Carrier not liable as such for safety of goods after construc. tive delivery. Measure of damage where goods lost or destroyed. Measure of damage where goods delayed. When value of contract lost by negligence of carrier can be recovered. 2. The defendants deny that they failed to deliver the said cod in a reasonable time, and they further deny that when it was delivered it had become stale and valueless. 397.) Though the consignor directs goods to be delivered at a particular place, the carrier may deliver them at another place agreed on between him and the consignee. (London & North-Western Rail. Co. v. Bartlett, 31 L. J. Ex. 92; and Cork Distilleries Co. v. Great Southern & Western Rail. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 269.) It was, however, intimated in the last case that if there had been a special contract between the consignor and the carrier, it would have been different. If the carrier delivers at the place directed in accordance with the ordinary usage, he is not liable, though he delivers them to a person the consignor did not name. (McKean v. McIvor, L. R. 6 Ex. 36.) Where there has been a delivery, actual or constructive, though the goods remain on the carrier's premises, he is no longer liable as a carrier, but only as a warehouseman, or on any special terms he may think proper to impose on the customer, and the contract is not affected by any of the statutes relating to carriers. (Shepherd v. Bristol & Exeter Rail. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 189; Chapman v. The Great Western Rail. Co., 5 Q. B. Div. 278; 49 L. J. Q. B. 420.) If at the consignee's address there is a refusal to accept them, the carrier becomes an involuntary bailee of them, and is only bound to act with reasonable care with reference to their custody. (Heugh v. London & North-Western Rail. Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 51.) And if such refusal is authorised by the consignee, the carrier may recover from him the expenses reasonably incurred in taking care of the goods. (Great Northern Rail. Co. v Swaffeld, L. R. 9 Ex. 132.) Measure of damages.]—The plaintiff is entitled where goods are lost or destroyed to recover their market value at the place and time at which they ought to have been delivered, as distinguished from that at which they were delivered to the carrier; if there is no market for the sale of such goods at that place, the jury must ascertain their value by taking their price at the place of manufacture, together with the cost of carriage, and allowing a reasonable sum for importer's profits. (Rice v. Barendale, 30 L. J. Ex. 371 (H. of L.); O'Hanlan v. Great Western Rail. Co., 34 L. J. Q. B. 154.) In cases of delay in the transmission, the plaintiff may recover the difference between the market price of goods on the day when they ought to have been delivered, and the price when they were available for sale owing to delay and damage caused by the defendants. (Collard V. South-Eastern Rail. Co., 7 H. & N. 79; 30 L. J. Ex. 393.) Where owing to the delay of a month in the delivery of cloth which the plaintiff wanted immediately to make into caps, he lost the season, it was held that he could not recover the loss of profits he would have made on the caps, but that he could recover the amount of depreciation in the value of the cloth on account of the lapse of the season. (Wilson v. Lancashire Rail. Co., 30 L. J. C. P. 232; and see Great Western Rail. Co. v. Redmayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329.) Notice of prospective profit or loss.]-It is necessary to enable a consignor to recover for the loss of a beneficial sub-contract or other calculated source of profit, that the carrier should have notice of the special terms of such contract or source of profit at the time the goods are delivered to him for carriage (Horne v. Midland Rail. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 583, affirmed Ex. Ch. L. R. 8 C. P. 131), and semble a mere notice of a sub-contract will not be sufficient unless so given as to make it a term in the contract with the carrier that the latter will on breach be liable for loss of contract. (Ibid. 139, 141, 145.) The same rule holds with regard to other losses from missing reasonably anticipated sources of profit, as Reply. 1. The plaintiff joins issue upon the defence. 2. As to the 1st paragraph of the defence, the plaintiff says damage cannot be recovered. Remote for instance the loss of the hire of goods sent for hire. (Hales v. London the party to sue.— Exceptions. Who entitled to sue.]