must be written on the bill, and be signed by the drawee. The mere signature of the drawee, without additional words, is sufficient. (b) It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money. An acceptance (sect. 19) may be partial, conditional, or local. But a holder is not bound as against previous parties to take a conditional acceptance (Petit v. Benson, Comb. 452); but if the acceptance was in Conditional fact conditional, it will not support the allegation of an absolute acceptacceptance. ance though the condition has been performed. (Langston v. Corney, 4 Campb. 176; Swan v. Cox, 1 Marsh. 176.) If, however, the drawee has accepted on condition of an extension of time for payment, the Payee of two Bills of Exchange against Acceptor upon the Bill, and also the Consideration. 1. On May 15, 1883, an account was stated and settled between the plaintiff and defendant, and it was thereby agreed holder may sue as on a bill accepted payable at the postponed date. (Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B. 891.) There may be an acceptance of a Effect of bill before it is filled in, and an acceptance of a blank bill is an autho- acceptance rity (sect. 20) to fill it up with any sum covered by the stamp (Armfield of blank v. Allport, L. J. 27 Ex. 42; Garrard v. Lewis, 10 Q. B. Div. 30); and bill. such acceptance binds the person signing to an innocent holder for value though the bill may have been issued improperly, or after a lapse of twelve years (Montagu v. Perkins, L. J. 22 C. P. 187), and in such a case the Statute of Limitations is no defence. (S. C.) A person who negligently issued a paper stamped with a bill stamp and signed by him, without intending it to be filled up as a bill, was held not liable to a subsequent bonâ fide holder for value. (Baxendale v. Bennet, 3 Q. B. Div. 525; 47 L. J. Q. B. 624; questioning Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, Ingham v. Primrose, 28 L. J. C. P. 294.) A bill of exchange drawn generally may be accepted in either of the following ways, viz., either generally, or payable at a particular place, or at a particular place and not elsewhere. If the drawee accepts generally he undertakes to pay the bill at maturity when presented to him. If he accepts payable at a banker's, he undertakes to pay the bill at maturity when presented either to himself or at the banker's. If he accepts payable at a banker's and not elsewhere, he contracts to pay the bill at maturity provided it is presented at the banker's, but not otherwise. (Halstead v. Skelton, 5 Q. B. 86 & 93.) It follows from this that it is only when the acceptor has made the bill payable at a particular banker's and not elsewhere, that in an action against him it is necessary to aver in the statement of claim and prove at the trial a presentment for payment at the place named. (Fayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531.) In the case of a general acceptance, or even an acceptance payable on demand at a particular banker's, in an action against the acceptor, it is not necessary to aver and prove a presentment for payment; and it has even been held that if the holder neglects to present, and the bankers at whose house the bill is made payable generally fail with money of the acceptor in their hands, the acceptor is not thereby discharged. (Turner v. Hayden, 4 B. & C. 1; Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461.) Three forms of acceptance, and effect of each. ners. One partner in a trading partnership can bind his fellow partners Acceptance by accepting a bill in the name of the firm; but the implied power of by partone partner to bind the others by his acceptance, or for the matter of that, by his indorsement of bills, does not extend to partnerships other than for trading purposes, such as a firm of solicitors. (Hedley v. Bainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316; Forster v. Mackreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 163.) It has been held that where one partner accepts a bill intending to bind the partnership, it is necessary that he should have accepted in the name of the firm, so that the name of the firm appears on the face of the bill. An action cannot be maintained against the firm where one partner signs his own name only although the proceeds are in reality applied to partnership purposes (Nicholson v. Ricketts, L. J. 29 Q. B. 55), for no person whose name or the name of whose firm does not appear on the bill, can be made liable on it. (Sect. 23 of the Act of 1882.) (Beckam v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79, 92, 96; Miles' Claim, L. R. 9 Ch. 635; 43 L. J. Ch. 732; 31 L. T. 9; 22 W. R. 809.) The firm will be liable on the bill that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of £400 on the balance of accounts for goods consigned by the plaintiff to the defendant as the plaintiff's agent for sale. 2. On the same day the defendant agreed to pay interest on the said sum of £400, at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum, if three months' time for payment were given him. 3. On May 15, the defendant accepted a bill of exchange for £405 drawn by the plaintiff and payable to the plaintiff's order three months after date. Particulars :- £405 20 £425 Where partner accepts in his own name, firm not liable. Directors of jointstock, mining, and railway companies have no power to accept bills. Acceptance by agents. The plaintiff claims £425, and interest on £405 at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum until payment or judgment. (that is, where it is accepted by a partner in their name apparently for partnership purposes), although the proceeds were not in fact applied to partnership purposes, and were never intended by the partner accepting the bill to be so applied, provided always the plaintiff was not a party to this fraud; but the unexplained fact that a partnership security has been received from one of the partners in discharge of a separate claim against him, is a badge of fraud, or of such palpable negligence as amounts to fraud, which it is incumbent on the party who takes the security to remove by showing either that the party from whom he received it acted with the authority of the rest of his partners, or that he himself had good reason to believe so. (Leverson v. Lane, 13 C. B. N. S. 278; L. J. 32 C. P. 10; Heilbut v. Neville, L. R. 4 C. P. 354; affirm, in Ex. Ch. L. R. 5 C. P. 478; 39 L. J. C. P. 245; 22 L. T. 662; 18 W. R. 898; Hogarth v. Latham, 3 Q. B. Div. 643; 47 L. J. Q. B. 339; 39 L. T. 75; 26 W. R. 388.) There is no implied authority in a director of a joint-stock company, not being a trading partnership, to accept bills on the part of the company (Brumah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963); nor is there any such authority in the directors of a mining company to bind the shareholders by making notes or accepting bills. (Dickinson v. Valpy, 10 B. & C. 128.) A railway company incorporated in the usual manner cannot draw, accept, or indorse bills (Bateman v. Mid-Wales Railway Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 499); nor has a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1862, this power, unless it is given by the memorandum and articles of association. (Peruvian Railway Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 2 Ch. 617.) An agent accepting a bill must be careful to make the fact of his agency appear on the face of the bill, for the law is that an agent will be personally liable to third persons by drawing, indorsing, or accepting in his own name, unless he unequivocally show on the face of the writing that he signs only in a ministerial capacity. (See Thomas v. Bishop, 2 Str. 955; Owen v. Van Oster, 10 C. B. 318; Mare v. Charles, 25 L. J. Q. B. 119.) Where an agent acting within his authority accepts a bill Indorsee against Acceptor and Drawer (b). The plaintiff's claim is against the defendant A. B. as acceptor, and against the defendant C. D. as drawer of a bill of exchange for £1000 dated 1st of January, 1883, payable three months after date, and indorsed by the defendant C. D. to the plaintiff, of the dishonour of which on presentation the defendant C. D. had notice. for his principal, the latter is of course bound; but a person may be bound though he has not himself accepted, nor has his agent done so for him, for if the drawee accredit the bill by acknowledging the handwriting of the acceptance to be his, before the plaintiff took it, he cannot afterwards exonerate himself by showing that the acceptance was forged. (Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp. 226; Mackenzie v. British Linen Co., 6 App. Cas. 82.) What necessary to constitute title by endorsement. (b) The plaintiff's title to sue consists in this, that some holder of the bill has indorsed it to him, and then delivered to him the bill with intent to transfer the property. (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 31.) The intention to transfer the property in the bill is essential, for the defendant may, if he can, show that the bill was never delivered to the plaintiff as indorsee, but only as agent for another (Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & E. 455), or that it had been delivered to the plaintiff, on a condition which had not been complied with. (Bell v. Ingestre, 12 Q. B. 317.) In the form given above there is only one indorser and one indorsee, the plaintiff; but it constantly happens in practice that on a bill there are several indorsers and several indorsecs; and this being so, the question frequently arises whether in the statement of claim it is necessary to set out the fact of all the indorsements one after another. Previously to How enthe Judicature Acts the rule was that where the first indorsement was dorsement made in blank, the bill became payable to bearer, and the holder might pleaded then state an indorsement from the payee to himself directly, though where inthere were intermediate special indorsements (Walker v. Macdonald, termediate 2 Exch. 527); and there is nothing in the new practice to alter the law transfers. on this point. Where, however, the first indorsement is not in blank, but is a special indorsement, it will be necessary to aver an indorsement by the first indorsee, and so on until either an indorsement in blank by some indorser is obtained, or an indorsement direct to the plaintiff; otherwise there would be a flaw in the plaintiff's title to sue on the bill. (c) In the absence of agreement, bills of exchange and promissory Interest on notes carry interest; but there is an important distinction, as to the time bills. from which the payment of interest runs, between the cases where a bill or note is expressly made payable with interest and the cases where the liability to pay arises by implication of law. The distinction is this, where the bill or note is expressly made payable with interest, it is payable from the date of the note, as in the above form (Richards v. Richards, 2 B. & Ad. 447); but where the instrument is silent as to |