-The person in whom the property was vested Consignee when it was lost or damaged is the person entitled to sue. As the de- generally livery of goods to the carrier usually vests the property therein in the consignee, the latter is the person who generally speaking can sue. (Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 Cl. & F. 600.) But where there is a special contract between consignor and carrier, or the property has not vested in the consignee, as where goods are sent on approval, the consignor should sue. (Ib.; Drain v. Shepherd, 1 M. & Rob. 223.) If, however, there is a contract between the consignee and carrier, under which the former is liable for freight, he may sue, (Mead v. South-Eastern Rail. Co., 18 W. R. 735.) A special property of the sender in a thing lost enables him to sue. Special (Freeman v. Birch, 3 Q. B. 492, n.) Where separate property of two property persons is sent in one box or parcel by a joint agent of both they may entitles join in an action for the loss. (Metcalf v. London & Brighton Rail. Co., sender to 27 L. J. C. P. 333.) If a master pays for his servant's ticket, and the sue. luggage of the latter is lost or injured, the servant may sue for the loss or injury in his own name, the tort being independent of contract. (Martin v. Great Indian Peninsular Rail, Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 9; Austin v. Great Western Rail. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 442.) See post as to injury to person by negligence of carriers. Acts or default of consignor.]—If the plaintiff has not properly packed Consignor's goods that are brittle and they are broken or injured he cannot recover own default from the carrier if the latter has used due care. It has been thought that contributwhere the foundation of the action is negligence and non-performance ing to loss. of duty, so as to be founded on tort rather than on contract, it would be a defence that the loss was owing to the plaintiff's own default. (Burrows v. March Gas Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 67.) Where it was proved that the defendant's cart was unfit to carry the plaintiff's goods and that they were improperly packed, evidence would be admissible to show that the plaintiff himself packed them and represented them as under their real weight, thus causing the defendant to put them in a cart which was too slight or small for them. (Webb v. Page, 6 M. & G. 196.) Fraud.]-If the consignor fraudulently concealed the value and risk Fraudulent concealment of risk. Shipowners and master of ship liable as insurers. How this liability is restricted. Limited with respect to accidental fires on shipboard and robbery of certain articles. Shipowner not liable beyond so much a ton of the ship's tonnage. Neither shipowner nor master liable for further that he will contend that if any such contract was made the same was bad in law as being unreasonable. from the carrier in order to be charged at a lower rate for carriage, he cannot recover on account of a loss occasioned through such concealment. (M' Cance v. Landon & North-Western Rail. Co., 31 L. J. Ex. 65.) If a person intentionally makes false answers to the carrier's inquiries, the contract is void on account of fraud. (Walker v. Jackson, 10 M. & W. 188, 189.) It was formerly necessary to plead such a defence specially; now it is equally essential to set forth the defence with sufficient explicitness. COMMON CARRIERS BY SEA.]—The owners of a general ship and the master were liable at Common Law as common carriers, that is to say, they were bound to redeliver the goods delivered into their charge, the act of God and the Queen's enemies only excepted. But this extensive liability is limited (1) By the bill of lading which the master gives to the consignor of the goods and which evidences the contract between the parties; and (2) by the operation of several statutes. It is usual for the bill of lading to contain an exception from liability for "accidents or damage of the seas;" but this exception does not protect the shipowner or the master from liability for loss or damage caused by the negligence of the crew. (Grill v. General Iron Screw Colliery Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 476, Ex. Ch.) So an exception for “breakage, leakage, or damage," does not protect the shipowners from liability for damage accruing through the negligence of their servants. (Martin v. Great Indian Peninsular Rail. Co., L. R. 3 Ex. 9; Czech v. General Steam Navigation Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 14.) But it is said that the effect of such exceptions is to shift the onus of proof, and oblige the plaintiff to prove affirmatively the negligence of the defendant's servants. (The Helene, B. & L. 429, P. C.; L. J. 35 P. C. 63.) Coming next to the statutory limitations of the shipowner's liability, there is the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, by which it is provided (sect. 503) that no owner (it must be noted nothing is said about the master, and he does not seem to get the benefit of this statute) of any sea-going ship shall be liable to make good to any extent whatever any loss or damage that may happen without his actual fault or privity of or to goods or things taken on board by reason of fire happening on board, or of or to any gold, silver, diamonds, watches, jewels, or precious stones on board by reason of robbery or embezzlement, unless the shipper shall at the time of shipping the same have inserted in his bill of lading, or otherwise have declared in writing to the master or shipowner their true nature and value. It will be noted that this statute protects a shipowner entirely for loss by fire not occasioned by his personal default occurring to goods generally; but that the exemption for liability resulting from robbery of goods is strictly confined to certain classes of valuables specified in the Act. The next statute is the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 65, which by its 54th section enacts that the owners (no mention of the master) of any ship, whether British or foreign, shall not in cases which occur without their fault or privity be answerable in damages in respect of loss or damage to any goods, merchandise or other things on board, to an amount exceeding £8 for each ton of the ship's tonnage: but it has been decided that the section does not extend to protect the shipowner for damage caused by delay. (London & South-Western Rail. Co. v. James, L. R. 8 Ch. 241.) A third statutory exemption is found in the 388th section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, which provides that neither owner nor master is liable for loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of a qualified pilot, where the employment of one is compulsory. Except, however, 2. Action by Consignee for Value of Goods not delivered. 1. On the 1st of November, 1879, three trunks containing wearing apparel were received by the defendants at Plymouth, as common carriers, consigned to the plaintiff at Birmingham. Liability of carrier of passengers in cases coming within one or other of these exceptions, or where the default of bill of lading limits the liability of the shipowner and master of a pilot. general ship, the latter are both liable to the consignor or consignee of the goods as insurers of the same, and bound to deliver safely unless the loss is occasioned by the act of God or the Queen's enemies. CARRIERS OF PERSONS-ACTIONS AGAINST.]-The liability of passenger carriers is more limited than that of carriers of goods. They are not insurers of the persons of the passengers, and are only liable for want of due care. (Readhead v. Midland Rail, Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 379, Ex. Ch. 38 L. J. Q. B. 169; 2 B. & S. 519.) They are not liable for accidents caused by hidden defects in their carriages which could not be detected by ordinary care and skill previous to the happening of the accident. (Readhead v. Midland Rail. Co., supra.) But they are liable for defects in their carriages caused by the negligence of their sub-contractors. (Frances v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 184; and Ex. Ch. Ibid. 501.) If a railway company issues a ticket for a journey extending beyond its own line, that is evidence of a contract to carry over the other line as well as their own, and their liability to the passengers in such cases is not affected if the injury is caused on the line not belonging to them. (Buxton v. North-Eastern Rail. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 549; Thomas v. Rhymney Rail. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 226; S. C., Ex. Ch. L. R. 6 Q. B. 266.) And in Foulkes v. The Metropolitan District Rail. Co. (5 C. P. D. 157; 49 L. J. C. P. 361), it was decided that where the ticket is taken at the station of A railway, and the accident happens on B railway, the latter, apart from any question of breach of contract, is liable in tort. To the same effect is Hooper v. London & North-Western Rail. Co. (50 L. J. C. P. 103). A railway company is not liable for the wrongful act of third persons over whom they have no control. (Wright v. Midland Rail. Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 137.) less than that of carrier of goods. Liability of carriers of passengers. Issuing ticket evidence of contract to carry The issuing of a ticket for a journey from one place to another is evidence of a contract to convey the passenger within a reasonable time on such journey, but not that the train shall arrive at the time expected. (Hurst v. Great Western Rail. Co., 34 L. J. C. P. 264.) Railway companies are liable to any person who has taken a ticket for a train advertised in their time-bills to run at a particular time if it does not run within (Denton v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 25 L. J. Q. B. 129), or there is not reasonable room in it for such person. (Great Northern Rail. Co. v. Hawcroft, 21 time. L. J. Q. B. 178.) Where railway companies stipulate in their timetables, &c., that they will not be responsible for delays in arrival or departure of trains, they will still be liable for unreasonable delays, though they are not liable in case of reasonable delay. (Prevost v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., 13 L. T. N. S. 20.) Where passengers are carried at their own risk (as in the case of cattle drovers holding a free pass with such a stipulation), the carrier is not liable for injuries through negligence, either on the transit or on the company's premises, in consequence of their being in a dangerous condition. (Gallin v. The London & North Western Rail. Co., 44 L. J. Q. B. 80.) A similar contract with one company protects another company over whose lines the passenger is carried for injuries caused through the negligence of the latter on their line. Where pas senger is carried by a free pass. carrier for 2. The defendants have not delivered the said trunks to the plaintiff or any of them. Liability of The question of the extent of a common carrier's liability for the luggage of passengers is one on which there is great conflict among the passenger's authorities. At one time it has been suggested that a common carrier luggage. has the liability of an insurer for the luggage of passengers, and at another time that he has no greater responsibility for the passenger's luggage than for the passenger himself. (See Richards v. London & Brighton Rail. Co., 7 C. B. 839; 28 L. J. C. P. 281; Butcher v. London & South-Western Rail. Co., 16 C. B. 13; 24 L. J. C. P. 137; Tally v. The Great Western Rail. Co., 40 L. J. C. P. 9; L. R. 6 C. P. 44; Le Conteur v. London & South-Western Rail. Co., 35 L. J. Q. B. 40; L. R. 1 Q. B. 54.) All the cases were reviewed in Bergheim v. The Great Eastern Rail. Co. (3 C. P. D. 221 ; 47 L. J. C. P. 318), and the Court of Appeal suggested the distinction that while a carrier may be liable as an insurer for luggage which is taken charge of entirely by the defendants, as where luggage is placed in a van, they are certainly not insurers of that portion of a passenger's luggage which is, at his request or with his consent, placed in the same carriage in which he travels or is about to travel. In such a case they are only liable when it can be shown that their negligence has brought about the loss. Where passenger takes merchandise as personal luggage. What damages a passenger may re Personal luggage means the class of articles which are ordinarily or usually carried by passengers as their luggage. (Hudston v. Midland Rail. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 366; Macrow v. Great Western Rail. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612.) See decisions on questions whether certain things were personal luggage, Macrow v. Great Western Rail. Co., supra ; Phelps v. London & North-Western Rail. Co., 34 L. J. C. P. 259; Mytton v. Midland Rail. Co., 4 H. & N. 615; 28 L. J. Ex. 385; Becher v. Great Eastern Rail. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 241. If a passenger who knows he is only entitled to take personal luggage takes merchandise, he is not entitled to recover for its loss from a railway company to whom he has given no notice of the contents of the package. (Cahill v. London & North-Western Rail. Co., 31 L. J. C. P. 271; Belfast & Ballymena Rail. Co. v. Keys, 9 H. L. Cas. 556.) The fact of a package being marked "Glass" is not sufficient notice to a company that the contents are merchandise within the meaning of the foregoing proposisitions. (Ib.) Measure of damages.]-If in consequence of the wrongful delay or erroneous information of a carrier, a passenger is obliged to hire another conveyance or to stop a night on his journey, he can recover his expenses, but he is not entitled to general damages for the derangement or loss of cover from business, trouble, or inconvenience caused to him. (Great Northern the carrier. Rail. Co. v. Hawcroft, 21 L. J. Q. B. 178; Denton v. Great Northern Rail. Co., 25 L. J. Q. B. 129; Woodger v. Great Western Rail. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 318.) Where a railway company instead of conveying the plaintiff to the station to which she had booked turned her out on a wet night at a station where she could get no accommodation or conveyance, and in consequence she had to walk a distance of four miles to her home, whereby she took a cold and was laid up, and incurred expense in getting cured, and was hindered in her business, she was held entitled to recover damages for the inconvenience suffered in consequence of being obliged to walk home, but not for the other consequences just mentioned, they being regarded as too remote. (Hobbs v. London & South-Western Rail. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111.) But as to this case, see McMahon v. Field (7 Q. B. Div. 591; 50 L. J. Q. B. 552; 45 L. T. 381), in which it was adversely commented on by the Court of Appeal. With regard to personal injuries or death of a passenger caused by the |